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PREFACE1 
Competing for the Future 
Sheila Lawlor* 
As Brussels begins its trade talks with the UK, it seems intent on fighting the last war, not the next.  In 
particular it demands that the UK must align with EU level playing field laws for an EU-UK trade deal.  
Having failed to keep the UK in its bloc, it hopes to bind sections of this country’s economy to its 
jurisdiction, subverting economic independence and restricting their performance.  For the EU, the UK 
is ‘a competitor on the doorstep’, and the competitive edge must be knocked off the rival economy, 
through the system it has perfected of command and control.i 
This preface will touch on the wider context of such differences and the approach of each model, the 
EU’s and the UK’s.  It will explain that the EU’s way of doing things is incompatible with and 
antipathetic to the UK’s, and that the case, constitutional, economic and political, for separate laws, is 
overwhelming, especially for financial services, the subject of the analysis and proposals for future trade 
which follow. 
A tale of two economies – the EU economy v the UK economyii 
The EU’s predecessors, going back to the first European Coal and Steel Community, reflected the 
thinking of its French co-founder.  France had developed a centrally directed, protected and controlled 
economic system, perfected over three centuries to serve the political, economic and military aims of 
the Hexagon’s rulers.  It was inevitable that the project of Robert Schuman in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, which aimed to bind the renascent German economy with its coal fields and steel plants and draw 
a line under three German invasions since the 1870s, would follow such a system.  The cooperative 
joint venture led by France aimed to rehabilitate Germany into the family of Europe’s western nations 
– at that stage France, the Benelux countries and Italy - by binding its economic and military power into 
a controlled system. 
For France, the EU was and remains a defining project of post-war governments.  Each generation of 
French leaders inherited the plan, and today, with 27 member states, for the two founder powers the 
imperative remains consolidation and survival.  Other aspects of the economic model are inevitably 
reflected in its protégé project: a model in which the state historically picked winners, favoured sectors, 
swallowed up or drove out smaller challengers and competitors, while national giants, often with a 
degree of state ownership, came to dominate. 
The system is underwritten by, and has developed under, an ever more extensive and expansive system 
of law, which seems to reach into every nook and cranny of economic action under the jurisdiction of 
the EU Court of Justice.  The legal framework developed in line with the project to promote and protect 
political and economic integration, with a ‘more is best’ approach, to legislate for and anticipate every 
eventuality with EU law and the Court underwriting the workings of the economy, though sometimes 
with derogation or neglect of the rules.  
By contrast, Britain’s economy, by and large, is based on encouraging competition, entrepreneurship, 
incentive and markets under the wider context of protecting liberty under the law.  Unlike the EU 
regime, the UK system is essentially a permissive system.  Everything is permitted that is not expressly 
prohibited by law.  Activities are legal unless otherwise ordered.  This is the common law.  There is a 
sparing attitude to the use of laws, an attitude of ‘less being better’ because it can be more effective – 
informed, targeted with clear aims;  efficient because it is informed and obeyed; and in the hands of an 
                                                     
* Sheila Lawlor is the Director of Politeia. 
i Angela Merkel’s response to the UK election result, 13 December 2019. 
ii For further discussion of these points, see my Now or Never. Countering the Coup against Britain’s Democracy (2019).  
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intellectually able, extremely knowledgeable and competitive, legal profession and the supervision of a 
politically independent, incorruptible and experienced judiciary. 
The EU’s demands and the trade talks 
Now, in the UK-EU battle over whose laws govern future trade, the EU demands that the UK align with 
EU ‘level playing field’ laws, and will, almost certainly, seek to insist on the primacy of EU jurisdiction 
for other sectors.  Competition is the problem for the bloc, because its economy, as explained, is founded 
on a system of centralised control which owes much to the model designated by its co-founding French 
fathers.  It is therefore hardly surprising that the first reaction of the bloc to the competitive potential of 
post-Brexit Britain is to control it.  To Brussels and its French overlords, the Anglo-Saxon economy 
seems like one giant and hostile ‘gig’ economy – competitive, flexible, with challengers jostling to take 
their place. But it is not only an anathema, it is feared as a threat to the economic and political cohesion 
of the fragile bloc, a threat to the controlled arrangements imperative for the bloc’s very survival.   
Michel Barnier, the EU’s Brexit negotiator and former French minister, whose distinguished career in 
Paris was exchanged for one in Brussels, will therefore play his cards for a trade deal that clips the 
wings of ‘the competitor at the door’ (by rule alignment). 
He may dangle in exchange the prospect of replacing the Northern Ireland Protocol, which keeps 
Northern Ireland in the EU Customs Union (as well as in the UK’s internal union), with such a trade 
deal.  Or he may deploy its potential for Brussels in the future to exert some control over UK-wide 
economic policy on state aid, an uncertain course given the likely UK legal challenge.  He could, with 
greater confidence and the support of the French President, Emmanuel Macron, use the tactic of 
financial sector trade.  
Emmanuel Macron will call many of the shots.  His aims are more ambitious than control and command.  
While he too wants to tie the UK economy into EU law, he also has other plans, for the realisation of 
which he recognises the value of an ally like Britain, of Anglo-French common interests with a historic 
friendship and peace time alliance, and of Britain as a potential ally and friend as he pursues the EU 
leadership on which he is intent after Angela Merkel bows out, and seeks to promote France’s global 
role in a revitalised project.  Macron is clever enough to recognise he has met his match in Boris 
Johnson.  He may consider some trade-offs in the talks, juxtaposing his wish list as the EU’s next leader 
and that to lead France on the world stage. 
But for now the focus will be on beating down the British as rivals, rather than allies.  Michel Barnier 
will promote French and EU interests by seeking to retain the EU’s ultimate control over the UK’s 
environmental and labour standards and state aid; he will aim to strengthen his hand by demanding UK 
financial businesses trading with the EU do so under EU law or management, linking a deal on those 
terms to demands for fishing and other rights and the right deal for financial services trade.  
Although Barnier envisaged as long ago as 10 July 2018 that EU-UK financial services trade could be 
on the basis of equivalence, the EU will not concede at this stage the enhanced equivalence the UK 
proposes, an agreement to cover the fuller range of activities on a permanent or time-fixed basis.  As 
matters stand, EU equivalence regimes tend to cover some financial activities, but not, for example, 
basic banking, and they lack certainty because Brussels can end access with thirty days’ notice.  Brussels 
now suggests the EU should have the upper hand, determining which UK sectors are equivalent, and 
for its own regulators to supervise UK rule alignment to those in the bloc.  It refuses a period of 
permanence; and it appears hostile to independent dispute resolution and neutral arbitration, and 
opposes ‘common’ management, even were the UK to be interested in that.  Speaking to the European 
Parliament in Strasbourg on 11 February, M. Barnier said ‘There will be no general, global, permanent 
equivalence’ with Britain, adding that the EU will maintain control of this and would decide alone 
whether to grant or withdraw equivalences; and also ‘There will be no common management.’iii 
                                                     
iii  Reported by Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/britain-eu-commission-barnier-idUSB5N27Y03J 
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Whether, however, these tactics will hold, is another matter.  Barnier’s clock is ticking.  It will be for 
the EU to meet the UK on UK ground and to do so rapidly, for the transition, as Boris Johnson's deadline 
ends on New Year’s Eve.  The price must now be paid by the EU for having overplayed its hand by 
imposing its hated ‘May’ deal and Theresa May’s fall.  That price is a new British leader, with a country 
and parliament rejuvenated and a rallying cry that would do Henry Vth proud. 
The UK position 
The UK has now left the EU and, when this year’s transition ends, it will end EU law and jurisdiction.  
Boris Johnson, who in July 2019 became Prime Minister, set out the new UK position for the then EU 
Council President, Donald Tusk, the following month.  The UK’s laws would potentially diverge from 
the EU’s: that, he reminded Tusk, was ‘the point of Brexit’.   
Johnson had inherited an anarchic Parliament that had, contrary to the 2016 referendum decision, 
obstructed and prevented the UK leaving the EU.  This is not the place to outline the political and 
constitutional chaos orchestrated by adherents of ‘remain’ in the wake of the leave vote, as they sought 
to obstruct the democratic decision of the majority.  But it set the scene for Johnson’s historic victory 
on 12 December to take back control, backed by the electorate who voted to despatch the most autocratic 
Parliament in decades, returning Johnson to power on a pledge to end EU law after the transition.  
Sovereignty will be fully restored after the transition, control of law-making will be returned to 
Westminster, and, with it, the accountability of parliament to the people, in whose name the UK’s laws 
will be made.  
When the electorate voted in December, it underlined its commitment to that goal by returning Johnson 
with an 80-seat majority.  The electors, no less than the Prime Minister, understood that with political 
and constitutional freedom goes economic freedom.  There could be no alignment with EU ‘level 
playing field’ laws, on labour market and environmental standards and state aid, for these would be 
under UK law and subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts of this country.   
There are overwhelming constitutional and political reasons for the UK to refuse the EU's demands.  
There are also economic reasons for the economies to diverge given the very different nature of each.  
When the UK starts formal trade talks, there will therefore be no surprises to add to Boris Johnson’s 
public statements since becoming Prime Minister about the UK's aims and his government’s policy.  
These make clear that after the transition EU law will end and the UK proposes a Canada plus trade 
deal, with zero tariffs and quotas.  As for Canada, there will be no UK ‘rule alignment’ to EU ‘level 
playing field’ laws and no subjection of the UK or its economy to EU law.  Moreover, though the UK 
will start life after the transition with identical laws to the EU, these laws may potentially diverge.  That 
policy is supported by the country, by Parliament and by the Cabinet.  The EU should therefore 
concentrate on the future, to secure the deal that will work best for both parties.  
The financial services sector 
For the financial services sector, there are especially strong reasons to insist on such a course, as the 
authors of this volume will explain. Barnabas Reynolds, whose proposal in 2016 for an Enhanced 
Equivalence agreement to replace the passport became the basis for the UK government’s policy, 
explains the Eurozone’s legal underpinnings for the sector and their shortcomings.  The international 
Basel Rules, designed to protect the financial system from systemic risk, have been circumvented, with 
member states’ borrowings not being backed by normal sovereign powers to meet their liability.  He 
and his co-authors, David Blake and Robert Lyddon, consider and explain a worrying spiral of over-
indebtedness and inadequate collateral, and warn of the grave threat this poses of systemic risk affecting 
the UK and global system, businesses, savers and investors.  Whereas the UK has helped to manage the 
risk by applying its own controls to the businesses it regulates, after the transition much will depend on 
whose laws govern the sector’s trade. 
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The first step must be for the Eurozone to follow the Basel Rules and for member states to adopt joint-
and-several liability for each other’s debts.  But ultimately, the UK, with the US, will be responsible for 
stopping contagion from spreading to the world’s system.  It can only do so under its own laws.  For 
that reason, it must insist on future financial services trade being on an Enhanced Equivalence basis 
with UK trade under UK law.  If the EU refuses, the UK must ensure that UK-based firms or their 
subsidiaries avoid meaningful exposures to unmanaged Eurozone risk, so as to prevent this country 
being embroiled in its potentially systemic contaminations. 
Not only is London a leading global financial centre, rivalled only by New York.  It also continues to 
develop as a global hub for business and investment from the world over, a magnet for capital, liquidity 
and expertise.  The diversity of professional knowledge and experience developed over generations in 
a range of services, the certainties of English law, the stability of the UK's democratic system and the 
independence of its judiciary, all strengthen the attractions of London as a secure place to invest, seek 
advice and conduct business.  If anything, these attractions will increase when the UK is free to make 
its own laws and potentially to diverge from the often ineffective, untargeted and bureaucratic EU 
regime which is unsuited to the nimble entrepreneurial businesses that have made London a byword for 
success. 
Sheila Lawlor, 
Director, Politeia 
24 February 2020 
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Controlling Eurozone Risk by Law* 
 
The bonds issued by the 19 European Union member states of the Eurozone present a major risk to the 
global financial market.  And this risk will become significantly greater after 31 December 2020 unless 
some very major actions are taken ‒ either in cooperation with the EU or, if that cooperation is not 
forthcoming, by the UK and other global financial centres such as the US.  
These remarks will come as a big surprise to many people.  After all, Eurozone members operate in the 
financial market in the same way as other participants, making loans and borrowing money through 
issuing debt, generally in the form of bonds held by banks and other investors worldwide.  However, 
Eurozone national central banks (NCBs) differ from other state central banks in a critical way.  They 
are dependent on the European Central Bank (ECB) for the currency required to cover their country's 
individual debts.  These countries cannot authorise their own central banks to issue currency (i.e., "print 
money") in the way that genuine sovereign states do. 
Thus, the debt of Eurozone member states is not riskless sovereign debt.  The problem is that EU 
regulatory procedures ‒ that dictate regulatory capital and collateral requirements throughout the entire 
Eurozone financial system ‒ ignore this reality and consider risky member state debt as akin to riskless 
sovereign debt.  Furthermore, EU rules prevent joint-and-several liability amongst Eurozone member 
states and the ECB.  This leads to a major risk that, should any one significant Eurozone member state 
default on its borrowings, all the other member states are implicated by connection, and the 
consequences could spread outside the Eurozone through a domino effect to the global financial system 
itself.  We witnessed how unmanaged financial risk, arising principally from Californian sub-prime 
loans, triggered the global financial crisis in 2007-8. 
Global markets have been willing to take the risk of continuing to deal with Eurozone member states 
largely because they have confidence that a significant amount of Eurozone risk is de facto mitigated 
by the UK within EU law.  This is because the UK, while it is an EU member, can supervise much of 
the EU banking system by imposing discretionary capital charges, monitoring systemic risk, and 
applying capital buffer charges to each bank incorporated in London.  These actions have at least since 
the 1970s helped to protect the international system from the risk of contagion arising from a financial 
meltdown in Europe. 
Unfortunately, the UK's protection of the global market from Eurozone risk will disappear after the UK 
leaves the EU legal and regulatory framework at the end of 2020.  This is because the EU requires non-
EU financial firms wishing to continue doing business in the EU to establish a physical presence there, 
operating under EU law and supervision.  The level of inherent EU risk will then expand in lockstep 
with the volume of business of these companies, while the UK's ability to mitigate, let alone manage, 
the risks from London will diminish.  The chances of a small spark in a minor Eurozone bank setting 
off a meltdown reaching the whole global system will be correspondingly increased. 
Consequently, this paper argues that taking action to deal with the future of the EU banking system is 
urgent and essential both to the EU's future and to the safety of the global financial market.  The analysis 
of the nature of the risk confronting the global financial system and how this risk can be managed is 
explained as follows: 
• Inadequacies of the EU's current monetary, fiscal and political architecture have created huge 
financial and economic risks, extending well beyond the EU's geographical borders. 
                                                     
*  We are grateful to Sheila Lawlor and Edgar Miller for their comments on this section. 
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• While UK regulation has been able to mitigate this risk, following Brexit it no longer will be possible 
to do and internal EU solutions have not been forthcoming. 
• The concept of Enhanced Equivalence would enable the EU to deal with the relevant structural 
banking and financial problems the EU faces, and would assist the UK in continuing to protect the 
global financial system from Eurozone financial risk. 
• If the EU does not agree to Enhanced Equivalence, regulators in the UK and other global financial 
centres, such as the US, will need to control this unmanaged risk jointly. 
A detailed Technical Analysis follows (pages 18-133), but these four issues will now be discussed in 
sequence. 
 
I. EU STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES HAVE CREATED HUGE FINANCIAL RISK FOR 
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
The global Basel Rules on regulatory capital, first adopted in 1988, have evolved to protect the financial 
system from the risks arising from increasingly complex and varied markets.  Whilst non-binding, the 
Rules are implemented in broad terms by signatory states.  They require banks to issue loss-absorbing 
capital in the form of equity and subordinated debt that can be written down to cover any (reasonably 
foreseeable) losses as they arise.   
The Rules have two main elements for the determination of bank capital levels: (1) a non-discretionary 
element (Pillar 1), and (2) a discretionary element applied by a bank's regulators (Pillar 2).  They also 
govern the use of collateral, as well as the holding of sufficient liquid assets to cover firms' exposures.  
In addition, the Rules require institutions to issue additional capital to cover exposures arising between 
individual firms, thereby protecting the system as a whole.  
Sovereign Debt:  Foundation of the Global Financial Regulatory System 
Sovereign-quality debt is held by many financial institutions for investment, collateral and liquidity 
purposes, in part because of its unique riskless characteristic.  Debt in the domestic currency of a 
sovereign issuer is treated under Pillar 1 of the Basel Rules (the non-discretionary element) as risk-free.   
This is because the sovereign country has powers available to it that ensure it need never default – i.e., 
the sovereign country is able to instruct its central bank to print more money to repay its debts.  If 
sovereign debt is issued in a foreign currency (e.g., Argentine government debt denominated in US 
dollars), it is considered as having some risk (generally considered low-level) because of the foreign 
exchange risk. 
Accordingly, under Basel Rules, sovereign debt is given the highest credit rating of any form of debt 
and is not required to be matched by loss-absorbing capital.  Other forms of debt are risk-weighted 
under Basel Rules and such holdings must be matched by a certain proportion of loss-absorbing capital.  
The same concept applies to collateral, whereby debt is normally given a discount or "haircut" according 
to how much risk it is seen to contain – but sovereign bonds can be taken as collateral without any 
haircut.  In addition, sovereign bonds are treated as the most liquid form of asset, capable of being sold 
for full value at any time and therefore relied upon by financial institutions in their cash flows and as a 
ready source of cash. 
Consequently, sovereign debt has become a key foundation of the global financial regulatory system 
under Basel Rules and is widely held.  Even firms that do not hold sovereign debt themselves tend to 
be exposed to it indirectly through their dealings with other institutions across the financial system. 
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Eurozone member state debt is not sovereign 
Eurozone member states2 fund themselves through the issuance of debt in addition to levying taxes.  
Their debt is widely held.  However, a particular problem arises with regard to Eurozone issuers of 
government debt.   
Crucially, the Eurozone's 19 member states cannot individually control the ECB upon which they 
depend for their currency.  The legal construction of the Eurozone splits sovereignty amongst the issuer 
of its currency, the ECB, and the member states.  Member states, individually, have no power to control 
the ECB, so lack one of the defining features of sovereignty, namely the ability to control further 
issuances of their currency. 
The result is that no member state is fully sovereign with regard to repaying its debts.  Nor is there joint-
or-several liability amongst the 19 Eurozone members.  Therefore, because each member state would 
need the agreement of all the others for the ECB to print more euros, each state relies on its domestic 
tax base to pay for its expenditure or repay its debts, a reliance that can falter in times of financial and 
economic crisis.  Should there be such a crisis, the individual states as well as the financial markets 
would be left dependent on a hoped-for collaboration between what are, in fact, disconnected entities.  
Any such collaboration is far from a foregone conclusion ‒ as Germany, in particular, has made clear.   
This means, unlike normal sovereign countries, Eurozone member states are at permanent risk of 
defaulting on their borrowings and cannot raise debt finance as if they were sovereign.  The justification 
for treating their debts as risk-free does not apply. 
EU Regulation ignores Basel Rules by treating member state debt as sovereign 
A proper application of the Basel Rules must take into account the underlying legal structures.  It is 
ultimately those structures that underpin where liabilities actually fall.  The EU legal structures do not 
oblige Eurozone member states to stand together behind each other's debts, thereby preserving the 
balance sheets of financial institutions through member states' collective guarantee and collective 
control over the ECB. 
Furthermore, within the EU, the Basel Rules are not properly applied.  In particular, EU regulatory rules 
applicable to financial institutions treat member state euro debts as debts in a sovereign currency 
controlled by each individual Eurozone member state.  Member state debt is treated the same as debt 
from OECD countries that have full control over the printing of their own currency (such as UK Gilts 
and US Treasuries) as if the member state debt represented top-quality collateral.   
In fact, in the context of Basel Rules, Eurozone member state debt is "sub-sovereign", akin to debt 
issued by public sector entities (e.g., municipal bonds in the US).  Such entities sit immediately below 
a sovereign.  On the other hand, Eurozone member state debt is of higher quality than a typical corporate 
bond, in as much as member states have tax-raising and limited fund-raising powers.  But, in law, EU 
member state debt is not sovereign debt. 
The EU's false elevation of sub-sovereign instruments to sovereign status has wider implications, as 
shown below.  Each level of debt issuer below the sovereign is treated one level higher than it should 
be in the true hierarchy of creditworthiness.  Thus, the EU gives undue stature to its public sector entities 
and other member state-connected debt issuers on the presumption that those entities and issuers have 
sovereign backing.  Moreover, the same flawed EU approach applies at the level of many individual 
Eurozone bank and corporate issuers, on the basis that the risks of those institutions depend, in part, on 
                                                     
2 19 of the 27 current EU member states are in the Eurozone:  Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia Slovenia and Spain.  
Denmark has opted out, as had the UK before it left the EU.  Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania and Sweden are not in the Eurozone. 
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the creditworthiness of the sovereign under which they sit.  The notion is that their access to emergency 
funding can turn on the ability of their home member state to provide that funding. 
Figure 1 makes clear there is no actual sovereign debt, as contemplated in the Basel Rules, at the apex 
of the Euro system debt pyramid.  Thus, an entire risk-free tranche of debt is missing from the system, 
creating additional risk that is not normally present in the currency zone of a unitary or federal state. 
Figure 1:  Comparison of the Creditworthiness Hierarchy in the UK and the Eurozone – No Actual 
Sovereign at Apex of Euro-Pyramid 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The inherent contradictions in this structure can be seen from the fact that independent credit rating 
agencies simultaneously assign relatively high risk ratings (for an OECD member government) to 
certain EU member state debt, while at the same time accepting that, for regulatory purposes, banks 
assign zero risk to the same debt.  Thus, for example, the debts of Italy and Portugal are both rated by 
Standard & Poor/Moody as BBB/Baa3, Cyprus is rated BBB-/Baa2 and Greece is rated BB-/B1.  In 
contrast, if this debt were to be rated as true sovereign debt, it would need to have a rating of AAA–
AA- in Standard & Poor's (S&P's) system and Aaa–Aa3 in the Moody's system. 
Systemic under-capitalisation/under-collateralistion/illiquidity creates huge global risk 
The gap between the reality and the EU's misrepresentation represents a huge source of unmanaged risk 
as Eurozone member state government debt enters the EU and global financial system. 
It might be argued that at least some (sophisticated) investors holding such debt would be aware of this 
reality and, consequently, would have taken it into account in their overall investment portfolio risk 
considerations.  If so, this might suggest that market mechanisms deal effectively with the problem.  
However, such an argument does not take into account the way exposure to EU sub-sovereign debt is 
spread opaquely throughout the Eurozone financial system. 
This EU regulatory misrepresentation of all Eurozone debt (i.e., treating individual countries as 
sovereign when they do not have sovereign status) extends well beyond the primary holders of Eurozone 
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bonds and has created a systemic problem throughout all of the EU's financial sector and financial 
institutions.  The effects are many: 
• Under-capitalisation across financial sectors.  This misrepresentation applies across several sectors 
of the EU's financial market – e.g., it applies to the regulatory capital requirements for insurance 
companies and the EU has considered extending it to EU pension funds. 
• Collateral and liquidity.  EU debt at every level in the debt hierarchy is used by the Eurosystem as 
collateral for which it is given a value as security, which in each case is one level higher in the 
hierarchy than it should be.  Instead of the collateral being subject to a haircut, reflecting its true 
risk, it is given a haircut as though it were one level less risky than it actually is.  In addition, EU 
banks are allowed to hold these same lines of bonds for liquidity purposes, with haircuts that are 
again too low. 
• Eurozone institutions – the ECB, the EIB, the ESM.  The same issue affects the EU institutions that 
sit above the "sovereign" countries – the "supra-sovereigns" – namely the EU itself, the ECB, the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).  Each is backed 
by the same member state sovereign obligations that are not genuine sovereign obligations, meaning 
that the supra-sovereigns should be rated lower than they in fact are.  These entities are thus under-
capitalised based on their estimated exposure to their overvalued member state backers.  
• Further, the supra-sovereign institutions have acquired member debt at levels that place the same 
mistaken, systemic (over-)reliance on member states' individual and collective ability to repay: 
o The EIB is heavily invested in member state debt. 
o The ECB, in seeking to provide liquidity to and stimulating growth in the Eurozone through its 
Quantitative Easing (QE) programme, has purchased €4.65 trillion of member state debt, as well 
as debt of member state public sector entities, banks and corporates, all based on the same over-
valuation of creditworthiness. 
o The Eurosystem accepts member state bonds that are eligible as collateral for its monetary and 
payment operations. 
o Eurozone member states' NCBs can borrow from one another in the ECB's TARGET23 system 
based on this collateral. 
o Eurozone banks also can borrow from their central banks on such a basis. 
As a result, the Eurosystem, 4 the Eurozone system5 and the EU's financial institutions are under-
capitalised, under-collateralised, and its regulated firms are less liquid than is generally recognised.  In 
addition, the systemic risk oversight of the EU system as a whole – designed to protect against an event 
affecting multiple institutions simultaneously – underestimates the level of overall risk. 
The overall level of risk injected into the EU financial system by these measures is vast and 
approximates to the very significant under-capitalised and under-collateralised exposures, based on the 
large pool of eligible bonds available to be used under this system ‒ which are overvalued.  This includes 
                                                     
3  TARGET2 is the high-value real-time gross settlement payment system for the euro, comprising the national high-value 
payment systems of the 19 Eurozone member states, the euro-denominated high-value payment systems in five non-
Eurozone EU member states, and the arrangements between TARGET2-participating central banks and the ECB to make 
cross-border payments.   
4  The Eurosystem, short for the Euro System of Central Banks, is a collective term for the European Central Bank (ECB) 
and the national central banks (NCBs) of the Eurozone member states.  The Eurosystem is not a legal person and cannot 
acquire assets and liabilities.  "Eurosystem assets and liabilities" are held either by the ECB or by one of the NCBs. 
5  The EU itself, the ECB, the EIB and the ESM. 
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the total amount of all Eurozone member state liabilities through direct bond issuances, TARGET2, the 
QE programme and the EIB.   
The effect of these treatments has been to incentivise individual member states to raise more debt than 
would otherwise be warranted and which they potentially cannot stand behind. 
EU Accounting Practices Mask Size of the Problem 
Furthermore, the Eurozone adopts misleading accounting practices that lead to additional risk.  For 
example: 
• Non-standard NPL treatments.  Contrary to normal accounting treatments around the world, the 
rump of non-performing loans (NPLs)—such as business loans, mortgage lending to consumers or 
consumer credit—are discounted and then treated as performing.  Treating them as performing debt 
is premised on the borrower achieving partial repayment despite evidence that the non-rump portion 
of the debt will not be recovered and despite no adjustment being agreed to the amount owed by the 
borrower.  
• Accounting practices that leverage the sovereign assumption.  The EU has permitted banks to 
securitise NPLs and repackage them, with guarantees by the relevant Eurozone member state where 
the borrowers are located.  It then permits EU banks to hold the resulting securitised NPLs at a level 
reflecting a sovereign treatment of the EU member state guarantee.  This has an alarming similarity 
with the repackaging of US sub-prime mortgages into supposedly "prime" segments that sparked the 
Global Financial Crisis. 
• Opaque accounts.  Eurosystem accounts are opaque.  They do not list all public debt in the manner 
of other developed countries, such as the UK or US.  The system runs four different sets of accounts, 
but, when consolidated, it assumes the amounts owing between NCBs and the ECB can be netted, 
thereby disregarding the intrasystem gross exposures.  It is unclear whether this assumption is 
legitimate even under EU law.  
There are also questions about whether the accounting treatment of member state public sector entity 
debt supplied by the EIB or controlled as collateral by the Eurosystem is properly applied.  For instance, 
the European Investment Fund, part of the EIB Group, has committed itself to high-risk financings, of 
which up to €26 bn could in law fall back on the EU taxpayer.  This will have given rise to over €500 
bn of loans by the end of 2020, on which the debt service (capital and interest) is to be drawn from 
public sector entities.  None of this debt is accounted for in the EU accounts relied upon by S&P's and 
Moody's for their credit ratings. 
The Annex on page 17 of this paper quantifies, at a high level, the scale of the problem.  The Technical 
Analysis that follows provides the further detail. 
 
II. AFTER BREXIT, UK REGULATION CAN NO LONGER MITIGATE THE 
PROBLEM WITHIN THE EU AND INTERNAL EU SOLUTIONS ARE UNLIKELY 
Given this huge potential risk facing the global financial system, why have capital markets continued 
to function and fund Eurozone member states? 
UK Regulation Currently Mitigates the Problem 
The answer is that the UK, as the host of the global financial market located in the European time zone, 
supervises financial institutions located in the UK.  This reflects the fact that much of the Eurozone 
market is hosted in the UK and supervised by UK regulators.  Because the UK is not in the Eurozone 
and UK regulators are not subject to Eurozone oversight, it has been able to offset the assumptions 
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embedded in EU law as well as the practices followed by Eurozone financial institutions, thereby 
protecting the global financial market.  The UK's regulators operate under EU law, but they are not 
subject to EU control in all respects.  Thus, they are able to use their supervisory discretions to 
counteract the effects of the EU's assumption that EU member state debt is of sovereign quality. 
As part of this supervision, the Bank of England conducts annual stress tests across UK-incorporated 
financial institutions to identify and manage risks in the financial system and to protect the portion of 
the global financial market hosted in the UK.  Its stress tests seek to mitigate the risks created by the 
Eurozone for financial institutions based in the UK by requiring banks to raise additional capital.  The 
additional capital is required under Basel Pillar 2, which is a discretionary segment of capital that global 
regulators are allowed to require of banks, providing an extra layer of security over and above the capital 
automatically required through the Pillar 1 chapter of the Basel Rules. 
Currently, it is possible for the UK's actions to mitigate risk in the EU and Eurozone because the EU's 
financial services "passport" allows businesses to operate from the UK cross-border across the EU, with 
the EU relying on home state regulation and supervision.  This set-up means that UK-based businesses 
can service the EU27 cross-border business.  It avoids the pointless cost of duplicative regulation, 
supervision and market fragmentation and minimises the cost of capital for growth and investment 
across the EU. 
It also means the UK's regulators are largely in control of the interaction between financial risk arising 
from the Eurozone and the segment of the global financial market that is hosted by the UK.  However, 
these actions affect solely the global market located in the UK and the institutions incorporated there.  
They do not affect institutions incorporated in other EU27 states.  For example, the European Banking 
Authority (EBA), located in Paris, seeks to coordinate proper regulation and the application of the Basel 
Rules across the EU as a whole.  But it has not sought to ensure that the bank stress tests conducted in 
the EU are used to counteract the EU's misappropriate application of Pillar 1 rules.  Neither has the 
division of the ECB ‒ the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) ‒ that regulates systemically important 
(and hence risky) Eurozone banks.6 
This is unsurprising.  Given that the EU has created these rules in the context of the Eurozone, it would 
be odd if the Eurozone or Eurozone-connected supervisors were allowed to overrule them. 
UK mitigation not possible post-Brexit 
Now that the UK has left the EU, it will no longer be possible for the UK to continue to play its 
mitigating role in the way it does now.  This is because the arrangements currently enabling the UK to 
mitigate the risk within the EU will disappear after Brexit – a consequence of the EU passport falling 
away.   
After Brexit, UK businesses will no longer operate under the EU regime.  The conventional assumption 
is that financial businesses will need to locate business in the EU27, which is the standard way in which 
EU financial business is conducted.  Because the UK will be outside the EU, UK financial businesses 
will be obliged to follow standard EU rules and practices when conducting EU business. 
Critically, in a post-Brexit environment, the UK, as an independent sovereign power, could never agree 
to apply EU-made law in the UK.  Not only would this law be written by foreign powers with no UK 
involvement, UK regulators would not be able to operate autonomously under such a system.  Indeed, 
                                                     
6  The ECB directly supervises systemically significant Eurozone banks in conjunction with local member state regulators, 
who are needed to invoke local law and use the local court system.  Local regulators supervise non-systemic banks with 
oversight from the ECB under harmonised standards set by EU laws and guidance from the EBA.  In practice, the views 
and decisions of local regulators are important and are subject to considerable autonomy.  Even if the ECB operates in an 
apolitical manner in its supervisory role, there is a risk that supervisory practices may be constrained because of the 
conflicts of interest faced by the local authorities located in the member state where the relevant financial institution is 
incorporated and whose assistance is necessary for supervision and enforcement. 
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the dangers for the UK of agreeing to follow EU law – as the EU is attempting to get the UK to do as 
part of the future trading relationship with the EU ‒ are not theoretical.  They were clearly evidenced 
when the EU sought to remove the UK's ability to adjust for risk uncaptured by the EU regulatory 
framework by attempting to block the UK's power to impose additional discretionary capital 
requirements on UK-incorporated firms under Basel Pillar 2.7  The intention was for regulatory capital 
to be centrally controlled at an EU level.  This would have removed the UK's ability to mitigate 
Eurozone risk.  The UK successfully resisted this idea but the hazards now are much greater.  
The UK also sought, with difficulty, in the attempted renegotiation of the UK's relationship with the 
EU by Prime Minister David Cameron in February 2016, to establish that the UK and sterling were 
independent of, equal to, and ring-fenced from the Eurozone and the euro.  However, that amendment 
to the EU's architecture has fallen away with the UK Brexit Referendum and, in any event, would have 
resolved only part of the problem for the UK under EU law in a post-Brexit environment.8 
So, unless other arrangements are made, EU law will require some financial business currently 
conducted in the UK to be conducted onshore in the EU.  Thus, the post-Brexit situation will give rise 
to increased risk for the global financial system.  Global financial institutions that have EU27 affiliates 
will need to stand behind them.  They cannot allow those subsidiaries to become insolvent, while 
continuing with their business elsewhere in the world – due to reputational risk, as well as political 
pressures.  Moreover, EU financial institutions that deal regularly with other firms around the world 
could trigger financial contagion outside the EU.   
The Eurozone has shown that it is neither willing nor able properly to manage this risk itself, not least 
because much of it remains hidden due to the system's extraordinary lack of transparency.  Not all of 
the Eurozone risk is easily observable on the balance sheets of individual EU financial institutions.  So, 
post-Brexit, conducting business-as-usual under EU27 or Eurozone supervision could unwittingly 
introduce risk into the global system – a risk which is not being managed by the EU27, by the Eurozone, 
or by the market itself.   
In this environment, global regulatory capital and accounting standards that exist to protect against such 
risk would not be properly applied.  Therefore, the under-capitalised, under-collateralised and 
insufficiently liquid Eurosystem and EU financial institutions—coupled with the Eurosystem operating 
non-transparent accounting practices—is a matter of concern to the global financial system. 
                                                     
7  "To the delight of European banks – and the consternation of Whitehall – the Commission [and Michel Barnier, internal 
market Commissioner] in July [2011] proposed a limit on how much capital national regulators could force banks to hold.  
British ministers think this was deliberately aimed at undermining the flagship recommendation of the Vickers 
commission, which advocated ringfencing UK retail operations behind a higher capital buffer", Barker, A.,"Barnier vs 
the Brits:  Financial regulation - UK's battle with Brussels is intensifying", Financial Times, 8 November 2011:  
https://www.ft.com/content/5471afde-096a-11e1-a20c-00144feabdc0. 
Similarly, "The bad-tempered exchanges at a late-night meeting of European finance ministers risked scuppering 
agreement on a 600-page law to implement the Basel III international accord on bank capital.  When some British 
demands to toughen up the text were rejected, Mr Osborne bluntly accused the European commission of offering 
concessions to French and German banks that breached the global agreement. 'We are not implementing the Basel 
agreement, as anyone who will look at this text will be able to tell you,' Mr Osborne told his stunned counterparts. 'I'm 
not prepared to go out there and say something that will make me an idiot five minutes later.' His sharp attack reflects the 
deep distrust marring relations between Brussels and London over regulation of the City...  The 'polemic' drew an angry 
response from Michel Barnier, the French EU Commissioner overseeing financial services, who insisted his rules 
complied with Basel while taking account of European 'specificities'.  Another flashpoint is the British and Swedish 
insistence that national regulators have the freedom to impose tougher rules on banks without EU approval – a move that 
Mr Barnier says will imperil the single market", Barker, A., "UK in furious rejection of EU bank plan - Britain's poisonous 
relations with Brussels erupted on Wednesday as George Osborne, the chancellor, refused to defend watered-down EU 
bank rules that would make him 'look like an idiot'", Financial Times, 2 May 2012; https://www.ft.com/content/82eab320-
949c-11e1-bb0d-00144feab49a. 
8  Letter by President Donald Tusk to the Members of the European Council on his proposal for a new settlement for the 
United Kingdom within the European Union, European Council, 2 February 2016, and David Cameron's statement on 
EU renegotiation:  3 February 2016. 
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Internal EU solutions possible, but unlikely 
There are two ways the EU potentially could eliminate the problem, requiring major changes in its 
internal modus operandi.  However, it is unlikely that either one would be implemented. 
Apply Basel Rules Properly.  The best way of dealing with the problem would be for the EU to eliminate 
its underlying cause – by applying the Basel Rules properly.  However, doing so would be highly 
problematical for the EU to implement; consequently, such an outcome is unlikely.  Why so? 
Removing this risk would require the EU to make a fundamental adjustment to its capital, collateral and 
liquidity rules.  Unfortunately, changing the rules and restructuring such levels of risk cannot be 
achieved easily.  The adjustment would require vast amounts of new capital, collateral and liquidity to 
be injected into the Eurozone and would require an immediate and fundamental reorganisation of the 
Eurozone's internal structures relating to the mutualisation of EU member state debt.  
Unsurprisingly, there is little political will to execute such a plan, especially in Germany.  Furthermore, 
because the loss-absorption buffer in the system is much lower than it is made to appear, and the system 
relies on sub-sovereign bonds for collateral and liquidity, the requisite amount of capital could not easily 
be conjured up from within the system. 
Share Member State Liability.  Member states potentially could introduce joint-and-several Eurozone 
sovereignty and stand collectively behind each other's debt issuances.  This means member states would 
benefit from each other's creditworthiness and collectively would effectively constitute a sovereign debt 
issuer that could exercise control over the ECB as the issuer of the euro currency.  
However, such a step would involve taxpayers in northern Europe accepting a level of political, 
economic and fiscal integration with the South and East that, so far, they have not been willing to accept.  
The German Finance Minister, Olaf Scholz, recently made relatively minor suggestions for integration 
– i.e., a Eurozone scheme to reinsure member state bank deposit guarantee schemes.  Unfortunately, 
even his small suggestion (which in any case would have been only a minor fix) has been strongly 
resisted, not least in Germany itself. 
It is clear that the EU will not voluntarily subject itself to the measures needed to address Eurozone risk 
outlined in the previous section.9 
 
III. AN ENHANCED EQUIVALENCE AGREEMENT COULD ADDRESS THE 
PROBLEM IN FULL 
A potential solution in the form of a post-Brexit Enhanced Equivalence deal in financial services, 
involving mutual UK-EU recognition of each other's Basel-driven high-level standards, would preserve 
the status quo.  It would allow UK law to be applied to UK businesses – and EU law to be applied to 
EU businesses. 
The Enhanced Equivalence concept 
Instead of having firms set up costly subsidiaries in the EU, it would be possible after Brexit for UK 
businesses to remain based in the UK continuing to service their EU27 customers from the UK, where 
Eurozone risk is currently mitigated as part of the UK's management of global market risk.  A new 
arrangement, properly formed, would allow the UK to mitigate Eurozone risk openly where it has only 
been able to mitigate this risk covertly under existing EU law arrangements which require it to pay 
                                                     
9  See, e.g., Statement by Michel Barnier at the presentation of the Commission's proposal for a Council recommendation 
on directives for the negotiation of a new partnership with the UK, Brussels, 3 February 2020; 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_20_185. 
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deference to the ineffectual approaches of fellow EU regulators.  This would require the EU to agree to 
a financial services arrangement based on an enhanced version of its existing concept of equivalence 
contained in EU law.  That is, the EU would allow UK financial businesses to trade in the EU, but under 
UK law, so long as UK law achieves similar standards as EU law, principally by reference to the Basel 
Rules. 
The legal text for such an arrangement has already been drafted and is ready to be finalised and signed.10  
An Enhanced Equivalence deal would allow, in the manner of the passport, businesses based in the UK 
to continue to service EU27 customers based on UK financial regulation and supervision.   
An Enhanced Equivalence deal would also minimise disruption to existing customer service models.  It 
would enable mutual recognition of each other's regulations and avoid duplicative regulation.  Existing 
UK business models would continue undisturbed and the UK would manage Eurozone risk sensitively, 
protecting the global market in the process.   
In addition, such an arrangement would benefit the EU27 by helping avoid the unnecessary additional 
costs created by UK financial firms operating through separately capitalised EU27 subsidiaries.  This 
is a cost that would have to be passed back to EU27 businesses and consumers, increasing their cost of 
capital and lowering growth.  It would also allow EU banks and investment firms to operate in the UK's 
global market without also having to set up separately capitalised and collateralised subsidiaries, whilst 
retaining the false assumption in their domestic market that Eurozone bonds are sovereign.  This would 
put EU institutions at a competitive advantage to global ones, but is a price the global financial system 
should consider paying – and a risk worth taking – to help it manage its way through the present dangers 
arising from the incomplete euro project. 
The EU27 and especially the Eurozone need minimal friction and minimum cost access to global 
markets for growth, particularly while the Eurozone continues to become fully established.  The 
Eurozone also needs access to the secondary markets in the UK, especially for illiquid instruments, like 
certain types of national public sector debt.   
The greatest liquidity, best pricing and smallest price spreads will remain in London, as it is the sole 
global financial centre in the European time zone, operating in multiple currencies and benefitting from 
the ability to net exposures and reduce risk through its concentrated management.  
Key elements of the deal 
There are some practical and political elements of a new Enhanced Equivalence deal that need 
agreement before it could be implemented.  Nevertheless, we believe Enhanced Equivalence is the best 
way forward and we see no fundamental reason why such agreements could not be forthcoming. 
These required agreements are: 
• Introduce durability, predictability and data sharing.  Certain amendments to the existing EU 
equivalence regime would need to be agreed, given (1) the greater interconnectivity between the UK 
and EU than with other jurisdictions and (2) the already apparent EU threats to remove equivalence 
recognition at very short notice if the UK were to enact laws the EU deems to be inappropriate.  Such 
amendments would need to be durable and predictable and subject to independent adjudication.  In 
order to continue mitigating Eurozone risk effectively, the UK would also need certain, real-time 
access to full and accurate Eurozone data, including information from the main EU financial 
                                                     
10  See the Treaty and legislative text in A Template for Enhanced Equivalence:  Creating a Lasting relationship in financial 
Services between the UK and the EU, Reynolds B., Politeia, 10 July 2017, which provides for the arrangement to be 
achieved partly by Treaty text and partly by regulation; or Free Trade in UK-EU Financial Services:  How Best to 
Structure a Brexit Free Trade Deal, Reynolds B., Politeia, 17 October 2018, which does the same but entirely through 
Treaty text, which it sets out in full.  
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institutions engaged in cross-border and global business (e.g., having access to the resolution plans 
for those institutions). 
• Expand existing scope.  The existing equivalence framework would need to be expanded.  As things 
stand, the EU has a hodgepodge of equivalence measures that cover only part of the financial 
sector—not, for example, commercial banking and insurance.  In order to continue managing 
Eurozone risk, the UK would need to have sight of and control all levers across its financial sector, 
through lawmaking as well as supervision. 
• Align UK and US practices.  The UK and the US—as the other main global financial centre—would 
need to agree a joint modus operandi.  Between the UK and US, it is the UK that needs to step up to 
mitigate most Eurozone risk following Brexit since financial business is most easily conducted and 
managed in the time zone of the customer.   
The US would continue its current approach domestically, as the US system is designed for, and 
works well with regard to, the markets run out of the US—which, of course, helps with the 
management of global risk.  Employing the US system to mitigate global systemic risk originating 
in Europe would not be practicable.  For example, adopting in the Eurozone the US approach to 
disclosure and litigation and employing its use of punitive fines and damages (given the Eurozone's 
deliberately misleading regulatory capital and accounting treatments) would introduce additional 
systemic risk and magnify the effects of any crisis in an unpredictable manner.  Such effects could 
run on long after the crisis and hang over market participants for years.   
• Hold the line on outcomes-based Enhanced Equivalence.  Currently, the EU is not favouring such a 
binding and wide-ranging arrangement.  Enhanced Equivalence would require the EU to recognise 
the UK's sovereignty in making laws and in supervision, which is contrary to some recent EU 
statements.   
"Equivalence"—expressed as "providing for recognition of another country's laws and jurisdiction 
based on high level outcomes"—was supported by Michel Barnier when, as European internal market 
Commissioner, he was promoting the concept to the US in 2013.11  This sensible interpretation for the 
US allows both parties to achieve recognition so long as they meet international standards where 
possible, rather than imposing any arbitrary line-by-line list of specific requirements that are 
unnecessary to operate the regime safely.  Only two underlying criteria need to be observed: (1) the 
prevention of systemic risk in the other's market and (2) the protection of the other's retail consumers 
under locally stipulated standards.  So long as this is the case, each party should be able to legislate and 
regulate as it sees fit.  Such a system is already in use by the EU with tens of countries around the 
world.12  
If the EU does not agree to Enhanced Equivalence, UK and US regulators will need to mitigate this risk 
jointly. 
 
                                                     
11  European Commission, "The European Commission and the CFTC reach a Common Path Forward on Derivatives", 11 
July 2013.  
12  A summary of the regime can be found in A Blueprint for Brexit:  The Future of Global Financial Services and Markets 
in the U.K., Reynolds B., Politeia, 3 November 2016. 
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IV. UK/US REGULATORS MUST MITIGATE RISK JOINTLY IF NO AGREEMENT ON 
ENHANCED EQUIVALENCE 
If the EU refuses to agree an Enhanced Equivalence regime, it will have created an unacceptable 
situation for the global financial system, which will have to address this risk itself. 
Post-Brexit regulation by the EU:  risk-prone, conflicted, unreliable, and costly 
Following Brexit—without any internal changes to the Eurosystem or without a UK-EU financial 
services deal in place—UK-based financial businesses currently providing services and products cross-
border to EU27 customers would not be able to continue operating as they do today.   
If the UK were to agree to EU demands that UK businesses operating in the EU be subject to EU 
regulations, UK businesses would be exposed to unacceptable levels of Eurozone financial risk.  This 
cannot be allowed to happen so, in the circumstances, convention would require non-EU banks and 
other financial institutions wishing to continue doing business in the EU to operate from a physical 
presence there.  Financial businesses would be required to operate some aspects of their business from 
EU27-incorporated entities, acting as counterparties facing EU27 customers.  They would be subject 
not only to EU law, but also to EU supervision, without the counterbalancing measures applied by the 
UK.   
These requirements have major implications for both capital and collateral, as they would trap newly 
acquired capital and collateral in the EU27 entities.  In order to minimise the resulting costs, typically 
these entities would offload the risk they take on back to their affiliates in the UK, where it could be 
managed in the same time zone.  However, the pan-EU supervisory authorities that oversee the 
application of the EU financial services regime – i.e., the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) ‒ 
have stated that EU-based entities must retain meaningful risk on their books and have on-the-ground 
managers of that risk, supervised by the EU regulators.   
If that were to happen, the level of EU financial risk would magnify and the chances of a small spark 
in a minor bank setting off a meltdown of the whole global system would be substantially increased.  
Having created an umbrella of rules, accounting approaches and opaque practices to facilitate the 
emerging construction of the euro, EU regulators are conflicted when it comes to reversing the position 
at a supervisory level.  For example: 
• The EBA applies its stress tests on the presumption that the Eurozone is an integrated whole. 
• Proposals for a pan-EU bank deposit guarantee scheme, which would mutualise the risk of local 
NPLs, have not been adopted. 
• No pan-Eurozone bank mergers and acquisitions market has developed, enabling financial 
institutions in one member state to acquire failing institutions in another, in large part because the 
local contributors to the deposit guarantee scheme of the acquiring member state would then be 
exposed to NPLs of the target's member state. 
• Regulations have been introduced for credit rating agencies to enable EU regulators to allay member 
state concerns and control the ratings of member states that are not deemed fair by the EU.  The new 
regulation was introduced in 2013, shortly after a very public and disputed ratings downgrade for 
France. 
• A new regulation has been introduced that enables EU regulators to remove recognition from foreign 
clearing houses (also called central counterparties, or CCPs) that clear in euros and, in so doing, 
value member state government collateral in a manner the EU does not accept.  This was in response 
to actions of the London Clearing House in 2011 and 2012 when Italian and Spanish member state 
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debt was subjected to a haircut to reflect market perceptions of its reduced creditworthiness.13  The 
EU wishes to control any such haircut adjustments in the future. 
• EU authorities have circumvented EU rules for the writing down of shareholder equity and a subset 
of creditor liabilities that are designed to keep failing banks in operation and avoid disruption to the 
EU financial system.  The way the rules have been applied has protected domestic investors and 
depositors in member states at the expense of the global market, thereby introducing further risk into 
it.   
It is clear that EU and Eurozone regulators have a fundamental conflict of interest between the need to 
maintain a safe financial system and the need to keep the Eurozone project on the road pending full 
integration into a proper, currency-issuing state.  They cannot afford to undo through supervision the 
problems they have created through their rules and practices. 
Thus, EU27 regulators cannot be relied upon to manage Eurozone risk safely. 
Mitigating unmanaged post-Brexit Eurozone risk 
The global financial market cannot allow the situation described above to continue.  Eurozone risk 
needs to be managed effectively and by non-conflicted supervisors.   
Otherwise, global financial resources could be misdirected to address the problems associated with the 
Eurozone's incomplete structure, putting business capital at risk of loss.  Individual citizens around the 
world could also be exposed to significant losses through their pension funds and other investments.   
So, in the face of the EU refusing either to make fundamental internal changes or agree to Enhanced 
Equivalence, as well as insisting on financial businesses operating where required through EU27 
subsidiaries, it will be necessary to neutralise the exposures created by EU27 law and supervision so 
that they do not contaminate the global market. 
This will require the following actions: 
1. Bypassing EU financial institutions.  The UK and US will need to require UK and US financial firms 
where possible to deal with EU27 customers directly and not through EU27 affiliates.  Such a 
requirement can be met under various existing EU laws, most notably when EU customers reach 
outside the EU at their own instigation to acquire services from the UK or US (reverse solicitation).14 
2. Helping EU customers.  UK and US firms can help their EU27 customers come to the financial 
market by setting up low-cost presences in the UK or US from which to acquire their financial 
services, in the same way that other customers do from all over the world.  Indeed, this was the 
principal method of delivery of financial services to businesses across the EU before the beginnings 
of the financial services passport in 1995.15  The UK Government could assist with this endeavour.  
A contractor could be appointed to help EU27 clients sign a short document to authorise the 
contractor to establish and maintain a presence on their behalf.  
                                                     
13  A. Aguiar, D.Y. Kennett, R. Bookstaber and T Wipf, A Map of Collateral Uses and Flows, Working Paper, Office of 
Financial Research, 26 May 2016.  
14  The Art of the No Deal:  How Best to Navigate Brexit for Financial Services, Reynolds B., Politeia, 29 November, 2017. 
15  With the Investment Services Directive (Council Directive 93/22/EEC).  This provided for the mutual recognition of 
home state prudential rules for investment firms.  A similar regime was introduced for banking (Council Directive 
93/6.EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC).  Full recognition of prudential and conduct of business rules was introduced in 
2007 with the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (Commission Directive 2004/39/EC) and also for banking 
(Directive 2006/49/EC and Directive 2006/48/EC) and insurance (Solvency II – Directive 2009/138/EC; Insurance 
Mediation Directive II – Directive 2016/97/EC).  
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3. Ensuring transparent data and remote management of risk.  For any residual category of business 
that global financial institutions need to operate with EU27 customers through an EU27 subsidiary, 
the UK and US can require the UK and US affiliates to supervise the taking on of any Eurozone risk: 
a. This would require full and accurate data to be obtained and assessed in the UK or US 
headquarters, and for that risk to be managed from the UK or US. 
b. EU27 presences could be required to be minimised and all material Eurozone risk could be 
transferred out through back-to-back trades (with full necessary information) to the UK or US 
affiliate where it could, in turn, be managed and collateralised. 
c. UK and US firms could chaperone all deals proposed by their EU27 subsidiaries and actively 
manage the risk arising from those subsidiaries through position limits and pre-authorising trades. 
These requirements might conflict with the ESAs' pronouncements about necessary local EU27 
presences, but the wider world must avoid the risk that would be created by relying on EU27 
supervision. 
4. Establishing stringent conditions for financial institutions' Eurozone exposures.  UK and US firms 
could be required to manage their risk arising directly or indirectly from EU27 counterparties and 
customers in a new way: 
a. Treat Eurozone member state debt on the correct basis of sub-sovereign quality and all public 
sector entity debt within that member state as sub-sub-sovereign, matching the true unmanaged 
exposures introduced into the market by that debt.  
b. Consider requiring firms, under UK and US rules, to analyse exposures to EU27 counterparties 
and subsidiaries on the basis of the financial position of those entities having applied the correct 
regulatory capital and accounting treatments to their exposures.  Similar adjustments would have 
to be made for collateral emanating from the Eurozone and Eurosystem, and also for the 
misleading EU27 approach to liquidity.   
c. Where proper data on the effects of the counterparty's under-capitalisation, under-
collateralisation or overestimation of liquidity are unavailable, position limits would need to be 
established to protect against uncaptured systemic risk. 
In all cases, information would be key.  The UK and US would need to insist on access to full data from 
EU27 and Eurozone entities, their regulators, central banks, and other authorities.  The information 
would need to cover all Eurozone sub-sovereign and sub-sub-sovereign exposures, direct and indirect.  
This way, any trades relying on this data and exposed to conflicted supervisory oversight could be 
undertaken directly or indirectly from the UK or US where the risk can be properly managed, netted 
and reliably collateralised. 
In such a way, without either internal EU changes or a proper Enhanced Equivalence deal, the UK and 
US can protect themselves and the global market from the risks identified above.  Yet, the very 
statement of these steps shows how detrimental it would be for the EU to refuse Enhanced Equivalence 
– forcing the UK and US to mitigate the resulting increased Eurozone risk, on a fully arm's-length and 
detached basis. 
Negative impact on EU 
A UK/US joint initiative preventing material risk being transmitted to the global markets means they 
cannot place any reliance on EU legal and regulatory risk management – which, in turn, means that the 
relocation of meaningful financial services jobs to the EU would need to be kept to a minimum.  This, 
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alone, flies in the face of one of the EU's post-Brexit objectives of attracting London-based businesses 
to the EU. 
Furthermore, taking the actions outlined above would make clear that the EU would be unable to reap 
the full benefits from the assumption embedded throughout its regime that member states have 
sovereign status.  A key benefit of this assumption is that the EU has created the euro currency on the 
cheap by requiring the rest of the world to bear the costs and risks of investment losses.  This cannot be 
allowed unchecked and the risk must be properly mitigated. 
Thus, joint UK/US actions would seek to neutralise those unfair benefits and impose full freight costs 
concomitant with the realities of the riskiness of the EU's financial system.  The combined magnitude 
of these costs could potentially prove terminal to some EU-based businesses.  These measures would 
handicap EU banks and other financial institutions in accessing global capital flows to fund their local 
activities and highlight to the world the structural flaw in the Eurozone's design.  Those EU member 
states, such as France, that are hoping to use Brexit as leverage to relocate London-based financial 
services to Paris under French-led management, would be thwarted.16 
In the face of such a large potential negative impact, it would be highly irrational for the EU not to 
respond to an offer of an Enhanced Equivalence arrangement ‒ not least because of the (current) strong 
political will within the EU to "do whatever it takes" to preserve the euro.  Agreeing for the UK to 
continue mitigating and indeed managing Eurozone risk in the integrated, sensitive and collaborative 
way it does at present would be far cheaper for EU businesses and consumers, and would facilitate 
economic growth.  If rational thought prevails, global financial services firms would be able to benefit 
from continuing to operate as they do now, from London, under a new Enhanced Equivalence 
arrangement.  This would allow them to service their customers across Europe without the unnecessary 
costs of duplicative, often ill-fitting and heavy-handed regulation.  Such an outcome is the only fair one 
for world consumers, businesses, the global market, the UK and US.   
In establishing the euro as it did, the EU created, as a by-product, phenomenal and unprecedented 
financial risk for the world, without its members properly underwriting that risk.  The financial crisis 
of 2007-8 was only a taste of the damage such systemic risk can wreak.  The EU's estimated share of 
global GDP in 2020 is 17.7%,17 while its share of the global stock market was 14.1% in 2019.18  A 
                                                     
16 France, in particular, has ambitions to establish itself as a leading EU financial centre, in apparent disregard for the 
systemic risk implications and costs to EU businesses and consumers, based on the following narrative:  "Until 1914, 
France was Europe's banker, even if London was the world's banker.  Brexit is perceived as the best opportunity in a 
century to regain that pre-eminence, what a French Senate report called its 'age-old ambition'.  …The prospect of Paris 
dethroning London is perceived, on the other side of the Channel, as within France's grasp.  It has snaffled the [EBA] on 
repatriation to the Eurozone from London in the wake of the Brexit Referendum, denying Frankfurt its natural home.  
Macron manoeuvred deftly to get Christine Lagarde, French former Centre-Right Finance Minister to replace Mario 
Draghi as head of the ECB".  In a France Info radio interview on 27 January, France's highly ambitious and powerful 
Finance Minister, Bruno Le Maire, repeated the line that Paris was about to overtake London as Europe's prime financial 
centre.  He went on to say that in the Brexit negotiations France can benefit 'if we are firm'" (Keiger, J., "Macron's new 
post-Brexit negotiating position", Briefings for Britain, 30 January 2020; https://briefingsforbritain.co.uk/macrons-new-
post-brexit-negotiating-position).  France has also tried to use long-term tax breaks to tempt UK-based bankers to move 
to Paris (Dawber, A., "Sarkozy woos City bankers with promise of Paris tax break", Independent, 23 August 2010; 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/sarkozy-woos-city-bankers-with-promise-of-paris-tax-break-
2059472.html). 
17  IMF World Economic Outlook 2019.  This is down from 20% now that the UK has left the EU.  In comparison, China's 
share of global GDP is 16.9%, up from 4.3% in 2003.  At the time of writing, an outbreak of corona virus beginning in a 
small food market in Wuhan is spreading globally around the world.  With an appropriate mitigation strategy involving 
isolating infected individuals, it may be contained, but it has already had a damaging effect on Chinese and global GDP, 
as it disrupts global supply chains.  The virus will "derail the nascent industrial recovery" in the Eurozone and consign it 
to more poor first-quarter growth, according to Oxford Economics (Rees, T., and Uttley, H., "Eurozone growth hit by 
coronavirus", Daily Telegraph, 15 February, 2020).  In a similar way, the failure a small bank in the Eurozone could 
spread contagiously to the rest of the world, with an even more damaging effect on global GDP, unless a similar mitigation 
strategy is put in place which isolates Eurozone financial risk from the rest of the world. 
18  MSCI All-Countries World Index; https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/8d97d244-4685-4200-a24c-3e2942e3adeb.  
This is down from 18.8% now that the UK has left the EU. 
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crash caused by unmanaged Eurozone risk could therefore cause a level of financial and economic 
damage that dwarfs what was experienced only 12 years ago.  The world cannot allow this to happen. 
 
THE UPSHOT – A CRITICAL FAILURE TO MANAGE RISK 
The issue at hand is the risk post-Brexit to the global system created by the incomplete Eurozone and 
the capital, collateral, liquidity and accounting treatments adopted by the EU that mask this fact and 
disguise the consequent financial and economic risk.  This risk is a global problem and must be 
addressed by the UK and US as key hosts of the global financial system.  It stems from the EU's attempt 
to create an EU-wide sovereign currency without addressing the consequent loss of member state 
sovereignty.  The EU does not manage this risk in any meaningful sense.  Because the political obstacles 
against allowing a simple, workable internal EU solution are too daunting, following Brexit it will not 
be safe for global investors to trade on the basis of EU27 supervision.  By far the simplest and most 
attractive solution is for the UK to carry on managing the risk, as it has been doing, under an Enhanced 
Equivalence arrangement which is durable, covers the whole financial sector and recognises UK 
standards that achieve high level international outcomes.  Such an arrangement could be executed 
swiftly so it could be in place before the end of 2020.  If this is not permitted by the EU, the UK and 
US must manage the risk to protect the integrity of the global financial system – which is a practical 
alternative, but less attractive for the EU and for the world. 
 
 
Controlling Eurozone Risk by Law: Annex 
   
17 
 
 
Annex: Quantifying the scale of the unmanaged Eurozone risk – a summary 
It is impossible to provide a single figure to quantify the scale of the whole problem.  We can however 
provide estimates of the size of two key problems with the Eurozone:  the size of Eurozone member 
state national debts and the size of NPLs in Eurozone banks. 
Take as examples Italy and Spain, which have the highest liabilities in the Eurosystem.  Their official 
national debts are 133% and 98% of their GDP, respectively.  However, we estimate that the actual 
national debt to GDP ratios of Italy and Spain could be as high as 167% and 138%, respectively, which 
is significantly greater than would normally be expected, given their BBB and A credit ratings.  
This is because their share of debts in the EIB amounts to 4–5% of their GDP, while the costs of the 
ECB's QE programme adds another 3%.  The TARGET2 euro payment system adds either nothing (if 
the debts are secured on existing public sector bonds) or up to 25 – 32% of GDP (if the debts are 
unsecured or are secured on non-public sector bonds).  So the volume of extra public sector debt is in 
the range of 8 – 40% of GDP for these countries ‒ and this excludes all contingent liabilities.   
A key problem is that official Eurostat statistics, which are used as the common reference point for 
assessing EU member state debt, do not provide a full picture of this debt.  They omit the direct debts 
of public sector entities like transportation, power and water utilities, and the indirect debts of these 
entities through the EIB.  They omit the extra public indebtedness caused by the QE programme and by 
the unsettled balances in TARGET2. 
They also omit all contingent liabilities, especially those of the highest EU-level institutions, including 
the EU itself, the ECB, the ESM, and the EIB—all of which have low loss-absorption capacity of their 
own.  They omit the liability of member state governments through their national bank deposit guarantee 
schemes, which are unfunded, and the liability of the Italian and Cypriot governments for the guarantees 
they have issued in connection with the securitisation of their banks' NPLs. 
Accordingly, the risk of default on these debts is much higher than generally realised, first because the 
debts are higher, and secondly because the Eurozone sovereigns—which are ultimately liable for the 
debts of both EU-level institutions and public sector entities, as well as the contingent liabilities—are 
not genuine sovereigns, having surrendered many of the instruments of financial sovereignty to the EU-
level institutions.  In particular, they cannot ask their NCBs to print money to pay back their debts in a 
way that a genuine sovereign country can.  Because the debt is greater and the risk of default is higher, 
the loss-absorption capacity within the Eurosystem is correspondingly lower than it appears. 
The second issue is the size of NPLs.  The official ECB estimate is €580 bn (or 3.8% of bank total 
loans), down from €1 trn (or 8%) in 2014.  NPLs are very high in the southern states of the Eurozone.  
Italy has a quarter of the Eurozone's NPLs and they are in excess of 40% of total loans in both Cyprus 
and Greece. 
But official estimates exclude the NPLs which have been hidden off-balance-sheet through 
securitisations and which the ECB treats as being reversed out of NPL status through "restructurings" 
and "forbearance".  In reality, these loans can be categorised as "zombie" loans liable to fall back into 
NPL status at any time.  Further, we argue that the 3.8% figure represents a potentially insufficient 
write-down on the face value of the loans that sit in NPL status, and Eurozone banks are using over-
optimistic risk-weighted assets methodologies on all of their business lines. 
The Eurozone banking system is currently able to meet its liabilities as they fall due only because of 
the ECB's QE programme of €2.9 trn and the Eurosystem's "hidden" lending to banks of €3.1 trn, 
totalling €6 trn of monetary support from the European authorities. 
In total, the Eurosystem owns or controls as collateral an amount that equates to 64% of the "general 
government gross debt" of the 19 Eurozone countries. 
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TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 
 
The European Union has applied the Basel Rules to Eurozone member state government 
bonds and accounting treatments to the Eurosystem in a way that threatens to undermine the 
global financial system, particularly after Brexit.  In the following Technical Analysis, we 
provide the evidence to support and quantify this assertion.  We then propose a solution that 
will help the Eurozone, whilst preserving the integrity of the global financial markets. 
 
Key background – framing the problem 
From the 1970s, globalisation started to occur significantly in the financial markets.  Ever-increasing 
demands by businesses all over the world for capital to fund their growth have been met by global 
financial institutions procuring that capital from beyond the specific jurisdictions where their clients are 
located.  This globalisation has accelerated, particularly since the early 1990s.  Meanwhile, given the 
increasing financial exposures generated by the cross-border provision of capital, there has been a 
significant effort by the major economies to agree and apply common rules to ensure the world's 
financial system is resilient.  These rules have sought to manage financial risk arising from individual 
financial institutions and also systemically.  An agreed framework for financial regulation started 
tentatively to be created with the formation of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel 
Committee) as an international standard-setting forum for central banks and regulators at the end of 
1974.  In fits and starts, this produced common rules, beginning in 1988 with Basel I, then continuing 
in June 2004 with Basel II (which was not fully implemented in the US) and now, after the 2007-8 
Global Financial Crisis, adopting Basel III.  Basel III has achieved extensive harmonisation in financial 
regulation across the G20 and beyond.  Its core rulemaking focus has necessarily been on banks.  Banks 
are at the heart of the financial system, since their businesses maintain mismatched maturities between 
assets and liabilities and therefore need to hold sufficient liquid assets to meet deposit withdrawals, 
together with carefully calibrated amounts of loss-absorbing capital to withstand significant foreseeable 
losses and avoid contagion through the effects of a sudden loss of confidence (i.e., bank runs). 
During this period, in 1999, the euro was created.  This established a common currency between 11 of 
the then 15 member states of the European Union; and now 19 of the 27 members of the EU are in the 
Eurozone.  In law, the Eurozone has been established within the EU's existing legal architecture, with 
limited separate legal personality, largely limited to the ECB, the EU's own central bank, which is 
controlled jointly ‒ but not individually ‒ by the participating member states.  The Eurozone was not 
established as a legal state, so it did not issue debt or manage a Eurozone budget, nor is there a single 
sovereign behind the euro currency.  Instead, Eurozone member states remain sovereign over the raising 
of the debt they need and, to a limited degree, over their budgets.  However, there is no joint-and-several 
liability between member states for each other's debt, nor for the liabilities of the ECB.  Amongst 
Eurozone member states, there is ongoing discussion concerning some level of fiscal consolidation, 
combined with a pan-Eurozone bank deposit guarantee arrangement, which would go some way 
towards achieving financial integration, but which would not achieve joint-and-several liability.  
Meanwhile, as discussions over consolidation take place, some Eurozone member states have taken on 
increasing and very significant levels of debt.  For example, we estimate that the total national debts of 
Italy and Spain could be as high as 167% and 138%, respectively, of their GDP – that is 33% and 40% 
higher than the official measures.  There is no legal infrastructure in place that guarantees that these 
debts will be repaid, despite the EU claiming that they have the status of sovereign debts.  As debt levels 
continue to grow, the Eurozone itself becomes increasingly vulnerable.  The resulting financial risk to 
the global financial markets, arising from Eurozone exposures, currently passes through and is currently 
supervised in the world's two global financial centres, the UK and US.  
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Brexit—the UK's departure as a member state of the EU on 31 January 2020—will require an 
adjustment in the global regulatory architecture, since the UK will no longer be part of pan-EU financial 
regulatory rulemaking and EU supervisory oversight.  The UK will need to develop new ways of 
managing its financial markets and their exposure to Eurozone risk.  With Brexit, the EU seeks to protect 
and enhance the Eurozone project by ensuring that any post-Brexit trade deal with the UK involves EU 
influence – if not control - over the UK's financial (and other) laws and regulations.  This is being 
promoted as a necessary requirement for maintaining a "level playing field" after Brexit, but, in practice, 
it would mean that the UK becomes a "rule-taker" from Brussels on an ongoing basis.  The EU also 
seeks continued access to the external finance needed to secure its long-term aim of full legal and fiscal 
consolidation.  At the same time, some member states wish to seize the opportunity to encourage the 
relocation of financial business from the UK to their own states. 
However, all this overlooks four points which, together, create a real danger for the world's financial 
markets by introducing huge risks into those markets and creating significant exposures for world 
economies.  It fails to consider: 
• The fundamental design flaw in the legal architecture underpinning the Eurozone, which treats both 
the Eurozone and its member states as sovereign, when this is mutually incompatible. 
• The extent of existing Eurozone member state debt that is not jointly-and-severally guaranteed in 
law and which is not readily apparent from publicly available accounts. 
• The fact that the true situation might be worse than is visibly apparent, given Eurozone accounting 
practices – and that it may be worse still, given the opacity of that accounting. 
• The fact that EU and Eurozone regulators are not in a position to manage significant financial 
business effectively, since they are structurally unable to reconcile the conflicting need to maintain 
the viability of the Eurozone with the need to regulate for financial safety and soundness.19 
Each of these factors is embedded in and a consequence of the Eurozone's very structure and cannot be 
resolved politically by the EU in the foreseeable future.  Properly categorised, the Eurozone member 
states are in fact "sub-sovereign", lacking the full powers of a sovereign state.  Each element of the 
Eurozone financial system is arguably only solvent because of the way it accounts for its business with 
the other elements.  Take, for example, banks.  Eurozone banks have significant holdings of Eurozone 
government bonds, which we argue are overvalued on the basis of the true credit risk they entail.  
Similarly, banks have systematically overvalued the NPLs of their commercial and retail customers—
which exceed 40% of all bank loans in countries such as Greece and Cyprus—by discounting them but 
then treating the residual or rump loan as "performing" – a treatment premised on the borrower being 
able and willing to achieve partial repayment in spite of evidence that the other portion of the loan will 
not be recovered.  The ECB estimated that the total value of NPLs in the Eurozone as of June 2019 
amounted to €580 bn (or 3.8% of total loans).20,21  These figures infer a nominal amount of loans of 
€15.26 trn, higher by €3.7 trn than the figure for total loans given in the ECB statistical database for the 
end of June 2019 of €11.91 trn.  The level of NPLs is down from almost €1 trn (or 8% of total loans) in 
                                                     
19 The "safety and soundness" of the European banking (and hence financial) system is one of the key aims of the EU's 
Single Supervisory Mechanism:  https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/thessm/html/index.en.html. 
20  "Non-performing loans in the euro area – where do we stand?", Speech by Andrea Enria, Chair of the Supervisory Board 
of the ECB, at the Conference "EDIS, NPLs, Sovereign Debt and Safe Assets" organised by the Institute for Law and 
Finance, Frankfurt, 14 June 2019. 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2019/html/ssm.sp190614~bee1d0f29c.en.html. 
21  We believe that there is systematic over-valuation of Eurozone bank assets.  While the NPLs may have some realisable 
value, so the entire 3.8% may not constitute an unrealised loss, this figure excludes the NPLs which have been hidden 
off-balance-sheet through securitisations and which the ECB treats as being reversed out of NPL status through 
"restructurings" and "forbearance", whereas in reality these loans can be categorised as "zombie" loans liable to fall back 
into NPL status at any time.  Further, we argue that the 3.8% figure represents a potentially insufficient write-down on 
the face value of the loans that sit in NPL status, and Eurozone banks are using over-optimistic RWA methodologies on 
all of their business lines.  
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2014, implying a nominal amount of loans of €12.50 trn.  Eurozone banks do not have the regulatory 
capital (and hence loss-absorption capacity) in place to cover the credit risk involved and are, as a 
consequence, heavily under-capitalised. 22   By the same token, other financial institutions using 
Eurozone government bonds as collateral are heavily under-collateralised.  The resulting risk is 
absorbed into the global markets and can no longer be accurately identified, isolated and managed by 
firms or their regulators.  Rectifying the situation will be extremely costly, since it would require the 
issuance of considerable amounts of regulatory capital and a much-reduced utility for member state 
government bonds as collateral and as a form of liquid asset.  This, in turn, will make it much more 
expensive for both companies and governments in the Eurozone to raise funds for investment and will 
have a negative impact on economic growth. 
In view of this, the immediate solution is for financial business conducted in the UK to remain there 
and not to be lured into the EU or Eurozone.  If the EU wishes to preserve the considerable financial 
benefits of its current unfettered access to the UK's global markets, it will need to enter into a new 
trading relationship with the UK that provides for certainty for the financial markets and accepts the 
UK's new, autonomous management of the entire financial sector as well as linked sectors, in the 
manner we outline in this paper.  We analyse the different components of the Eurozone problem and 
explain why an Enhanced Equivalence-based trade arrangement in financial services after Brexit would 
be the optimum solution for the Eurozone, not only helping the Eurozone in its development process 
but also facilitating the evolution of effective regulation for the global financial system. 
In essence, the EU has applied the Basel Rules to Eurozone member state government bonds and 
accounting treatments to the Eurosystem in a way that threatens to undermine the global financial 
system, particularly after Brexit.  This is not well understood by governments, financial regulators, and 
financial institutions in the EU or globally – as well as the vast majority of financial journalists.  We 
propose a solution that will help the Eurozone, whilst preserving the integrity of the global financial 
markets. 
 
1. The problem:  a fundamental flaw in the Eurozone's legal architecture, with zero-
risk weighting of EU sub-sovereign bonds causing global systemic risk 
The core of the problem is the failure to recognise the sub-sovereign nature of Eurozone member state 
debt when applying the international Basel Rules on regulatory capital.  In short, EU regulations have 
been crafted with a view to facilitating the construction of the Eurozone by allowing the continuing 
treatment of member states as sovereign, whilst transferring their individual powers to issue currency 
to the ECB.  In so doing, they cut across the global Basel system of regulation, misleadingly treat 
Eurozone member state debt as "sovereign" for Basel regulatory capital purposes and mask the true 
underlying risks.  None of the Eurozone member states has control over the central bank issuer of the 
currency, the ECB.  The sovereignty underpinning the system is, in fact, dispersed between member 
states and the ECB, leaving no single entity with full sovereignty.  This inherent weakness lies at the 
root of a flawed EU application of the Basel Rules across the entire Eurozone architecture.  At its most 
basic, it enables debts issued by Eurozone member states to be held by EU member state banks as if 
they were risk-free investments, even where the member states involved have much weaker third-party 
credit ratings than the AAA/AA- (S&P's) or Aaa/Aa3 (Moody's) ratings that are deemed to be 
compatible with a genuine risk-free investment.  However, it goes deeper than that by treating public 
sector entities and other member state-connected debt issuers as unduly creditworthy.  As will be shown, 
this treatment of Eurozone-connected debt means the Eurosystem 23  and the Eurozone's financial 
                                                     
22 There are those who think the global banking system as a whole is over-capitalised because the Basel Rules have required 
too much capital to be issued across the board.  The point here is different.  The Basel Rules have effectively been 
disapplied for a major source of risk, which leaves the Eurozone under-capitalised under the Basel system, however 
calibrated. 
23 The Eurosystem, short for the Euro System of Central Banks, is a collective term for the ECB and the NCBs of the 
Eurozone member states.  The Eurosystem is not a legal person and cannot contract assets and liabilities of its own.  
"Eurosystem assets and liabilities" are held either by the ECB or by one of the NCBs. 
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institutions are under-capitalised and under-collateralised.  The risks inherent in the debt are not offset 
by loss-bearing capital and the debt is at the same time being used as collateral within the system at 
levels which do not reflect the risk of non-repayment.  It is also being used as a liquid asset when its 
creditworthiness means it cannot be treated as such. 
1.1 The Basel Rules and how they should be applied 
The Basel Rules provide for globally agreed regulatory capital standards.  They are very detailed, 
particularly in light of the 2007-8 financial crisis and the introduction of the Basel III regime for bank 
capital adequacy.  The specific problem is the EU's rules for the regulatory capital—essentially equity 
and subordinated debt—required to be issued by banks and investment firms (in this context, broker-
dealers taking on significant credit risk) for their holdings of Eurozone member state government 
debts.24  These EU regulatory capital requirements are purportedly in conformity with the Basel Rules 
but are, in fact, incorrect in their application. 
What do the Rules do?  The Basel Rules seek to ensure that banks cover all but the most extreme risks25 
they run by maintaining on their balance sheets adequate, internationally agreed amounts of capital 
capable of absorbing reasonably foreseeable losses.  There are various different components to that risk.  
The principal ones identified by the Basel Rules are credit risk, market risk and operational risk.  The 
issues discussed in this paper relate to credit risk, which is the risk of a counterparty defaulting or 
otherwise failing to perform on its obligations under a specific piece of business.  For holders of debt26 
issued by governments or others, credit risk is the risk of default by the issuer on an obligation to pay 
interest or to repay the principal at the end of the debt's term.  The ingredients of the credit risk are, 
first, the financial capacity of the issuer (counterparty risk) and, second, the risk implied by the terms 
for the specific piece of business agreed between the parties, such as the tenor27 and any security offered 
to investors (facility risk).  By requiring a bank to issue loss-absorbing capital to cover the credit risks 
the bank is running, the regulatory capital rules seek to reduce the consequences of a default on the 
repayment by the bank's borrowers, which, in turn, reduces the chances of the bank itself "failing or 
[becoming] likely to fail" as a result of the counterparty default.28  The lack of a normalised application 
of the international standards to EU-based banks and investment firms in their holdings of Eurozone 
member state government debt gives rise to intra-EU systemic risk which, due to the interconnectivities 
of the financial markets, also creates systemic risk globally.  The EU has applied the Basel Rules to 
Eurozone member state government debt in a way that introduces unmanaged risk29 into the financial 
system.  In other words, the EU is allowing banks registered in the Eurozone to operate with insufficient 
loss-absorbing capital to manage the credit risk associated with their holdings of Eurozone member 
state government debt. 
How do the Rules apply?  International bank regulatory capital rules are determined by the Basel 
Process, which arises through a forum for cooperation under the auspices of the Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS) aimed at achieving global monetary and financial stability.30  The Basel Process sets 
out regulatory capital standards regarding the minimum capital required by banks supervised by BIS 
                                                     
24 Eurozone member state government debts are taken on by these governments individually, and in the form of both loans 
and bonds.  The term is often shortened to "Eurozone government bonds", which is misleading in two ways:  it excludes 
loans and it infers there is a Eurozone government, when there is not. 
25 An extreme risk is defined as one that is likely to occur only once in 200 years. 
26 Debts or claims are terms that refer to both obligations based on loans that are borrowed and on bonds that are issued.  
When a bank owns debts of or claims on another party, they are accounted for as an asset in the bank's balance sheet and 
as a liability in the balance sheet of the other party. 
27 The length of time remaining before a financial contract expires. 
28 The "failing or likely to fail" test is set out in the EU's BRRD and it has replaced any member state national insolvency 
tests for banks.  The determination of whether a bank is failing or likely to fail is made by the bank's prudential regulator, 
in consultation with the resolution authority.  The resolution authority will decide whether the bank should be resolved 
under the BRRD or whether it should be wound down under the national insolvency rules of the bank's country of 
incorporation.  In the Eurozone, the ECB is the prudential regulator for the largest banks and the SRB is the resolution 
authority for all Eurozone banks. 
29 An unmanaged risk is one that is not hedged or covered. 
30 For more information about the BIS, see the BIS Committees and Associations page:  https://www.bis.org/stability.htm. 
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members, 31  with enhanced requirements for "global systemically important financial institutions" 
(GSIFIs).  These standards are referred to as the Basel Rules.  Countries participating in the Basel 
Process seek to implement the Basel Rules as a matter of domestic law.  The EU seeks to implement 
the Basel Rules within the EU for all banks (including smaller banks) and investment firms that are 
incorporated in the EU.32 
Under the Basel Rules, holdings by banks of different types of debt are required to be covered by 
different amounts of regulatory capital.  In calculating a particular amount, a debt's principal value33 is 
adjusted to reflect an assessment of the likelihood of the debt being repaid – its "risk-weighting".  This 
takes account of both counterparty risk and facility risk.  A risk-weighting of 80%, for instance, takes 
80% of the principal value of a debt as the amount requiring to be assessed for regulatory capital 
purposes.  A lower risk-weighting indicates a lower chance of issuer default. 
The bank then has to issue the necessary fraction of this risk-weighted amount as regulatory capital.  
That fraction is determined through the two Pillars of the Basel framework.  Pillar 1 ("minimum capital 
requirements") sets the minimum rules applicable in all jurisdictions, and Pillar 2 ("supervisory review") 
furnishes national financial regulators with discretionary tools for managing otherwise uncaptured risks 
such as systemic risk, concentration risk, reputational risk, and liquidity risk.  Under Pillar 1, there is a 
minimum of 7% of so-called "Common Equity Tier 1" (CET1) capital.  The minimum can be revised 
upwards in two ways.  First, there is an extra loading of between 1% and 3.5% if the bank is a GSIFI.  
The Financial Stability Board34 (FSB) issues an annual list of such banks,35 each being allocated into 
one of the five levels that drive the amount of the extra loading36.  Second, national regulators may from 
time to time impose their own extra loading on the banks within their purview, called the "counter-
cyclical buffer", the aim of which is to increase the cost of credit to both banks and borrowers and 
thereby dampen down excessive expansion of credit. 
In total, therefore, for a debt risk-weighted at X%, the associated regulatory capital is equal to the 
Nominal amount of debt × X% × the bank's currently applicable fraction of regulatory capital.  The 
bank's applicable fraction will be 7%, raised by between 1% and 3.5% if the bank is a GSIFI, plus any 
current counter-cyclical buffer.  If that fraction is currently, say, 8%, then a debt of nominal value €50 
mn, which has a risk-weighting of 100%, must have €4 mn of capital set against it.  If the risk-weighting 
is only 25%, then the required capital falls to €1 mn.  
There are two methodologies which the Basel Rules permit banks to use in calculating their risk-
weightings.  First, the bank can apply the standardised weightings set out in detail in the Basel Rules, 
many of which are determined by reference to credit rating agency assessments.  Second, they can 
                                                     
31 Note that some banks are supervised by a regulatory authority other than the relevant BIS member.  For example, banks 
in the US are supervised by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency rather than the Federal Reserve. 
32 The EU implementation of the Basel Rules is through the Capital Requirements Regulation (Regulation (EU) 575/2013) 
and the Capital Requirements Directive (Directive 2013/36/EU).  Both of these pieces of legislation have recently been 
amended, in part to implement the FSB's Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) requirement.  There are transitional 
provisions for certain aspects, but, in general, the revisions to CRR will apply directly across the EU from 28 June 2021.  
Subject to certain exceptions providing for later application dates, the revisions to the CRD must be transposed into 
member state law and applied from 29 December 2020. 
33 The principal value is the amount borrowed, as stated in the loan agreement or in a bond's trust indenture.  "Nominal 
value" and "face value" are synonyms for "principal value". 
34 The FSB is an international body that monitors and makes recommendations about the global financial system.  Its 
mandate is as follows:  "The FSB promotes international financial stability; it does so by coordinating national financial 
authorities and international standard-setting bodies as they work toward developing strong regulatory, supervisory and 
other financial sector policies.  It fosters a level playing field by encouraging coherent implementation of these policies 
across sectors and jurisdictions.  The FSB, working through its members, seeks to strengthen financial systems and 
increase the stability of international financial markets.  The policies developed in the pursuit of this agenda are 
implemented by jurisdictions and national authorities":  https://www.fsb.org/. 
35 https://www.fsb.org/2019/11/fsb-publishes-2019-g-sib-list/ accessed on 11/26/19 for the 2019 update. 
36  To simplify matters, we have not mentioned here the possibility of an institution having extra requirements placed upon 
it by dint of being nominated as a "domestic systemically important bank" (D-SIB) or as an "other systemically important 
institution" (O-SII).  These requirements might also interplay with GSIFI requirements, since a GSIFI will normally be a 
DSIB/O-SII in one or more countries as well. 
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calculate their exposures using internal risk models, which are built using the banks' own historical loss 
data, supplemented or supported by externally-sourced data from data vendors.  This latter method is 
referred to as the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach.37 
The same issue of risk-weightings that are too low manifests itself in the valuation of collateral, where 
this is taken by one party to secure a debt owed to it by another.  The collateral should be both liquid—
meaning it will be a debt based on a bond (which is transferrable) and not a loan—and have a current 
value in excess of the debt.  The size of this excess is customarily referred to as the "haircut" and is 
expressed as a percentage, meaning that the face value of the collateral, less the haircut, is the maximum 
amount that should be lent against the collateral.  The haircut exists to take account of the possibility of 
a deterioration in the market's perception of the credit risk of the collateral, as well as of a rise in absolute 
interest rates or in the shape of the yield curve that increases the yield-to-maturity demanded by buyers 
in the secondary market.  Given that the interest coupon on such a bond is fixed, an increase in yield-
to-maturity is brought about by a fall in price.  This is known as market risk and affects a lender when 
they attempt to sell repossessed collateral and find that the discount demanded from the face value by 
investors exceeds the haircut – even when there is no change in credit risk.  Lenders are wise to apply 
haircuts of 15 – 20% on readily-marketable securities in order to mitigate this risk, and even higher 
haircuts if they are accepting collateral that is not readily-marketable, e.g., in the form of real estate, 
aircraft or ships.  Within Eurozone financial markets, the prime manifestation of haircuts is in the 
Eurosystem eligible collateral list for monetary and payment operations.  The list runs to 25,000+ bond 
issues, with a haircut stated against each one.  These haircuts have been arrived at by applying the same 
principles as underlie the risk-weighting of debts owned by Eurozone banks. 
1.2 How the Basel Rules treat the debts of genuine sovereigns and how the Eurozone bends 
the Rules 
The standardised treatment under the Basel Rules for the risk-weighting for sovereign debts is that they 
are banded into categories according to the external credit rating of the sovereign.  Debt issued by AAA 
to AA- rated sovereigns is 0% risk-weighted, requiring no loss-absorbing capital to be issued by banks 
in respect of such exposures.  For sovereigns rated A+ to A-, only 20% of the principal amount of the 
bonds needs to be included in banks' regulatory capital calculations.38  Exposures to the BIS, the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Union, the ECB, the ESM and the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) are permitted a 0% risk weight.39  
However, there is an important dispensation permitted under the Basel Rules, whereby a claim on a 
sovereign in that sovereign's own currency can be accorded a 0% risk-weighting, regardless of the 
sovereign's external credit rating, and ignoring whether the currency involved—the sovereign's own—
is truly a sovereign currency in the manner contemplated when this dispensation was drafted. 
The Basel Committee itself notes that "in practice, all Committee members currently exercise this 
discretion and set a 0% risk weight".40  This is the root of the problem with the Eurozone:  member 
states allow their banks to classify claims in euros on Eurozone member states as risk-free, even though 
                                                     
37 CRE 20.1 of the Basel Framework sets out two methodologies for banks calculating their risk exposures.  The first option 
is a standardised approach that prescribes specific risk-weights for different exposures.  The second option is an internal 
ratings-based (IRB) approach.  Subject to de minimis conditions, banks that are permitted to do so by their regulator may 
use:  (1) internal estimates of risk components and (2) prescribed formulae in order to calculate risk-weights (CRE 30.1-
2 and Articles 143(1) and 153(1) of the CRR).  The 0% risk-weight under the standardised approach acts as a benchmark 
for IRB calculations, incentivising and justifying banks in following an approach close to or at the 0% risk treatment.  See 
also:  https://www.risk.net/definition/internal-ratings-based-irb-approach. 
38 The risk-weights for the ratings are:  AAA to AA-:  0%; A+ to A-:  20%; BBB+ to BBB-:  50%; BB+ to BB-:  100%; 
below B-:  150%; unrated:  100%.  Different risk-weights are possible where a national regulator recognises the ratings 
of an Export Credit Agency.  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III:  Finalising post-Crisis Reforms, 
December 2017. 
39 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III:  Finalising post-Crisis Reforms, December 2017. 
40 See fn 58 below.  For more on the Basel Committee, see the European Parliament's Briefing Note The Role of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision: 
 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/587390/IPOL_BRI(2017)587390_EN.pdf. 
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the Eurozone member state is not the sole user of the currency and does not control the currency in the 
way in which Japan controls the yen or the US controls the US dollar.  The counterparty risk component 
of credit risk is thus set at 0% for all business that banks conduct with that sovereign.  With this 
component set at 0%, it does not matter at what level the facility risk component (taking account of 
tenor and security) is set.  When counterparty risk and facility risk are multiplied together and the overall 
risk-weighting for credit risk is arrived at, since counterparty risk is weighted at 0%, the overall risk-
weighting for the credit risk will be 0%. 
1.3 The Capital Problem:  incorrect application of the Basel Rules, given the sub-sovereign 
status of Eurozone member states 
A problem with the legal construct of the Eurozone therefore arises from this application of the Basel 
Rules for Eurozone member state government debts.  The EU permits the Basel treatment of high-
quality sovereign debts and of central bank and global financial system debts to be extended to Eurozone 
member state government debts, without amendment.  Under the Capital Requirements Regulation 
(CRR),41 which is the regime by which the EU applies the Basel Rules within the EU, Eurozone member 
states are treated as sovereign in a manner that matches the treatment of any genuinely highly rated 
sovereign state, such as Japan or the US.  However, the EU fails to discriminate among the bonds issued 
by the member states as to their creditworthiness and fails to take account of the incomplete legal 
framework behind the euro as a currency.  For banks using the standardised approach to regulatory 
capital under the CRR, Eurozone member state government debts are risk-weighted at 0%, just like 
OECD sovereign debts of a country with the highest creditworthiness.42  A similar approach is permitted 
for banks applying the IRB approach,43 although the IRB approach, in principle, allows for upward 
adjustments.  As a result, the EU treats these bonds as akin to risk-free cash.   
The upshot is a system-wide overvaluation of assets, and a consequent shortfall in regulatory capital 
and loss-absorption capacity in the EU27's financial institutions sector.  
1.4 The Collateral Problem 
Collateral should be tradeable and liquid; hence it is likely to consist of bonds and not loans.44  The 
lender should lend less than the face value of any collateral to take account of the possibility of a 
deterioration in the market's perception of the credit risk of the collateral, as well as market risk in the 
form of a rise in absolute interest rates or in the shape of the yield curve that increases the yield-to-
maturity demanded by buyers in the secondary market, and hence reduces the realisable price of the 
collateral.  Risk-weightings are expressed in a different manner when accepting the debt of an issuer as 
collateral – as a security margin or haircut.  The result is an under-collateralisation across the EU27 
financial institutions sector. 
A similar treatment is given to Eurozone member state debts held by the ECB and by the NCBs of the 
Eurozone member states, both as collateral beneficiaries for loans extended to banks through the 
modules of the TARGET2 payment system and as owners under the QE programme.45  This supra-
sovereign aspect is explained further in section 1.8 below. 
                                                     
41 Regulation (EU) No 2013/575/EU.  
42 See fn. 38 above.  The permissive standardised approach to regulatory capital tends to be in use by the smaller banks in 
which risks to Eurozone debt may be most acutely concentrated.  The standardised approach is mechanical in its 
application and does not take account of any data on the actual losses experienced by the bank.  The multitudes of smaller 
banks, which tend to use this approach, are therefore particularly exposed. 
43 See fn. 37 above. 
44 Loans can be made tradeable through such devices as Transferable Loan Certificates, Assignment or Novation.  However, 
these devices, rarely if, ever result in a financial instrument that is listed on an exchange, or for which there are active 
secondary market-makers.  The financial instrument is therefore not liquid in a meaningful sense, in which case it is 
ineligible as collateral. 
45 TARGET2 is discussed in section 2.1 below, while the QE programme is discussed in section 2.2. 
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The same debts are also relied upon by CCPs46 as collateral lodged by financial institutions which have 
margin liabilities to them.  CCPs hold the debts as collateral margin at full face value, a situation they 
will become increasingly unable to alter as their "colleges" of regulators—the set of institutions that set 
their rules—fall under the control of the EU financial services authorities.  Under the latest amendments 
to the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR),47 known as EMIR 2.2,48 the ECB itself will 
obtain numerous powers over CCPs, which could be used to impose consistently the inappropriate 0% 
treatment of Eurozone member state bonds.  As things stand, CCPs, including, in particular, those in 
the UK, are able to decline to accept those bonds or to apply a haircut to the value at which they hold 
them.49 
1.5 The Liquidity Problem 
The same treatment has an important knock-on effect for the EU's implementation of the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio (LCR), which is meant to ensure that banks can remain liquid in times of stressed 
financial markets and can meet their near-term liabilities and cash outflows as they fall due.50  Banks 
must make a calculation of their near-term liabilities and likely cash outflows and demonstrate that they 
have sufficient High-Quality Liquid Assets (HQLAs) to meet those liabilities and outflows.  Different 
types of asset can qualify as HQLAs and they are normally all bonds since they are more liquid than 
loans ‒ but not all can be included in the calculation at full face value, without a haircut.  There are 
three levels of HQLA:  Level 1 counting at full face value, Level 2A counting at 85% of face value, and 
Level 2B counting at between 50 – 75% of face value.  When bonds are allocated a 0% risk-weighting 
under CRR, they qualify as Level 1 HQLAs with no haircut,51 as opposed to the Level 2A in which a 
15% haircut would apply if the sovereign only enjoyed a 20% risk weight under CRR.52  Because EU 
authorities allow the Eurozone's Level 2A bonds to enjoy a 0% risk weight, they are elevated to Level 
1 status under LCR, strongly incentivising banks to hold them because they count for their full face 
value with no haircut. 
Beyond whether Eurozone banks are as liquid as they appear, there is a question mark over the entire 
Eurozone bond market and its liquidity, with such a large proportion of it being held either within the 
ECB's QE programme (€2.6 trn), or as collateral behind the Eurosystem's loans to "monetary financial 
institutions" (€3.1 trn, primarily lent to banks), or as collateral for the TARGET2 debts that the 
Eurozone NCBs owe one another. The total bond market size itself is opaque, as is how much remains 
in private hands and is not tied up as a buy-and-hold investment in the Eurosystem programmes 
mentioned above. Rating agencies – pivotal to bond markets – have come under state control,53 and 
clearing houses are increasingly doing so.54  Furthermore, the immediate prospect is for a deterioration 
as a result of the mandatory buy-in provisions of the Central Securities Depositories Regulation (CSD 
Regulation),55 being implemented in 2020.  It is questionable whether the market is even as liquid as it 
was at the time of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis in 2011-2, as the measures taken and planned by 
the authorities direct markets towards adopting risk assessments and trading positions that underpin the 
authorities' own interests, and control and even punish contrary and independent trading positions and 
assessments.  This diminishes or drives out the layer of trading actors who make the market liquid.  In 
effect these independent actors are no longer allowed to act in a way that contradicts the financial 
                                                     
46 Also known as clearing houses. 
47  Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. 
48 Regulation (EU) No 2019/2099. 
49 EMIR, art. 46, read with the related Regulatory Technical Standards (Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 
153/2013). 
50 Documented by the BIS document BCBS238, Basel III:  The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring 
tools, dated January 2013. 
51 Ibid, paragraph 50(c) on page 18. 
52 Ibid, paragraph 52(a) on page 19. 
53  See Factor 5 in section 5. 
54  See the discussion of EMIR 2.2 under Factor 3, in section 5. 
55  Regulation (EU) No 909/2014. 
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interests of authorities, meaning the markets are no longer free markets but serve the interests of the 
state actors that supervise them. Further details are set out in Annex 6. 
1.6 Why the EU's approach is wrong 
The EU's approach fails to discriminate among the bonds issued by member states as to their 
creditworthiness.56  More importantly, however, the EU deviates from the approach adopted in the 
Basel Rules in treating Eurozone member state government bonds as warranting sovereign treatment at 
all.57  Those Rules should apply only to sovereign debts issued by states in control of a central bank 
issuer of their own currency.  Eurozone member states are instead "sub-sovereign" since they have no 
such control.  The rationale for sovereign debts enjoying special treatment under the Basel Rules is 
based on the presumption of their being issued by governments whose central banks can print their own 
currency.  In that case, the government, acting through its central bank, retains the necessary powers to 
create money to make coupon and principal payments and hence avoid any default.  This is an important 
sovereign power that can only be exercised by a government that has sovereign control of its own 
currency, and it lends to the debts of that government in its own currency a quality that is matched 
neither by the same government's debts in a foreign currency nor its debts in a shared currency.  
The Basel Rules do make a differentiation for the treatment of debts issued by a government in a foreign 
currency, where the government does control its own domestic currency:  the government can issue 
more of its own currency, exchange it in the foreign exchange markets for the currency in which the 
debt is denominated and make its debt service payments.  However, this entails significant risks, both 
in terms of the government's ability to obtain the foreign currency at all and in terms of the amount of 
its own currency it will have to issue in order to obtain a fixed amount of the foreign currency.  In 
practice, any doubts about the government's ability to repay its debts will lead the markets to drive down 
the international value of the government's own currency, making it even more difficult for the 
government to service its debts.  This is an additional risk for the investor or lender to whom the debt 
is owed, compared with the situation where the debt is in the government's own currency.  Basel Rules 
recognise this increased risk but their frame of reference contrasts a domestic currency debt of a 
government that has sovereign control of its currency with a foreign currency debt of a government in 
the same circumstances. 
Eurozone member state debt does not fit into either set of circumstances.  In fact, the quality is lower 
than either a domestic or foreign currency debt issued by a country with sovereign control over its own 
currency.  A Eurozone member state cannot issue more "domestic" currency, whether to meet its debts 
in euros or to create euros to sell in the foreign exchange markets to service its debts in foreign currency.  
The power to issue more of the "domestic" currency—the euro—has been ceded exclusively to the 
European-level monetary authorities.  
As things stand, therefore, the Basel risk-weighting for exposures to sovereigns and central banks 
ranges, in theory, from 0% to 150% for exposures denominated in either the domestic or the foreign 
currency, starting with lower risk-weights for exposures to stronger credit-rated counterparties, as 
mentioned above.  In addition, exposures in a domestic currency are permitted to be 0% risk-weighted 
                                                     
56 Others have made the same point, notably in response to discussion paper:  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
The Regulatory Treatment of Sovereign Exposures, December 2017.  Responses are available at 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d425/overview.htm.  However, no action has yet been taken. 
57 This fact was discussed in a 1987 Basel consultation paper and a 1988 Basel I paper.  The Basel Committee members 
outside the European Community (EC) considered the EC's approach to EC member state sovereign risk as unattractive 
and put them at a competitive disadvantage.  The Basel Committee noted that the approach resulted in asymmetry among 
the Basel Committee members, whilst also noting that at the time its practical importance would not be significant due to 
the relatively low level of cross-border business undertaken by banks located in the EC.  In addition, these papers highlight 
how the original Basel Rules were intended to address the risks presented by different types of sovereign and resulted in 
the distinction between the treatment for sovereign debt issued by OECD countries and non-OECD countries.  See Bank 
for International Settlements, Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, Proposals for International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, December 1987, and the related Basel I paper, 
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, July 1988. 
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if the state applies a permitted national discretion to adopt such a treatment, so long as its sovereign 
exposures are "issued and funded" in its domestic currency.58  In practice, all Committee Members 
currently take advantage of this discretion for their government borrowings in their domestic 
currencies.59  For Eurozone member states, the question arises as to whether that approach should be 
followed or whether it would leave some credit risk unmanaged—as it is not envisaged in the Basel 
Rules—such that a modification is required to take account of the circumstances of the Eurozone.60  
To reiterate, there are fundamental differences between the position of Eurozone member states and of 
normal sovereigns outside the Eurozone.  Eurozone member states do not have the usual array of 
monetary policy tools at their disposal nor are sufficiently analogous tools held by the ECB.  Their 
NCBs do not control the issuance of their domestic currency61 and they do not control the actual issuer, 
the ECB.62  Unlike Japan, the US or the UK, Eurozone member states have no ability to authorise their 
central banks to issue currency to pay coupons on their debt or to repay the principal if they otherwise 
run out of funds.  They can instead only issue more debt or default, as demonstrated in the cases of 
Ireland, Portugal, Greece and Cyprus:  each issued additional debt to avoid default in the absence of 
funds, but could issue it only to the International Monetary Fund, to other EU member states or to one 
of the EU's bail-out mechanisms (the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), the EFSF 
or the ESM)63 because the financial markets had closed on them. 
Furthermore, member state NCBs cannot unilaterally change local interest rates to strengthen or weaken 
"their" currency's value in the foreign exchange markets.  Eurozone member state debt is not guaranteed 
"jointly and severally" by the other states of the Eurozone.  The Eurozone does not issue debt as a bloc, 
and there are no Eurobonds akin to US Treasury bonds or UK Gilts.  Each member state's NCB owns 
and funds the ECB to a certain percentage (known as its "capital key" – see Table 5 below) and assumes 
liabilities for ECB losses to that same percentage up until the ECB's capital and reserves have been 
exhausted.  After that, a Qualified Majority Vote of the ECB Governing Council is needed to raise more 
capital, again in line with each NCB's capital key.64  Meanwhile, on the expenditure side, Eurozone 
member states have also lost many attributes of sovereigns:  while retaining responsibility, within 
certain limits, for their own tax and spending, they are severely constrained by the Maastricht Rules65 
(to foster stability and growth) and by the Fiscal Stability Treaty66 (intended to bring the debt-to-GDP 
ratio down to 60% by 2030 or by even more in order to take account of age-related social costs up to 
2050).  The constraints limit the annual fiscal deficit that can be run, the period for which any fiscal 
deficit can be run and the raising of new debt.  In practice, the Eurozone member states are precluded 
from meaningful, autonomous measures to reflate their domestic economies.  
The Eurozone structure has created a type of debt for its member states that is comparable with 
municipal or public sector entity bonds in other jurisdictions, or even the debt of emerging market 
                                                     
58 In its discussion paper:  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, The Regulatory Treatment of Sovereign Exposures, 
December 2017, the Basel Committee proposed removing this exemption to reflect that exposures to any sovereign entail 
some risk.  However, no such change has been made. 
59 Ibid. 
60 The Basel Committee did not go so far as to detail the appropriate treatment for the Eurozone member state government 
bond risk in its December 2017 discussion paper, ibid. 
61 Article 128 of the Treaty on the European Union grants the ECB exclusive powers to authorise the issue of euro banknotes.  
Once authorised, the ECB and the NCBs are able to issue the notes, but the latter cannot issue such notes unilaterally. 
62 In addition, the ECB is increasingly taking a greater role in member states' issuances, while being responsible for setting 
interest rates at the Eurozone level. 
See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/key_ecb_interest_rates/html/index.en.html. 
63 Of which the EFSM and EFSF are now closed to further drawings, leaving the ESM, described below, alone as a fund 
available for new drawings.  
64 For details of how the ECB is funded, see https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/capital/html/index.en.html. 
65 The annual government deficit must not exceed 3% of GDP, or 2.2% if the member state is also in the Eurozone, while 
government debt must not exceed 60% of GDP. 
66 This is formally known as the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
(TSCG).  It was agreed on 2 March 2012 and entered into force on 1 January 2013.  The main provision of this Treaty is 
the requirement to have a balanced budget rule in domestic legal orders (the Fiscal Compact), Article 3, TSCG.  Out of 
the 25 Contracting Parties to the TSCG, 22 are formally bound by the Fiscal Compact (the 19 Eurozone member states 
plus Bulgaria, Denmark and Romania).  See https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/fiscal-compact-taking-stock_en. 
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sovereigns.67  Many municipals and public sector entities have state-like features but can default on 
their obligations, just like private corporations, since they are not able to print money to repay their 
debts.  By adopting the approach the EU has taken, it has undermined the work of the global, standard-
setting Basel Committee in seeking to capture the risks, particularly credit risks, arising in the financial 
markets.  In essence, EU financial regulations have obscured the extent of the financial risks inherent 
in the Eurozone which would become apparent if risk-based capital requirements were to be applied in 
accordance with the Basel Rules. 
The EU Stability and Growth Pact68 seeks to rein in EU member states' expenditure and to provide for 
sound public finances and the coordination of fiscal policies.  If it were to be properly applied, the Pact 
would reduce the chances of default of a Eurozone member state government.69  It might therefore be 
argued that the Pact, by controlling expenditure, justifies a sovereign risk-weighted treatment for 
Eurozone member state bond issuances.  However, this fails to consider the structural differences 
between the sub-sovereign nature of Eurozone member states and normal sovereigns.  If a government 
cannot print its own currency or operate other monetary levers to repay its debt—because it is operating 
in a currency it does not control and it does not retain its own currency as a fallback—all other things 
being equal, its debt is unquestionably riskier than normal sovereign debt, and the additional risk should 
be recognised and accounted for in the context of the regulatory capital regime.70 
1.7 Illustration of the problem 
The structural differences can be explained using Figure 2. 
Figure 2:  The nature of a sovereign claim vs. a sub-sovereign claim, e.g., on a Eurozone member 
state 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
67 For a list of sovereign defaults, see Beers, D., and Mavalwalla, J. (2017) Database of Sovereign Defaults, Bank of Canada, 
Technical Report No. 101:  https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/r101-revised-june2017.pdf.  
68 The EU Stability and Growth Pact is an agreement among the then 28 member states of the EU relating to fiscal issues 
only.  It was introduced by a resolution and two Council Regulations of July 1997, which entered into force in July 1998 
and January 1999, respectively.  The Maastricht Treaty (formally, the Treaty on the European Union) officially 
established the European Union in 1993, creating EU citizenship and laid the foundations for the introduction of the euro 
and a central banking system. 
69 There is also the ESM, which provides limited financial assistance to Eurozone states in financial difficulty.  It can borrow 
through bond issuances up to €500 bn (ESM Treaty, art. 39).  Note that while art. 39 was drafted as a transitional provision 
subject to change before the treaty entered into force, the amount has remained unaltered in the 2019 draft revised text.  
€153,233 bn was used to bail-out the Irish, Portuguese, Cypriot, Spanish and Greek banks between 2011 and 2016. 
70 Others have made the same point, notably in response to the discussion paper Bank for International Settlements, Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, The Regulatory Treatment of Sovereign Exposures, December 2017. 
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There is no sovereign, as contemplated in the Basel Rules, at the apex of the Eurosystem pyramid.  Each 
Eurozone member state is instead on the level of a sub-sovereign in a country with its own currency. 
It has already been seen that this is not reflected in the risk-weightings accorded to the sovereign.  The 
under-weighting at the sovereign level has then trickled down to the risk-weightings accorded to all 
other levels of sovereign-related entity in the Eurozone.  It has a consequential impact on the credit 
quality of public sector entities that depend on the sovereign.  These entities derive their 
creditworthiness from their connection to the sovereign borrower under which they sit.  The sovereign's 
creditworthiness is reduced by it not having sovereign control over its currency.  In consequence, the 
creditworthiness of these other public sector entities is reduced. 
This fact ought to be reflected in the risk-weightings accorded by banks to their business with the 
sovereign and with all these other entities.  Thus, every type of Eurozone counterparty automatically 
ranks one level below where it would rank in a genuinely sovereign country: 
• Sub-sovereigns, whose debts sit within the scope of what Eurostat classifies as general government 
gross debt,71 including state government, local government and social security funds. 
• "Other public sector entities" (OPSEs)—also classified as "sub-sub-sovereigns"—would include 
publicly funded transport, postal, water, gas, electricity and communication utilities, as well as 
private companies under majority public control and special-purpose asset holding companies with 
a supply contract with a public entity (such as within a structure funded by the EIB Group through 
the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI)72). 
These entities are classified into two groups: (1) sub-sovereign, whose debts are included in the Eurostat 
database of "general government gross debt"; and (2) other public sector entity, whose debts are 
invisible in the Eurostat database.  
There is also the issue of the EU institutions that sit above the sovereigns—the "supra-sovereigns", 
namely the EU itself, the ECB, the EIB, and the ESM—and how they are backed.  They are backed by 
the same sovereigns, which are not genuine sovereigns, meaning that the supra-sovereigns should be 
less highly rated than they are. 
Finally, the same phenomenon may well be operating at the bank and corporate level as well, although 
the matter is beyond the scope of this paper.  This could occur with banks because the standardised risk-
weighting for an OECD bank is 20%, regardless of its credit rating.  This could also occur with 
corporates if the corporate has a high external credit rating, even if its standardised risk-weighting is 
100%. 
The position of supra-sovereigns merits special consideration. 
1.8 Supra-sovereigns:  the structural flaw in supra-sovereign claims 
Just as we must have regard to the situation facing the entities sitting below a sovereign, we must also 
have regard to the situation facing the supra-sovereigns in the Eurozone and to the claims that depositors 
may have on a "national deposit guarantee scheme" (NDGS) in case the bank went into resolution. 
The supra-sovereigns and the NDGS do not have capital and resources of their own:  their 
creditworthiness depends on their recourse to the EU and Eurozone member states.  See Table 1. 
                                                     
71 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=sdg_17_40&plugin=1 accessed on 
26/11/19. 
72 The EFSI is discussed in section 2.3. 
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Table 1:  Line of recourse for EU entities 
ENTITY LINE OF RECOURSE 
European Union73 Where the EU has borrowed in order to make a loan, or where it has 
issued a guarantee to the EIB for its loans, a default by a borrower or a 
guarantee claim by the EIB would leave a claim under the 
Commitments Appropriation of the EU Budget, which is a joint-and-
several liability of all EU member states, whether in the Eurozone or 
not.  The amount that can be committed by the EU is limited to 0.26% 
of EU GNI for the seven-year Multiannual Financial Framework up to 
the end of 2020, plus what remains committed from previous periods.  
This is confirmed in Moody's 2015 rating report on the EU in which 
they attest, on p.1 under "Overview and Outlook", to the "European 
Commission's right to call for additional resources of on average up to 
around 0.26% of EU Gross National Income (around €40 billion on 
average) each year during 2014-20 from its member states, on a joint 
and several basis". 
European Investment 
Bank74 
The subscribed-but-not-called block of capital, subscribed by all EU 
member states, but on a several-but-not-joint basis. 
European Stability 
Mechanism75 
The subscribed-but-not-called block of capital, subscribed by all 
Eurozone States, but on a several-but-not-joint basis. 
European Central Bank76 A small block of subscribed-but-not-called capital from the non-
Eurozone central banks.  The capital subscribed by the Eurozone 
central banks is larger but has all been called.  A further raising of the 
capital requires Qualified Majority Voting support of the ECB 
Governing Council, which is composed of the senior ECB executives 
and the governors of the Eurozone central banks.  A capital raising is 
allocated around the Eurozone and non-Eurozone central banks 
according to their capital keys in the ECB (which are calculated with 
reference to each member state's share of the EU's population and 
GDP).  The resultant claims on central banks to pay in new capital are 
on a several-but-not-joint basis. 
National deposit 
guarantee scheme 
A claim on the exchequer of the member state concerned, as Olaf 
Scholz, German Finance Minister, recently confirmed in his speech 
proposing to upgrade the separate NDGS under a European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme.77 
 
Table 2 shows a clear hierarchy based on the nature of the claim on member states, and on which ones. 
                                                     
73 EU investor publication – Investor Presentation p.8 of July 2015, confirmed in Moody's 2015 rating report on the EU. 
74 Explanation in Moody's 2015 rating report on the EIB of 2015 pp. 16 – 17, "Strength of Member Support". 
75 https://www.esm.europa.eu/esm-governance#anc_shareholders – The subscribed capital is €705 billion, but the paid-in 
capital is only €80 billion.  The table, accessed on 27/11/19, shows each member state's subscribed and paid-in capital 
but omits to state the contingent liability of each member state to pay in the balance. 
76 See Table 5 for a breakdown of ECB capital. 
77 See Scholz, O., "Germany will consider EU-wide bank deposit insurance", Financial Times, 5 November 2019.  Scholz's 
proposal did not receive wide support, especially in Germany, and has not to date been taken forward. 
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Table 2:  Nature of liabilities of EU entities 
ENTITY NATURE OF LIABILITY 
European Union In place/no decision-making needed; joint-and-several liability; all EU 
member states. 
European Investment 
Bank 
In place/no decision-making needed; several-but-not-joint basis of all 
EU member states. 
European Stability 
Mechanism 
In place/no decision-making needed; several-but-not-joint basis – 
Eurozone only. 
European Central Bank Not in place ‒ requires a vote of the ECB Governing Council to create 
the liability; several-but-not-joint basis of all EU member states. 
National deposit 
guarantee scheme 
In place/no decision-making needed; liability of one member state 
only. 
 
It is therefore clear that the creditworthiness of all the Eurozone supra-sovereigns—which sit above the 
sovereigns in the hierarchy—is dependent upon the same sovereigns as the entities below, including the 
NDGS.  See Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3:  There is no "Eurozone government", no genuine sovereign issuer 
 
 
Just as the risk-weightings accorded by banks to their business with the sovereign and with all entities 
in the levels below the sovereign may be too favourable, in the sense of not reflecting the true credit 
exposure involved, this concern also applies to the risk-weightings accorded by banks to all the supra-
sovereigns, since their creditworthiness is based on their being a look-through to the same sovereigns. 
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1.9 The supra-sovereign capital, collateral and liquidity problem  
Like the banks, the supra-sovereigns harbour their own problems in relation to capital, collateral and 
liquidity, including:   
• The EIB's loan portfolio is concentrated in the sub-sovereign and OPSE sectors, and its risk-
weightings on loans, in many cases over 15 years' final maturity, ought adequately to recognise both 
the counterparty risk and facility risk dimensions of credit risk.78 
• The Eurosystem eligible collateral list contains supra-sovereigns, sub-sovereigns and OPSEs, as well 
as sovereigns, and the haircuts ought adequately to recognise both the credit risk and market risk 
inherent in these holdings. 
• The Eurosystem makes loans to monetary financial institutions (MFIs) based on this collateral, both 
through Longer-term Refinancing Operations and through the modules of TARGET2, and again the 
haircuts ought adequately to recognise both the credit risk and market risk inherent in accepting 
these holdings as collateral. 
• Eurosystem members' NCBs lend to one another through TARGET2 also based on this collateral, 
and similarly the haircuts ought adequately to recognise both the credit risk and market risk inherent 
in accepting these holdings as collateral.79  
Eurostat collects and reports some (incomplete) data on this topic.  However, the total amount of public 
sector debt involved exceeds the amounts reported in the Eurostat figures because Eurostat only 
includes the debts into the sovereign and sub-sovereign levels in Figure 2 above.  The debts at the OPSE 
level are excluded.  Nor do the Eurostat figures include the sovereigns' contingent liabilities under: 
• The Commitments Appropriation of the EU Budget. 
• The subscribed-but-not-called capital commitments to the EIB and ESM. 
• Guarantees issued by member states in the context of securitisations of banks' "NPLs". 
• Guarantees issued by sovereigns for the debts of public sector entities to the EIB where the PSE 
would class as a sub-sub-sovereign. 
There cannot be a contingent liability for a capital commitment regarding the ECB because that would 
need a Governing Council meeting to create it. 
Overall, the exposures of the Eurosystem are opaque and difficult to pin down.  Annex 1 sets out 
numerous points of uncertainty as to the full situation which require further exploration if an accurate 
assessment is to be made. 
  
                                                     
78 The risks in the EIB are discussed in section 2.3. 
79 The risks in TARGET2 are discussed in section 2.1. 
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Table 3:  The impacts of the risk-weighting of sovereigns at 0% 
IMPACT 
OF SOVEREIGN BEING 
0% RISK WEIGHTED 
OF SUB- AND SUB-SUB- 
SOVEREIGNS ENJOYING TOO 
FAVOURABLE A RISK-
WEIGHTING 
Capital call on EIB, 
ESM, ECB less reliable  
 
EU, ESM, EIB 
overrated   
EIB CET1 ratio 
overstated 
  
Banks' CET1 ratio 
overstated   
Banks less liquid than 
they appear   
QE portfolio contains 
more risk  
 
(if it contains these bonds) 
Haircuts in ECB 
eligible collateral list 
are too low 
  
NCBs have collateral 
shortfall   
CCPs have collateral 
shortfall   
NDGS claim less 
valuable than it appears  
 
 
 
1.10 Depiction of the impacts 
Table 3 summarises the primary and secondary impacts of the risk-weighting of sovereigns at 0%, and 
of the trickle-down (and indeed trickle-up) effect of risk-weightings being accorded that are too 
generous to public entities and to supra-sovereigns. 
1.11 Application to other financial markets participants 
The EU has applied its approach to the regulatory capital treatment of Eurozone member state 
government debts across the financial system as a whole, not just in the context of banks.  For example, 
insurance companies are required to apply a similar treatment to Eurozone member state government 
bonds in their own regulatory capital treatment under Solvency II.80  There is an additional issue with 
EU-based insurance companies which relates to the so-called Ultimate Forward Rate.  This is used to 
calculate the required regulatory capital against life contracts, and particularly where the contracts have 
a guaranteed rate in them ‒ which is common in many continental countries, such as Germany, although 
not in the UK.  For all currencies other than the euro, the rate is set at market rates.  For the euro, it is a 
                                                     
80 Article 180, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/35 of 10 October 2014, supplementing Directive 2009/138/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance 
(Solvency II). 
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fixed rate determined in the regulation, which is now well above market rates.81  That lowers the capital 
requirement but introduces further risk. 
Then there are pension funds.  The main pension funds in the EU are in the Netherlands and Ireland, 
and, before Brexit, in the UK.  Currently, EU pension funds do not have solvency capital requirements, 
but under pressure from continental life insurance companies—which do and which therefore believe 
they are at a competitive disadvantage to pension funds in the market for retirement income products—
the EU has sought to introduce solvency capital for pension funds in the revisions to the IORP 
Directive.82  Solvency II-type regulatory capital requirements for EU pension funds would introduce a 
similar problem to that faced by other EU financial institutions.  Also there is the mooted "financial 
transactions tax", strongly supported by France,83 which would badly affect pension funds.84  
1.12 The Basel Committee's assessment of the EU's implementation of its Rules 
As a strict technical matter, Basel assessed the EU's credit risk-weighting regime under the standardised 
approach as "largely compliant"85 – the same grading as the US.  However, even some EU institutions 
recognise that the EU implementation of Basel has undermined confidence in the risk-weighted assets 
(RWA) framework and acted as a drag on bank valuations.  This includes areas where the EU has 
expressly deviated from the letter of Basel (as is the case for instance with Company Voluntary 
Arrangement exemptions and the treatment of insurance subsidiaries) as against those where it has 
deviated from the spirit of the rules, which is the case for sovereign debt treatment. 
This is reflected in two quotes from a 12 November 2019 speech by Jose-Manuel Campa of the 
European Banking Association:  "Fitch for instance argued that 'making EU banking regulation fully 
compliant with Basel standards will be ... important for … restoring investors' confidence in risk-
weighted assets (RWA)'.  They concluded that 'an EU move to improve Basel compliance would aid 
[the] analysis of bank capital, and reduce investor scepticism'.  Similarly, Moody's stressed that, and I 
quote, the 'BCBS [Basel Committee] finding is credit negative for EU banks, because they are subject 
to a regulatory regime and to capital requirements that are not as rigorous as those in other countries'.  
The analysts stressed that the EU's assessment was the weakest at those times".86 
It is also worth noting that almost one-third of the Basel Committee representatives are from the EU.  
Decisions of the Basel Committee are taken by consensus.  Moreover, Basel has determined that the 
EU has been deficient in allowing banks that employ an IRB approach too many concessions in using 
their credit models – including on sovereigns.87  
Sovereign treatment has also been a vexed topic more generally.  In 2017, the Basel Committee 
considered, in its proposed revisions to the Basel Rules, the introduction of new rules for sovereign 
                                                     
81 From 1 January 2020, the UFR is 3.75%, well above current long-term market rates.  See 
https://eiopa.europa.eu/Pages/News/EIOPA-publishes-the-calculation-of-the-Ultimate-Forward-Rate-for-2020.aspx. 
82 The IORP II Directive (Directive (EU) 2016/2341 of December 14, 2016) repealed the IORP I Directive (Directive 
2003/41/EC of 3 June 2003).  The European Commission's proposals to include Solvency II capital requirements for 
pensions were excluded from the final version of IORP II and Recital 77 explains the policy decision:  "The further 
development at Union level of solvency models, such as the holistic balance sheet (HBS), is not realistic in practical terms 
and not effective in terms of costs and benefits, particularly given the diversity of IORPs within and across member states.  
No quantitative capital requirements, such as Solvency II or HBS models derived therefrom, should therefore be 
developed at the Union level with regard to IORPs, as they could potentially decrease the willingness of employers to 
provide occupational pension schemes".  It is questionable whether this is the end of the story, given the European 
Commission's persistent practice of concentrating ever more power at the centre. 
83 "France to push for European financial transactions tax", Reuters, December 10, 2017; https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-
france-tax-environment/france-to-push-for-european-financial-transactions-tax-idUKKBN1E40G1. 
84  Tim Worstall, The case against a financial transactions tax, Current Controversies Paper No. 33, November 2011, 
Institute of Economic Affairs,  https://iea.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Financial%20Transaction%20Tax_0.pdf. 
85 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.  Programme (RCAP):  Assessment of Basel III Regulations – European Union, 
December 2014:  https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d300.pdf. 
86 See https://eba.europa.eu/file/248669/download?token=J2cBYTyJ. 
87 See fn. 85 above. 
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exposures, distinguishing between exposures to central banks, exposures to central governments and 
exposures to other sovereign entities, including sub-national governments.  Exposures to EU member 
state governments were envisaged to qualify as exposures to a central government, despite Eurozone 
countries' central banks not having the independent power to issue currency.88  This proposal would not 
therefore have rectified the current misapplication of the rules for sovereign treatment by the EU, but it 
would have resulted in further more sophisticated sub-distinctions between the various categories of 
sovereign, which might have required a more sophisticated breakdown of risk amongst entities within 
the Eurozone that rely on member state support.  However, even this initiative failed.  No consensus 
was reached as to the appropriateness of the proposal and it was not incorporated into the Basel Rules.   
 
2. How TARGET2, the QE programme, the EIB Group and bank NPLs augment the 
problem 
The situation is compounded by the build-up of large liabilities, many of which are insufficiently 
collateralised, related to the TARGET2 euro payment system, the Eurozone's QE programme and the 
loans and guarantees made by the EIB Group.  The liabilities themselves have become very significant, 
but, in addition, many of the liabilities and loans have been collateralised with member state government 
bonds and other member state public sector entity bonds, which are wrongly presumed to be safe, zero 
risk-weighted collateral.  These three examples enable us to attempt to quantify the scale of the problem 
that is addressed in this paper by indicating the additional public sector liabilities permitted by the zero 
risk-weighting of Eurozone sovereigns.  A more accurate way of quantifying the problem would be to 
have access to the portfolios of business of the Eurozone supra-sovereigns and of all Eurozone banks, 
as well their respective IRB methodologies and then to calculate their degree of under-capitalisation 
and under-collateralisation.  Annex 1 gives a fuller overview of the extensive researches that would 
have to be undertaken to fully quantify the problem, so the calculations here regarding TARGET2, QE 
and the EIB Group should be read merely as indicative of the scale of the problem.  The problem is 
compounded by the volume of NPLs in many Eurozone banks. 
2.1 TARGET2 
TARGET2 is the high-value real-time gross (RTGS) payment system for the euro, comprising the 
national high-value payment systems of the 19 Eurozone member states, the euro-denominated high-
value payment systems in five non-Eurozone EU member states and the arrangements between 
TARGET2-participating central banks and the ECB to make cross-border payments.  All business in 
euros contracted with Eurosystem members must be settled through TARGET2, and it also carries the 
main financial markets business between financial institutions, as well as the settlements of balances in 
other Financial Markets Infrastructures.89   
The TARGET2 system includes modules through which the Eurozone NCBs make loans to the banks 
that they have sponsored onto the system.90  These modules are the Proprietary Home Account, which 
an NCB maintains itself and links in to the TARGET2 infrastructure, and the Home Accounts Module 
and Standing Facilities, which sit inside the TARGET2 infrastructure. 
These loans must all be backed by collateral on the Eurosystem eligible collateral list.  Where the 
collateral includes, as it must, bonds issued by the EU's supra-sovereigns, sovereigns, sub-sovereigns 
                                                     
88 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, The Regulatory Treatment of Sovereign Exposures, December 2017.  The 
definition of an exposure to a central government is stated as:  "exposures to a government of a state which has the power 
to raise taxes, borrow money and issue currency by means of a central bank, either of that state, or of a currency union to 
which that state belongs".  This appears designed to cover Eurozone states, and it fails to make the vital distinction that 
those states do not individually control the central bank of the currency union (the ECB) which issues the relevant 
currency. 
89 Essentially, these are a multilateral systems between participating financial institutions, including the operator of the 
system, used for the purposes of recording, clearing, or settling payments, securities, derivatives, or other financial 
transactions.  https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/target/target2/html/index.en.html. 
90 TARGET2 Information Guide for TARGET2 Users v4.0 of December 2016, page 12. 
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and OPSEs, the loans—and therefore the NCBs—will be under-collateralised if the creditors are lending 
close to the face value of the bonds less the haircut. 
The quantity of direct financing being extended by the Eurosystem to the banks is not made explicitly 
clear in the Eurosystem's accounts.  It would be one of the areas for further detailed enquiry in order 
fully to assess the level of risk posed to the global markets resulting from the Eurosystem, as laid out in 
Annex 1.   
The Eurosystem issues four sets of accounts:  the ECB's annual report as of December 31st, a 
Eurosystem consolidated balance sheet over two pages as at December 31st, which is included within 
the ECB annual report, a Eurosystem aggregate balance sheet on the last business day of each month, 
and the disaggregated financial statement of the Eurosystem, also on the last business day of each 
month.  The Eurosystem aggregated balance sheet of 30 August 2019 (i.e., the sum of all the external 
assets and liabilities of the ECB and the NCBs vis-à-vis non-members of the Eurosystem) showed 
"loans to monetary financial institutions" that were residents of the Euro area of €3.1 trn.  These cannot 
be loans between Eurosystem members, nor loans to Eurozone sovereigns or supra-sovereigns, nor 
loans to any entity outside the Eurozone.  There is no similar position in the ECB balance sheet 
published at year-end beyond the much smaller "longer-term refinancing operations" of just over €720 
bn.  By a process of elimination, then, this figure must represent loans made by NCBs to banks, either 
of the full €3.1 trn, or of €2.4 trn if the full figure includes "longer-term refinancing operations". 
Over and above the loans made by NCBs to banks through the modules of TARGET2, there is the issue 
of the imbalances between the NCBs on their accounts held with one another, which were established 
to process cross-border payments.  These payments are ultimately for private sector end-users, be they 
financial institutions, corporates or individuals.  TARGET2 has converted private sector cross-border 
liabilities into sovereign cross-border liabilities, which are treated as risk-free.  To illustrate, suppose 
an Italian company imports machinery from a German company and finances this with a loan from its 
Italian bank.  The Italian bank debits the loan account and makes a payment into the German company's 
German bank.  This, in turn, leads to a TARGET2 debit for the Banca d'Italia and a TARGET2 credit 
for the Bundesbank.  The balances between the Banca d'Italia and the Bundesbank are not settled, but 
are rather novated to the ECB at end-of-day, before being reversed back on to their original accounts at 
the start of the following day.  The Banca d'Italia would retain either a deposit of the Bundesbank on 
its books or an overdraft on its own account at the Bundesbank. 
By this method, TARGET2 causes the private debt of an Italian company to become funded by the 
central bank of Germany, an operation that does or does not add to the national debt91 of the Italian 
government, depending upon which account the debt is configured on. 
In the case where the debt is in the form of an overdraft on the Banca d'Italia's account at the 
Bundesbank, this also may or may not add to Italy's national debt depending on which bonds the 
overdraft is secured with from the Eurosystem eligible collateral list.  If the bonds actually lodged by 
the Banca d'Italia are ones that are included in the Eurostat database for the "general government gross 
debt", then the operation will not add to Italy's national debt as it is commonly understood.  If the bonds 
are issued by an Italian "other public sector entity", the operation will also not add to Italy's real national 
debt as the bonds have already been issued and are a public sector debt, but the debt will be incremental 
to the Eurostat figures.  If, however, the bonds are issued by supra-sovereigns or by banks/corporates, 
the operation does increase the national debt, because the debt is a debt of the Banca d'Italia but the 
collateral is not in the name of any Italian public entity. 
In the case where the debt is in the form of a deposit on the Bundesbank's account at the Banca d'Italia, 
this also increases the Italian national debt as no collateral is required. 
                                                     
91 Defined to include Banca d'Italia's Eurosystem liabilities. 
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We assume that the debts of central banks are not included in Eurostat's "general government gross 
debt", as the notes to the tables do not specifically say they are.  Annex 1 sets out the scope of Eurostat's 
figures.  
It might be thought that the EU's TARGET2 system, which underpins the Eurozone, connects the 
member state economies sufficiently that their liabilities could be treated as supported by all Eurozone 
states collectively.  This would then justify a 0% risk-weighting being applied.  The Eurozone, as a 
whole, controls its own currency through the ECB, but the Eurozone does not issue debt and is merely 
a collection of individual member states.  It is true that the TARGET2 system provides an element of 
cross-subsidisation between Eurozone member states in allowing for extensive and automated mutual 
credits and debits between member states' central banks.92  However, the TARGET2 system merely 
involves the creation of intra-Eurosystem debts between member states' central banks, not a means of 
cancelling debts, since EU law prohibits bail-outs of member states.93  Thus, TARGET2 does not 
achieve the communal backing by Eurozone member states of each other's debts, even though people 
may perceive these debts to be communally backed. 
As a practical matter, were any Eurozone member state to run into financial difficulties, it has been 
made clear by Germany and other northern Eurozone member states with TARGET2 surpluses that 
there will be no bail-out;94 and indeed the Eurozone's behaviour in relation to the post-2009 Greek 
sovereign debt crisis affirmed this approach.  Although the Eurozone reform deal, agreed by EU finance 
ministers in June 2019, will see a common budget established for the euro area,95 the expected limit of 
around €20 bn means that this deal could not then be used for the purposes of significant bail-outs.  
Further, at the beginning of 2017, Mario Draghi, the then (Italian) head of the ECB—who four years 
earlier had said the ECB would do "whatever it takes to preserve the euro"—made it clear, in a letter to 
two Italian parliamentarians, that a country could leave the Eurozone but would first need to settle its 
TARGET2 liabilities "in full".96  This TARGET2 obligation would mean that if Italy were to leave the 
euro, for example, it would end up redenominating its national currency into lira whilst retaining euro 
debts – which would be debts in a foreign currency over which it exerts no control.  The likelihood 
would be a fall in the relative value of the lira, putting Italy's repayment of its TARGET2 euro balances 
beyond reach.  If an economically significant Eurozone member state, such as Italy, were to default on 
its debts, the Eurozone could face an existential crisis.  The Governor of the Hungarian National Bank 
has noted that "[t]wo decades after the euro's launch, most of the necessary pillars of a successful global 
currency…are still missing".97  It might be the case that the "no bail-out" prohibition in EU law and the 
statements of Mario Draghi about the enforcement of TARGET2 liabilities would in practice be 
circumvented and forgotten, but the size of the debts involved make this possibility politically difficult, 
such that this is an eventuality that cannot be relied upon to occur. 
                                                     
92 Blake, D., "Target2:  The Silent Bailout System that Keeps the Euro Afloat", SSRN, 22 May 2018, 
(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3182995), observes that Eurozone member states are able to 
borrow through the TARGET2 system without paying interest and without having to repay the loan.  TARGET2 has been 
used by the highly indebted Eurozone member states to counteract in part Germany's refusal to share its surpluses (circa 
€900 bn) with those member states in deficit (Italy owes circa €450 bn and Spain owes circa €400 bn).  See Figure 10 
and the TARGET2 figures here:  https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/target/target2/facts/html/index.en.html. 
93 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, arts. 123 and 125.  These provisions apply as between all EU member 
states.  However, while a bail-out is not permitted by law, certain types of conditional financial assistance are available 
to members of the Eurozone.  Art. 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (as amended by the 
European Council Decision 2011/199/EU) states that "[t]he member states whose currency is the euro may establish a 
stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole.  The granting 
of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality".  Pursuant to this 
Article 136 and the ESM Treaty, the ESM was established.  See fn. 69 above for details of the ESM's operation and 
lending capacity. 
94 Smith, H., "Greece must reform or leave Eurozone, says German minister", The Guardian, 4 December 2016. 
95 Dendrinou, V., "Finance Chiefs Agree on Euro-Area Budget But Skirt Funding", Bloomberg, 14 June 2019. 
96 Canepa, F., "Any country leaving euro zone must settle bill first:  ECB's Draghi", Reuters, 20 January 2017. 
97 Matolcsy, G., "We need to admit the euro was a mistake", Financial Times, 3 November 2019. 
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2.2 The QE programme 
In 2015, the ECB introduced a quantitative easing programme (officially called the Asset Purchase 
Programme (APP)) to provide liquidity to the Eurozone banking system and, in turn, stimulate 
economic growth.  This programme has been extensively used.  The ECB bought €2.6 trn of Eurozone 
bonds between March 2015 and December 2018.98  Under QE, the ECB's balance sheet increased to 
€4.65 trn.  The programme was running at €30 bn of new purchases per month until it was reduced to 
€15 bn a month pursuant to an ECB Governing Council meeting on 14 June 2018,99 and new purchases 
were stopped as of the end of December 2018.  However, the same meeting decided to reinvest 
maturities.  As the QE portfolio size had built up to €2.6 trn at the end of 2018, its average remaining 
life becomes important in estimating the monthly maturities.  If this was still the balance at the end of 
June 2018, and if the average remaining life was 48 months, the monthly maturities would be €54 bn, 
while if it was 60 months, they would be €43 bn.  The run-down and curtailment of new purchases, 
even offset by the reinvestment of maturities, was deemed to have failed to achieve the desired stimulus, 
and, in November 2019, the ECB restarted the QE programme with additional purchases of Eurozone 
bonds at the rate of €20 bn per month.100 
The key issue with QE is what the portfolio consists of in detail.  All the bonds must be on the 
Eurosystem eligible collateral list.  The question that arises relates to the quality of that collateral.  
Available statistics show that the majority of the QE portfolio is invested in public sector bonds – which 
covers all of the issuers within the scope of Eurostat's data, plus OPSE as shown in Figure 2 and the 
diagrams in Annex 1.  Corporate and bank bonds were purchased but in much smaller volumes.  The 
QE portfolio is owned in a structure whereby each NCB buys the bonds issued by entities in its own 
country.  Neither the NCBs nor the ECB need to issue capital against the portfolio in the way a 
commercial bank would have to under the Basel Rules.  To the extent the bonds held in the QE portfolio 
involve credit risk that is not provisioned with regulatory capital, the overall risk to the Eurosystem has 
increased.  As with other aspects of the Eurosystem, there appears to be a significant shortfall in any 
loss-absorption layer inside the system given the size of QE and what it is invested in.  The publicly 
available data are sparse.  In Annex 1, we set out certain questions that need to be addressed for a full 
understanding of the position. 
2.3 The EIB Group 
The EIB Group has three components:  the EIB itself, the European Investment Fund (EIF) and the 
EFSI.  The EIB describes itself as "the lending arm of the European Union".101  Established in 1958, 
with EU member states as shareholders, the EIB makes loans for the purpose of promoting European 
integration and social cohesion.  The EIF was established in 1994 to provide finance for small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs, including microfinance) in order to "foster EU objectives in support 
of entrepreneurship, growth, innovation, research and development, and employment".102  It is part of 
the EIB Group but does not lend money to SMEs directly.  Instead, it provides finance through private 
banks and funds, principally through venture capital and in guaranteeing loans.  
The EFSI is an initiative launched jointly by the EIB Group—the EIB and the EIF—and the European 
Commission to help overcome the current investment gap in the EU.  EFSI is one of the three pillars of 
the Investment Plan for Europe103 that aims to revive investment in strategic projects around the 
continent to ensure that money reaches the real economy.  With EFSI support, the EIB Group is 
"providing funding for economically viable projects, especially for projects with a higher risk profile 
                                                     
98 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-49674176.  Bond coupons and maturing principal were reinvested in the 
programme.  These bonds must be on the ECB eligible collateral list. 
99 https://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2018/jun/14/ecb-qe-stimulus-mario-draghi-fed-rate-hike-uk-retail-sales-
business-live.  
100 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2019/html/ecb.mp190912~08de50b4d2.en.html. 
101 https://www.eib.org/en/about/index.htm. 
102 https://www.eif.org/index.htm. 
103 See Investment Plan for Europe:  the Juncker Plan at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/jobs-growth-and-
investment/investment-plan-europe-juncker-plan_en. 
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than usually taken on by the Bank".  It is intended to focus on sectors of key importance for the EU 
economy, such as:  strategic infrastructure including digital, transport and energy; education, research, 
development and innovation; renewable energy and resource efficiency; and support for small- and 
mid-sized businesses".104  EFSI was first announced by European Commission President Jean-Claude 
Juncker in November 2014 and was also known as the Juncker Plan and, later, the InvestEU 
Programme.105,106 
EIB loans are concentrated into the type of borrower referred to in Figure 1 and in the diagrams in 
Annex 1 as "other public sector entity".  Such loans fall outside Eurostat's statistics.  The EIB's paid-in 
capital is only around 10% of its subscribed capital; the remainder represents a claim on EU member 
states on a sovereign-but-not-joint basis, as also shown in Annex 1.  A key point is that the EIF, not 
being a bank, does not have to maintain regulatory capital.  By having the EIF make the high-risk 
commitments that would attract a large capital requirement if the EIB had made them, the EIB manages 
to limit the appearance of the risks in the business it and its subsidiary are undertaking. 
Further, the data issued by EIB does not give clarity as to the make-up of its loan portfolio or its risk-
weighting system.  The EIB has substantial off-balance sheet business as well as its loans.  It is opaque 
what the risk profile is of the counterparties to this portfolio of off-balance sheet business, as well as of 
the portfolio itself due to its intrinsic characteristics.  Yet the EIB still reports a very high CET1 ratio.  
Annex 1 describes the further enquiries needing to be made about the EIB in order to ascertain whether 
it is another institution that is applying risk-weightings that overstate the quality of the Eurozone 
sovereigns which are its borrowers or on whom there is a financial dependency on the part of its 
borrowers.  This effect—where other public sector borrowers are accorded too favourable risk-
weightings—is one we refer to as "trickle-down".  If it is in play at the EIB, then its portfolio of business 
contains more risk than its CET1 ratio implies, and there is a greater chance that the EU member states 
will be called upon to pay in some or all of their subscribed-but-not-called capital. 
By the same token, this claim on member states for more capital would not be as strong as it appears, 
because, in the case of 19 of the 28 EU member states, it is a claim on an entity that is sub-sovereign 
and does not control its own currency. 
If the EIB's assets are less solid than they appear, and if the claims on EU member states for extra capital 
are less reliable than they appear, this weakens both the pillars on which the EIB's own credit rating 
depends.  
2.4 Bank NPLs 
The previous sub-sections discussed the risk to the Eurozone banking system arising from the sub-
sovereign status of Eurozone member states – which is the main focus of the paper.  However, this risk 
is compounded by the scale of NPLs in many Eurozone banks by private-sector borrowers.  Banks have 
put in place restructuring and forbearance arrangements for such borrowers when it is clear that the debt 
is unlikely ever to be repaid, e.g., because the borrower's business has been "idle" with no activity during 
the reference period.  These arrangements include the discounting of NPLs but then treating the residual 
or rump loan as "performing" – a treatment premised on the borrower being able and willing to achieve 
partial repayment in spite of evidence that the other portion of the loan will not be recovered. 
                                                     
104 https://www.eib.org/en/efsi/index.htm. 
105 EFSI is the EU's version of what in the UK is known as a "private finance initiative" (PFI) – a way of creating "public–
private partnerships" (PPPs) to finance major infrastructure investments and other public sector projects. 
106  To illustrate how the EU uses EFSI/InvestEU, in January 2020, the EU announced a €1 trn Green Deal Investment Plan 
(GDIP) that will create an "enabling framework" to stimulate private and public investment in support of the 
transformation of the EU economy to meet its environmental strategy for the EU economy to become carbon neutral by 
2050.  The GDIP will encourage "crowding in" private investment by leveraging the EU's budget guarantee under the 
InvestEU programme with a key role to be played by the EIB to ensure the funded projects "provide high additionality" 
(Rust, S., "EC promises 'enabling framework' for green investment", IPE, 17 January 2020; 
https://www.ipe.com/news/ec-promises-enabling-framework-for-green-investment/10043247.article). 
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3. The Eurozone's use of misleading accounting practices 
Misleading accounting practices have led to additional risk, some of which are also opaque, the opacity 
itself causing yet more risk.  The approach to Eurozone accounting appears to be based on a presumption 
that the system will work its way out of the current situation through growth (allowing billions of euros 
worth of NPLs throughout the Eurozone to become performing again) before taxpayers in the successful 
northern member state economies – especially in Germany ‒ realise that they will ultimately be liable 
for bailing out the Eurosystem.  
The opacity of the EU's accounting framework is also a problem, leading to uncertainties regarding the 
Eurosystem, beyond those examined in this paper.  There are the questions about the nature of the 
Eurosystem eligible asset list, over the amount of Eurozone member state sovereign bonds owned or 
controlled (as collateral) by the Eurosystem, as well as the amounts of other Eurozone member state 
public sector entity debt supplied either by the EIB or controlled as collateral by the Eurosystem.  
Finally, there is the question of the true extent of the imbalances in the TARGET2 system and the 
efficacy of the legal means by which the gross balances are reduced to what the ECB reports.107 
 
4. Quantifying the scale of the problem 
The EU wishes to promote the creditworthiness of Eurozone (and other EU) member state government 
bonds and other liabilities.  However, the data show that the underlying levels of member state 
indebtedness, potentially being either provisioned with inadequate levels of capital or used at 
inappropriate levels for intra-Eurozone and other collateral purposes, is of significant concern.  In 
essence, there are potentially huge levels of debt in Eurozone member states to which the Basel capital 
and collateral treatments are misapplied.  Here we estimate the levels of that debt.  Some of this debt 
will be held by non-financial institutions, which may be able to fend for themselves in determining the 
repayment risks inherent in what they own.  Other debt will be owned by financial institutions which 
can, in principle, manage their books based on their own assessment of the unmanaged risk arising from 
such instruments.  However, even if this is correct, there are second, third and further order effects 
where that risk will be difficult to trace and measure.  The original flaw of not capturing the risk in 
Eurozone financial instruments gives rise to significant systemic risk to the EU's financial system as a 
whole – and thence, unless steps are taken, to the global financial system. 
4.1 What are the key adverse impacts? 
There are certain specific instances of the impact of the sub-sovereign treatment in operation which 
need to be understood in order fully to evaluate the situation. 
Unreliability of member state ability to meet a capital call from the EIB, ESM or ECB 
Rating reports of Eurozone supra-sovereigns stress the very strong legal claim on member states108 and 
make some adjustment for the average credit rating of the group of member states concerned (whether 
that be Eurozone only or all EU).  However, since the Eurozone member state ratings are themselves 
overstated because the Eurozone member states are not genuine sovereigns, the ability of these member 
states to meet capital calls is concomitantly weaker.  We interpret this as implying that the ECB has a 
claim on the sovereign as and when the Governing Council agrees to raise the ECB's capital, albeit the 
claim is formally routed through the NCBs of the EU member states, which are the ECB's shareholders.  
                                                     
107 A brief exposition of these questions is set out in the Annex 1 to this paper.  
108 For example, Moody's EIB rating report 2015 under "Overview and Outlook", page 1; and Moody's EU rating report 
2015 under "Overview and Outlook", page 1. 
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Over-ratings of the EU, ESM and EIB 
The credit ratings of the EU, ESM and EIB are thus overstated.  In the EU's case, the call for extra 
funding to make the EU's debt service payments is strong legally, but, in reality, is as weak financially 
as the calls for pay-in of capital by the ESM and EIB.  The ECB is unrated. 
Furthermore, the quality of the EIB's loan portfolio—quoted in the Moody's EIB rating report 2015109 
as a source of the EIB's strength—is undermined by its concentration on public sector entities in 
Eurozone member states, even where the loan has a guarantee from the sovereign.  The sovereign 
guarantee is less reliable because it is not a genuine sovereign, and the stand-alone creditworthiness of 
the borrower is lower because its ultimate source of strength is its connection to the same sovereign.  
Moreover, Moody's makes reference to "third party credit enhancements (e.g., guarantee by other 
parties, pledged financial security, assignment of rights)", without stating who are the issuers of the 
guarantees, what the pledged financial security is or what rights have been assigned, such that there can 
be no certainty that these supposed credit enhancements really do enhance the credit risk of the loan 
itself. 
EIB Group 
The role of the EIB is to make loans on behalf of the European Union.110  The exact make-up of the 
EIB loan portfolio is not in the public domain and would be one of the areas for detailed enquiry set out 
in Annex 1.  The credit risk embodied in the EIB's investments adds to the credit risk of EU member 
states. 
Eurosystem QE programme 
In 2015, the ECB introduced a quantitative easing programme.  Not only were Eurozone government 
bonds purchased, so were corporate bonds and the bonds of OPSEs.  To the extent that these latter bonds 
involved credit risk, the overall risk to the Eurosystem increased. 
The exact make-up of the QE programme portfolio is not in the public domain and would be one of the 
further areas for detailed enquiry as laid out in Annex 1. 
Eurosystem eligible collateral list111 
The Eurosystem publishes a list of bonds that are eligible as collateral for Eurosystem monetary and 
payment operations.  This means that central banks can borrow from one another in TARGET2 based 
on this collateral, and that banks can borrow from central banks.  There are open questions—addressed 
in Annex 1—as to whether certain bonds are eligible as collateral at any Eurosystem member, or just at 
a "home" Eurosystem member.  That point aside, the list contains bond issuers that are the EU's supra-
sovereigns, sovereigns, sub-sovereigns and OPSEs, as well as financial institutions and securitisation 
vehicle companies. 
Each bond issue has a haircut assigned to it.  In the case of Eurozone supra-sovereigns, sovereigns, sub-
sovereigns and OPSEs, these will be too low, given the true status of the sovereigns themselves and 
given that all the other three types depend ultimately on the same sovereigns.  The Eurosystem will 
therefore be under-collateralised on its loans when it advances against this collateral up to the face value 
less haircut. 
                                                     
109 See fn. 108 above. 
110 https://www.eib.org/en/about/index.htm. 
111 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/assets/html/index.en.html, the Eurosystem not being a legal person but rather a 
collective term for the ECB and the Eurozone NCBs. 
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Bank liquidity 
As explained above, banks are allowed to hold these same lines of bonds for their regulatory liquidity 
ratios, with specified haircuts or no haircut.  The haircuts are too low for the same reasons that the 
haircuts in the Eurosystem eligible collateral list are too low.  In consequence, banks are less liquid than 
they appear to be.  
Bank capital adequacy 
Where banks are lending to or contracting for off-balance sheet business with this same universe of 
counterparties (Eurozone supra-sovereigns, sovereigns, sub-sovereigns, OPSEs), their IRB models will 
be understating the credit risk, which will have the result of the banks overstating their CET1 ratios. 
4.2 How to assess the scale of the problem? 
The overall scale of the problem is based on the current known portfolio of assets being risk-weighted 
at too low a level: 
• Where the asset is in the books of a bank, the under-weighting gives rise to too low a loss-absorption 
capacity for the case that the asset defaults. 
• Where the asset is being used as collateral, the under-weighting is expressed as a haircut that is too 
low to provide the lender with a comfortable security margin if they have to repossess and liquidate 
the collateral, which, in turn, leaves them exposed to a risk of loss.  There is inadequate risk-
absorption capacity in the collateral, which means that the loan it is securing will be under-weighted 
in the lender's calculation and the lender will be maintaining too low a loss-absorption capacity. 
• Where the asset is being held by one of the entities that form part of the supra-sovereign and 
sovereign network of entities, it is unclear whether they hold any capital to cushion against a risk of 
loss, beyond having a claim on one another. 
All in all, the loss-absorption capacity is too low, given the known portfolio of assets and the current 
known risks – see Figure 4.  
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Figure 4:  Current loss-absorption capacity is too low even in respect of known indebtedness 
 
 
This issue is compounded because there is unknown indebtedness, as outlined above, that needs to be 
brought into the equation, and the loss-absorption capacity needs to be increased as a percentage of both 
the known and unknown levels of indebtedness – see Figure 5. 
 
 
Capturing Unknown Indebtedness and subjecting both it and known indebtedness to  
higher risk-weightings would greatly increase the need for loss-absorption capacity. 
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Figure 5:  Increasing loss-absorption capacity through higher risk-weightings 
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The only place from which member states can draw extra funds to increase the loss-absorption capacity 
of the supra-sovereigns is by borrowing more.  Given the exigencies of the Fiscal Stability Treaty and 
their current levels of debt, this source is limited. 
Banks can raise their capital by issuing more of it, by selling assets at above their book value, and 
through retained profits.  Two normal sources of recapitalisation are all but closed off at present in the 
Eurozone:  markets are closed for new bank share issuance and bank merger and acquisition activity is 
low.  Bank profitability is hindered by low interest rates and weak credit demand.  Banks should also 
increase their capital to comply with Basel III – which would contribute to higher loss-absorption 
capacity.  However, the European Banking Federation recently sponsored a study from Copenhagen 
Economics112 which concluded that this could only be achieved by banks both reducing their quantity 
of lending and by increasing its price.  This would negatively affect businesses and consumers and 
reduce GDP growth.  In sum, the options for banks to raise their capital are currently very limited.   
4.3 Official measures of national debt 
Figure 6 shows how the market assessment of Eurozone member state debt—as reflected in S&P's credit 
ratings—differs from the EU's 0% risk-weighting assumption over the period between December 2007 
and December 2016, which includes the period of the 2007-8 financial crisis.  Only six of the 19 
Eurozone members had January 2020 credit ratings (AAA or AA) which could justify the 0% risk-
weighting assumption if the Eurozone member did control all the levers of control over its own currency 
– down from 11 members prior to the beginning of the crisis.   
Figure 6:  Eurozone Sovereign Bond Credit Ratings 
 
Source:  Eurozone Sovereign Rating Trends 2017, S&P Global Ratings 
Figure 7 shows official EU government debt to GDP ratios for 2019 Q1.  Included are the 19 Eurozone 
member states.  The average of these (denoted EA-19) is 86%, well above the Maastricht limit of 
60%.113  Key Eurozone economies, Italy and Spain,114 have official debt to GDP ratios of 133% and 
98%, respectively.  It should be noted that these figures do not include the debts of the level "other 
public sector entity" – as we discuss further in Annex 1.  This suggests that the official measure—even 
                                                     
112 EU Implementation of the Final Basel III Framework:  Impact on the banking market and the real economy, accessed as 
document 191122_copenhagen-economics_final-basel-iii-evaluation.pdf from the Copenhagen Economics website. 
113 Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
114 Selected because they have the highest TARGET2 liabilities. 
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before taking the other factors below into consideration—underestimates the true scale of Eurozone 
member state debt. 
Figure 7:  European Union Government Debt to GDP ratios, 2019 Q1 
 
Source:  Newsrelease euroindicators 119/2019 –19 July 2019, Eurostat; 
https://ec.europa.eu/standard/documents/2995521/9984123/2-19072019-AP-EN.pdf/437bbb45-7db5-4841-b104-
296a0dfc2f1c 
The lower creditworthiness of certain Eurozone member state government bonds, in turn, affects those 
who hold these bonds—in particular, Eurozone banks—and introduces risk which the supervisors and 
markets need to manage.  Of the €10.1 trn of Eurozone government debt outstanding,115 Eurozone banks 
held around €1.8 trn of it on their books as at the start of 2019.116  Given total Eurozone bank assets of 
just over €30 trn,117 the banks' exposure to their governments' debt amounts to 6% of their assets 
(median), rising to around 11% in the case of Cyprus – see Figure 8.  There are, of course, legitimate 
reasons why banks hold these bonds – to comply with the LCR and to have a stock of readily marketable 
assets which can be converted into cash either in the open market or through loans or repurchase 
agreements at the central bank.  When all monetary financial institutions" (MFIs) are included (such as 
"other deposit-taking institutions", defined under EU Regulation ECB/2013/33, in addition to banks), 
the reliance of Eurozone governments on short-term investors in their bonds is even more striking.  
Figure 9 shows that in 2018, these institutions held 24%, 17% and 18%, respectively, of the bonds of 
Germany, Spain and Italy.  This compares with just 8% for the UK, where the bulk of government 
bonds are held by long-term investors such as pension funds and life offices.  
Table 4 shows that the majority of bonds issued by EU central governments (more than 50% on average) 
have short residual maturities (less than seven years), which increases rollover risk, the risk that 
governments are forced to refinance their maturing debts on unfavourable terms or, worse, unable to 
refinance at all because the markets close out on them.118  By contrast, the average residual maturity of 
UK central government bonds is much greater at 15 years.  Indeed, the UK has the longest maturing 
central government debt of all members of the OECD, which exceeds that of, for example, Japan (8 
years), France (8 years), Germany (6.8 years), Italy (6.5 years), Canada (6.2 years) and the US (5.7 
years).119  One of the key reasons for this is the strong demand for long-dated bonds from UK pension 
                                                     
115 General government gross debt – 2019 Q1, Eurostat; https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/teina230. 
116 European Central Bank (May 2019) Financial Stability Review.  
117 European Banking Federation:  https://www.ebf.eu/. 
118 Also noteworthy is the fact that Eurostat does not report this information for major countries such as Germany and the 
Netherlands. 
119 Source:  Chart A.5 Average maturity of the debt stock by country (end-December 2018), HM Treasury Debt Management 
Report 2019-20. 
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funds and life offices.  It gives the UK government huge flexibility in choosing the timing and terms of 
any refinancing of its maturing debt. 
Figure 8:  Domestic sovereign exposures by Eurozone banks 
 
Source:  Chart 3 (left panel) in European Central Bank (2019) Financial Stability Review, May; 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/financial-stability/fsr/html/ecb.fsr201905~266e856634.en.html 
 
Figure 9:  Domestic sovereign exposures by all Eurozone monetary financial institutions 
 
Source:  Bruegel Dataset on Sovereign Bond Holdings, October 2018 
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Table 4:  Residual maturity of EU central government bonds, percentage of total, 2018 
STATE 
MATURITY:  
LESS THAN 1 
YEAR 
(ULTRA-SHORT) 
MATURITY:  
FROM 1 TO 7 
YEARS 
(SHORT) 
MATURITY:  
FROM 7 TO 15 
YEARS 
(MEDIUM) 
MATURITY:  
OVER 15 YEARS 
(LONG) 
Belgium 14 36 26 24 
Bulgaria 6 55 25 14 
Czechia 18 51 27 4 
Denmark 14 46 17 23 
Germany 18 N/A N/A N/A 
Estonia 47 24 10 19 
Ireland 15 36 32 16 
Greece 15 14 17 55 
Spain 16 45 28 11 
France 18 43 24 14 
Croatia 18 52 27 2 
Italy 9 47 19 26 
Cyprus N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Latvia 15 52 15 18 
Lithuania 6 54 26 14 
Luxembourg N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Hungary 28 N/A N/A N/A 
Malta 18 39 32 11 
Netherlands N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Austria 3 N/A N/A N/A 
Poland N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Portugal 24 39 22 15 
Romania 22 51 18 9 
Slovenia 10 36 30 23 
Slovakia 10 38 36 16 
Finland N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Sweden 31 48 17 3 
United 
Kingdom 21 20 16 43 
 
Sources:  (1) For all countries except UK:  Average remaining maturity of EU central government gross debt 2018, 
Eurostat, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/product?code=gov_10dd_rmd. 
(2) For UK:  Charts A1 and A3 of HM Treasury Debt Management Report 2019-20, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/785550/debt_management
_report_2019-20_final_web.pdf. 
4.4 TARGET2 
The official figures present an incomplete picture of the true national debts of Italy and Spain, for 
example.  Figure 10 shows the additional liabilities that they have accrued under TARGET2.  As of 
August 2019, Italy and Spain had outstanding liabilities under TARGET2 of €454 bn and €398 bn, 
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respectively.  These correspond to 25% and 32% of GDP.120  These amounts may or may not be adding 
to these countries' national debt, or may be doing so only in part (as explained in section 2.1 above).  
The publicly available data do not allow us to distinguish between a TARGET2 liability accruing in the 
form of an uncollateralised deposit – which would add to the national debt – and an overdraft 
collateralised with bonds that already form part of the Eurostat figures for "general government gross 
debt" – which might not.121  If the full TARGET2 liability counts as national debt, then the total debt to 
GDP ratios of Italy and Spain are 158% and 130%, respectively.  
Figure 10:  TARGET2 balances, € bn, August 2001–August 2019 
 
Source:  www.eurocrisismonitor.com/ 
4.5 The QE programme 
We next consider the Eurozone QE programme.  There are four streams of asset purchases:  the Public 
Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), the Covered Bond Purchase Programme 3 (CBPP3), the Corporate 
                                                     
120 Based on 2019 Q2 GDP data, using a USD = 0.9 EUR conversion rate.  Sources:  countryeconomy.com/gdp/Italy; 
countryeconomy.com/gdp/Spain. 
121 It is important to distinguish between loans in TARGET2 that occur when an NCB has a long balance on its account held 
at another NCB—for which no collateral is offered—from loans where an NCB overdraws its account at another NCB.  
The latter case can only be effected against collateral, which could be sovereign bonds of its own country because it has 
a ready supply of them; and the possibility of additional government issues exists for this purpose.  The former type of 
borrowing—taking in deposits from other NCBs—does have the effect of inflating the overall debt above the quoted 
ratios, whereas the latter does not.  The ratios quoted are based on Eurostat's "general government gross debt", which 
includes loans as well as bonds, and encompasses the sovereign borrower and regional/local authorities. 
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Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) and the Asset-Backed Securities Purchase Programme 
(ABSPP).122  Figure 11 shows the cumulative net purchases of bonds under the programme.  As of 
October 2019, the proportions of total bond purchases across the four programmes are 82%, 10%, 7% 
and 1%, respectively. 
Figure 11:  Cumulative net purchases of bonds under the Eurozone QE programme, 2015–2019 
 
Source:  https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html 
The ECB confirms that, under the PSPP, net purchases were in line with each Eurozone member state's 
ECB capital key123 – see Table 5 below.124  We will assume that the same rule applies to all bond 
purchases.  This implies, for example, that Italy's share of bond purchases across the whole QE 
programme was 11.8023% of the total, while Spain's was 8.3391%.  Given a total of €2.6 trn, this means 
that the purchases of Italian and Spanish public sector bonds amounted to €307 bn and €217 bn, 
equivalent to 17% and 18% of GDP, respectively – using GDP data in Table 6.  82% of the bonds 
purchased in the QE programme were public sector entity (PSE) bonds.  PSE bonds are split between 
central government bonds—which are classified as sovereign bonds and already included in the 
measure of national debt above—and the bonds of OPSEs ‒ which may not be included in the definition 
of national debt if they are debts of public entities whose obligations fall outside the Eurostat scope of 
"general government gross debt".   
Without the further information outlined in Annex 1, we cannot know the breakdown of the portfolio 
and how much of it falls outside the Eurostat figures.  For the purposes of this section, we will assume 
that all bonds purchased under the PSPP are sovereign bonds and hence do not add to the overall net 
                                                     
122 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html.  
123 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/pspp-qa.en.html. 
124 EU member states outside the Eurozone hold the remaining 30.4% of the capital key in the ECB.  For example, the Bank 
of England has a shareholding of €58 mn.  These shareholdings are explained as follows:  "The EU's nine non-euro area 
NCBs are required to contribute to the operational costs incurred by the ECB in relation to their participation in the 
European System of Central Banks by paying up a small percentage of their share in the ECB's subscribed capital.  Since 
29 December 2010, their contributions have represented 3.75% of their total share in the subscribed capital.  The capital 
paid to the ECB by the non-euro area NCBs amounts to €123,333,635.55.  …The non-euro area NCBs are not entitled to 
receive any share of the distributable profits of the ECB, nor are they liable to fund any losses of the ECB"; 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/capital/html/index.en.html. 
Technical Analysis Eurozone Accounting - Establishing the True Problem 
 
52 
liabilities of the Eurozone.125  This means that 18% of the bonds purchased do add to Eurozone public 
sector balance sheet – i.e., to the assets owned by a PSE (i.e., by a Eurozone NCB) that are not issued 
by another PSE.  This increase in the size of the public balance sheet inherently tracks back to the 
balance sheet of each member state, since the supra-sovereigns—like the ECB and EIB—are no more 
than a look-through to the sovereigns behind them.  
Notwithstanding this line of recourse in case losses are incurred, in the construct of QE, it is the NCB 
of a member state that buys the bonds issued by entities in that member state.  So the QE portfolios of 
Italian and Spanish issuers are bought by the NCBs of Italy and Spain respectively, adding the same 
amount to their assets, but not adding to their capital.  The addition is to liabilities.  QE directly increases 
the liabilities of the central bank of each member state.  For Italy, this amounts to €55 bn (3.1% of 
GDP), while for Spain, it amounts to €39 bn (3.2% of GDP).  Again, we should regard these figures as 
approximate.   
Table 5:  Eurozone NCBs' contributions to the ECB's capital 
NATIONAL CENTRAL BANK 
CAPITAL 
KEY % 
PAID-UP 
CAPITAL (€) 
Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique 
(Belgium) 2.5280 273,656,178.72 
Deutsche Bundesbank (Germany) 18.3670 1,988,229,048.48 
Eesti Pank (Estonia) 0.1968 21,303,613.91 
Central Bank of Ireland (Ireland) 1.1754 127,237,133.10 
Bank of Greece (Greece) 1.7292 187,186,022.25 
Banco de España (Spain) 8.3391 902,708,164.54 
Banque de France (France) 14.2061 1,537,811,329.32 
Banca d'Italia (Italy) 11.8023 1,277,599,809.38 
Central Bank of Cyprus (Cyprus) 0.1503 16,269,985.63 
Latvijas Banka (Latvia) 0.2731 29,563,094.31 
Lietuvos bankas (Lithuania) 0.4059 43,938,703.70 
Banque centrale du Luxembourg (Luxembourg) 0.2270 24,572,766.05 
Central Bank of Malta (Malta) 0.0732 7,923,905.17 
De Nederlandsche Bank (The Netherlands) 4.0677 440,328,812.57 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austria) 2.0325 220,018,268.69 
Banco de Portugal (Portugal) 1.6367 177,172,890.71 
Banka Slovenije (Slovenia) 0.3361 36,382,848.76 
Národná banka Slovenska (Slovakia) 0.8004 86,643,356.59 
Suomen Pankki – Finlands Bank (Finland) 1.2708 137,564,189.84 
Total1 69.6176 7,536,110,121.69 
 
Note:  1.  Owing to rounding, the total may not correspond to the sum of all figures shown. 
Source:  https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/capital/html/index.en.html. 
                                                     
125 This is likely to be an underestimate. 
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Table 6:  EU GDP in 2018 
YEAR 
PERCENTAGE OF EU28 
TOTAL 2018 
CURRENT PRICES, 
MILLION EURO 2018 
European Union – 28 countries 100.0 15,898,311.6 
Euro area (19 countries) 72.7 11,561,187.9 
Germany  21.0 3,344,370.0 
United Kingdom 15.2 2,419,185.9 
France 14.8 2,353,090.0 
Italy 11.1 1,765,421.4 
Spain 7.6 1,202,193.0 
Netherlands 4.9 774,039.0 
Poland 3.1 496,360.9 
Sweden 3.0 471,196.2 
Belgium 2.9 459,819.8 
Austria 2.4 385,711.9 
Ireland 2.0 324,038.2 
Denmark 1.9 301,340.9 
Finland 1.5 234,453.0 
Czechia 1.3 207,772.4 
Portugal 1.3 203,896.2 
Romania 1.3 202,883.6 
Greece 1.2 184,713.6 
Hungary 0.8 133,782.2 
Slovakia 0.6 89,721.0 
Luxembourg 0.4 60,053.1 
Bulgaria 0.4 56,086.9 
Croatia 0.3 51,579.1 
Slovenia 0.3 45,754.8 
Lithuania 0.3 45,264.4 
Latvia 0.2 29,151.0 
Estonia 0.2 26,035.9 
Cyprus 0.1 21,137.8 
Malta 0.1 12,323.8 
 
Source:  Eurostat; https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do; 
https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/setupDownloads.do. 
The implication of these data is that the Eurosystem owned €2.6 trn126 of Eurozone debts as at the end 
of 2018 in its QE programme.  For the most part, the NCBs bought public sector debt issued by entities 
in their own country, which did not increase the country's own national debt.  However, the NCBs also 
                                                     
126 Eurosystem consolidated balance sheet at 12/31/18 at position 7.1.  
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bought debt that was not public sector, funded the purchase with new liabilities, and thus increased their 
own national debt. 
The entire QE portfolio—public sector or not—carries a credit risk against which the NCBs carry no 
capital, because the profits and losses on QE are transferred to the ECB.  This results in an unrecognised 
risk of loss for the ECB.  The ECB's QE portfolio is subject to the ECB profit-and-loss absorption 
mechanism whereby the ECB takes over any profit or loss experienced by the NCB that is the holder 
of the asset.  Against this risk, the ECB had capital, reserves and an unappropriated Profit and Loss 
Account of €9 bn and provisions and revaluation accounts of €33 bn on the same date, which amounted 
to a loss-absorbing capacity of €42 bn in all, i.e., just 1.6% of the QE amount.  As the QE portfolio has 
an average life (duration) of the order of 4–6 years, an upward movement in interest rates of just 0.32% 
would cause the value of the portfolio to reduce by 1.6%, eliminating the ECB's entire loss-absorption 
capacity and requiring it to be recapitalised by its owners, all the NCBs of the EU member states.   
Table 7: EIB accounts 2018 
ACTIVITY IN 2018 IN € MILLION 
Projects approved 62,723 
European Union 52,406 
Partner Countries 10,317 
  
Signatures 55,640 
European Union 47,832 
Partner Countries 7,808 
  
Disbursements 52,597 
European Union 46,866 
Partner Countries 5,731 
  
Resources raised (before swaps) 59,958 
Core currencies (EUR, GBP, USD) 51,720 
Other currencies 8,238 
  
SITUATION AS AT 31.12.2018 IN € MILLION 
Outstandings  
Loans disbursed 451,121 
Loans to be disbursed 105,847 
Financing from budgetary resources 14,298 
Borrowings 455,384 
  
Own funds 71,325 
Balance sheet total 555,793 
Net profit for year 2,339 
Subscribed capital 243,284 
of which called up 21,699 
 
Source:  EIB Group:  key statutory figures; https://www.eib.org/en/about/key_figures/data.htm 
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4.6 The EIB Group 
Finally, we consider the EIB Group.  Table 7 shows the accounts for the EIB in 2018.  At the end of 
2018, loans disbursed or committed by the EIB amounted to €561.2 bn (€451.1 bn disbursed + €105.8 
bn committed).  The EIB's total subscribed capital is €243.3 bn, although only €22 bn is called up.  
The EIB is increasing its loan book by approximately 10% per annum on a compound basis, but not 
increasing its capital.  We know that the primary destination of its lending is into "other public sector 
entities" within the EU. 
We know that its subsidiary, the EIF, also enables funding into "other public sector entities" within the 
EU, and that the EIF's activity is substantially bound up with financings under the EFSI, into which the 
EIB also lends directly. 
The EIF's method of enabling funding is either to issue a guarantee to an investor that injects cash into 
an EFSI project or to make a so-called "equity commitment" to a fund, which then can take on other 
borrowings and inject cash into an EFSI project. 
Either way, the EIF's engagement does not result in a position on its balance sheet, because guarantees 
are off-balance sheet and because its "equity commitment" is structured as an agreement to inject more 
capital on top of a small paid-in portion. 
The paid-in portion does appear on the EIF's balance sheet, but since it is such a small portion of the 
whole, the EIF holds very little direct investments.  At the end of 2018, the EIF had only €790 mn of 
investments, €570 mn being private equity holdings and €200 mn debt investments; it also has €1.2 bn 
of treasury investments.  Set against that, its capital, including share premium, is €1.3 bn, and there is a 
further recourse fund of €3.6 bn to the EIB, the EU and the smaller shareholders pro rata to their 
percentage holding.127  
The key point about the EIF is that it is the EIB's (and the EU's) vehicle for supplying higher risk 
financing.  The EU's responsibility for their subscribed-but-not-called portion of the EIF's capital is 
29% × €3.6 bn = €1.04 bn, and this will come under the Commitments Appropriation of the EU Budget.  
The EIB's responsibility for their subscribed-but-not-called portion of the EIF's capital is 62% × €3.6 
bn = €2.23 bn.  A call on that could be met by the EIB issuing more debt itself or by calling up more of 
the subscribed-but-not-called portion of the member states' capital.  The EIF is discussed in more detail 
in Annex 2. 
The EIB and EIF together advance the financings under the EFSI, in the manner described in Annex 3.  
The original EFSI programme had reached its funding total of €315 bn by mid-2018.  This was later 
extended to €500 bn by 2020.  The EIB now enjoys a €26 bn first-loss guarantee from the EU Budget, 
complemented by a €7.5 bn allocation of the EIB's own capital, making a total of €33.5 bn that the EIB 
is permitted to commit in the context of EFSI financings.128 
Since the EIF is not a bank, the EIB is not required to deduct its capital in the EIF from its own capital 
before determining the EIB's own ability to lend.  That ability is 20 times the EIB's on-balance sheet 
capital under the Basel Rules Leverage Ratio, or the amount, after application of the EIB's IRB 
methodology and taking into consideration the EIB's regulatory capital fraction, which causes it to have 
a surplus over its minimum CET1 ratio. 
Since the capital in the EIF is part-paid, and 80% unpaid, this 80% is not considered in the EIB's 
Leverage Ratio.  Furthermore, only 20% of the EIB's capital commitment to the EIF needs to be carried 
on its balance sheet—€558 mn—which is an insignificant figure given the EIB's size.  It would be 
interesting to know what risk-weighting the EIB gives to this €558 mn.  The EIF is an AAA-rated entity, 
                                                     
127 EIF, 2018 Annual Report, p.11 of the accounts/p.97 out of 184 in the document. 
128 https://www.eib.org/en/efsi/what-is-efsi/index.htm. 
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due to the recourse it has to the EU and EIB, which are also both AAA-rated.  On that basis, the EIB 
could accord a very low risk-weighting to its capital in EIF, as long as it overlooked the fact that it was 
itself a significant source of support to the EIF's rating.  If, on the other hand, the EIB considered the 
quality of EIF's asset portfolio as exemplified by the contents of pages 69 to 77 in the EIF 2018 Annual 
Report, and if the EIB considered the level of subordination of the EIF's loans and investments in its 
customers, then the EIB should apply a very high risk-weighting to its paid-in capital in the EIF of €558 
mn, and should carry a substantial risk-weighted asset to take account of the off-balance sheet liability 
to pay in the callable capital of €2.23 bn. 
Figure 12 shows the shareholdings in the EIB by member state.  For example, Italy's shareholding was 
16.1108% of the total, while Spain's was 9.6665%.  The shareholders in the EIF are:  the EIB (62%), 
the European Union (29%) and 30 privately owned EU financial institutions (9%).  The EU member 
states therefore own 91% of the EIF through either the EU or EIB.  The Eurozone's share of the EIB is 
74%, while its share of the EIF is 67%.129  In terms of member state liability for the exposures caused 
by the EFSI, member state shares in the EU Budget are given in Figure 13.  This implies that Italy and 
Spain are liable for 11.92% and 8.46%, respectively, of the €26 bn guarantee from the EU Budget, and 
16.1108% and 9.6665%, respectively, of the €7.5 bn allocation of the EIB's own capital.  
But the main issue is the share of the EIB's assets committed into those countries, out of the total of 
€557 bn of loans either disbursed or committed as of 31/12/18.  This includes the EIB's loans in the 
context of the EFSI, but it does not include the EIF's EFSI commitments.  Those commitments are small 
relative to the amounts committed by the EIB, even though they are high risk, but this only gives half 
the picture, or even less.  Calculations extrapolated from EIF's annual reports from 2009 to 2018 suggest 
that it had a book of guarantees outstanding as at 31/12/18 of €27 bn and a book of "equity 
commitments" of €15 bn, but the important figure is how much finance was "leveraged" by EIF 
investments, i.e., the amount of finance that the underlying projects were able to raise from various 
financiers thanks to the engagement of the EIF as a backstop.  The total amount leveraged came to €300 
bn. 
Taking this amount together with the EIB's own loans of €557 bn, we have an amount of €857 bn of 
financing extended or enabled by the EIB Group. 
                                                     
129 That is, 74% of (62% + 29%). 
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Figure 12:  European Investment Bank shareholdings, 2013 
Breakdown of the EIB's capital since 1 July 2013 
 
Source:  EIB Group:  Governance and structure; https://www.eib.org/en/about/governance-and-
structure/shareholders/index.htm. 
The contention is that 75% of this portfolio is lent to Eurozone public sector borrowers whose debts fall 
outside the Eurostat figures, either because they are outside the EU130 or because they are an OPSE 
excluded from the scope of Eurostat's figures.  Such a loan into a Eurozone OPSE increases the national 
debt of that Eurozone member state as commonly understood.131 
The EFSI operates EU-wide, but it is possible to track the size of its investments down to the Eurozone 
member state level.  The total finance enabled by EFSI—over €300 bn by the end of 2018—can be 
tracked to the member state in which a public sector entity has agreed to use the resulting asset and 
should, therefore, be added to the state's public sector debt, the EFSI borrower ranking as an OPSE at 
one step removed.  In effect the borrowing EFSI company is a form of shell company, arguably 
established solely to keep its direct debts out of the Eurostat figures. 
A chart on p.140 of the EIF 2018 annual report gives a geographical breakdown of the "exposure at 
risk" under guarantees:  18.4% is into Italy and 11.0% into Spain.  If we use these percentages as 
markers for how much of the total finance enabled by the EIF has been added as new, invisible, public 
sector debt in those two countries, it is €55 bn in Italy and €33 bn in Spain. 
                                                     
130  The entirety of the EIB's loan portfolio outside the EU is to public sector borrowers in the non-EU country concerned. 
131  The remainder of the EIB's portfolio comprises loans to SMEs through commercial banks. 
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Figure 13:  Percentage share of EU Budget revenue by member state, 2017, after rebates 
 
Source:  Amending Budget No. 6/2017:  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018B0091&from=EN 
Italy's share of liabilities in the EIB and the EIF/EFSI is €39 bn (2.22% of GDP) and €55 bn (3.13% of 
GDP), respectively.  In comparison, Spain's share of liabilities in these organisations are €24 bn (1.96% 
of GDP) and €33 bn (2.70% of GDP), respectively. 
It is important to recognise that the EIB shareholding of €243.3 bn is not included in national balance 
sheets under EU public accounting rules.  James Richardson, Chief Economist at the National 
Infrastructure Commission, described this as a "little bit of fiscal magic".132  Piers Williamson from The 
Housing Finance Corporation (THFC) went further:  "[o]ne of the benefits of the EIB is that, until 
recently, it was classified as a remote contingent liability.  Effectively, it is off the Government's balance 
sheet, so it is a fantastic money-printing device for every nation in the European Union.  I do not mean 
that cynically; it genuinely is that".133  It is nevertheless important to understand the all-in position and 
accept that these liabilities are genuinely part of each country's national debt. 
4.7 Total potential liabilities 
Table 8 brings together the total potential liabilities for Italy and Spain from the six sources considered 
above.  Italy's total potential liability is up to 167% of GDP, while Spain's is up to 138% of GDP.  By 
comparison, the debt to GDP ratio of Argentina is 86%.134  
                                                     
132 Quoted in House of Lords Brexit:  the European Investment Bank, 31 January 2019; 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/269/269.pdf. 
133 Ibid.  
134 https://tradingeconomics.com/argentina/government-debt-to-gdp, Cf. Gallas, D., "Why confidence in Argentina's 
economy is dwindling", BBC News, 30 August 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-44107630 and 
Pérez, S., and Dube, R. "Argentina's president-elect faces his nemesis:  the IMF", Financial News, 4 November 2019.  
S&P's credit rating for Argentina is CCC- with negative outlook, while S&P's credit rating for Italy stands at BBB with 
negative outlook, which is three grades higher, and S&P's credit rating for Spain stands at A with stable outlook which is 
four grades higher than Argentina's  
(https://tradingeconomics.com/argentina/rating, https://tradingeconomics.com/italy/rating, and 
 https://tradingeconomics.com/spain/rating). 
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Table 8:  Total liabilities for Italy and Spain in 2018–19 (% of GDP) 
SOURCE OF 
LIABILITY QUALIFICATION ITALY SPAIN 
National debt As per Eurostat database 133 98 
TARGET2 Depending on whether existing national debt is taken as collateral 0–25 0–32 
QE programme  Extra liabilities taken on to buy non-public sector bonds 3.10 3.20 
EIB Loans to "other public sector entity" 2.22 1.96 
EIF/EFSI Loans not counted within Eurostat tables 3.13 2.70 
Total  141.5–166.5 105.9–137.9 
 
It is perfectly plausible that Italy has been able to borrow up to 33% more of its GDP (i.e., €582 bn) and 
Spain has been able to borrow up to 40% more of its GDP (i.e., €481 bn) than they would have been 
able to do had they been independent sovereign countries, given their third-party credit ratings.  
Although some of the figures in Table 8 might be underestimates and others might involve some double 
counting,135 the table provides a rough quantitative estimate of the size of the risk that arises from the 
sub-sovereign reality of Eurozone membership for Italy and Spain. 
 
5. Exacerbating Factors 
We now consider six factors that exacerbate the situation. 
Factor 1: Use of bank resolution to offload risk from member state retail (and other) 
depositors and investors into global markets 
First, EU, Eurozone and member state actions in the context of failing banks tend to evade the pan-EU 
legal requirements for bank resolution and protect local member state retail (and other) depositors and 
investors, exacerbating the unmanaged risk exposure faced by wholesale investors, especially those 
outside the Eurozone.  Applicable bank resolution regulations and their practice of interpretation and 
implementation have secured the protection above all others of local, retail (and other) depositors and 
investors in the Eurozone issuer states.  The consequence has been an evasion of the agreed pan-EU 
regime for sharing the burden of failing financial institutions across equity and debtholders more or less 
equally.  The interests of local individual taxpayers within Eurozone member states have been 
prioritised to the detriment of investors elsewhere, with the result that other parts of the financial system 
holding Eurozone bank bonds, such as other banks, pension funds and (now to a lesser degree) insurance 
companies are exposed to additional risk arising from these holdings.  This is itself a source of systemic 
risk for bank holders of the debt. 
EU authorities have the power, in the context of the resolution of banks which are seen to be "failing or 
likely to fail", to "bail-in" creditors, i.e., incrementally to write off a bank's equity holdings and write 
down its subordinated debt, and then its senior debt, up to a point where this allows the bank to continue 
in business, while ensuring the protection of retail depositors, up to a limit of €100,000 in their 
accounts.136  Local member state legislators and authorities can, at a moment of prospective failure, 
                                                     
135 It is impossible to tell from the published official data, so some debt included in TARGET2 and the QE programme might 
already have been included in Table 8 and might already have been counted in row 1. 
136 Larger depositors are in principle to be bailed-in, protecting retail depositors only up to €100,000.  Retail depositors with 
less than €100,000 are to be paid out by way of the national deposit guarantee scheme, so the resolved bank would have 
two levels of liability:  the national deposit scheme as the only creditor, with the bailed-in depositors becoming 
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crystallise and nullify numerous exposures arising from their local banks and force them to be borne by 
the global financial market. 
The relevant pan-EU regime follows from the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD).137  
This directive was crafted to govern bank resolutions across the EU and to achieve a mutualisation (i.e., 
sharing) of losses in the private sector.  It applies when a bank is "failing or likely to fail".  At that point, 
if State support is provided (as it normally is), the resolution authorities have the power to ensure 
shareholders and creditors of the bank bear losses equivalent to a minimum of 8% of the bank's liabilities 
through bail-in.  Thus, for instance, if public money is used to bail-out the bank, then an immediate 8% 
write-down of equity or conversion of (junior and then senior) debt into equity is required as a matter 
of law, prior to any other resolution steps being taken.138  This mechanism is intended to ensure burden-
sharing across existing investors and creditors and to incentivise creditors, in particular, to pay proper 
attention to the financial condition of their banks.  Within the Eurozone, the arrangements for resolution 
of 113 (as at Q3 2019) systemically important banks (i.e., the same set of banks that are supervised 
under the Eurozone's SSM) is overseen by a pan-Eurozone body, the Single Resolution Board (SRB).  
It is also intended to be required (although this is not yet fully implemented) that banks issue additional 
capital in the form of so-called TLAC (Total Loss Absorbing Capacity139), to ensure that, if any bail-in 
takes place, there is adequate replacement capital available afterwards to continue the bank's operations.   
In practice, for many, if not most, of the Eurozone resolutions occurring to date, local retail investors 
in banks' regulatory capital issuances have become exposed to the BRRD's requirement for bail-in of 
8% of liabilities.  A pure application of the rule would have meant the authorities eliminated equity and 
subordinated debt owned by retail holders as part of any bail-in, at the same time as eliminating holdings 
of wholesale market investors in those instruments.  Eurozone member state governments and central 
banks have responded to such cases by seeking to avoid pain for local retail investors, circumventing 
the BRRD rules by ever-more ingenious and increasingly questionable methods.  They have sought to 
target international wholesale investors by bailing-in their debt and minimising the bail-in for local 
individual taxpayers, local retail investors in bank equity or debt and local depositors.  The treatment is 
now under challenge, in the case of Banco Santander's acquisition of Banco Popular Espanol. 140  
Circumventions have included a failure to apply the 8% bail-in rule in the recent cases of bank resolution 
or bank recapitalisation in Greece, Italy, Cyprus and Germany.141  The claim being made by Mexican 
holders of equity and subordinated debt under the Mexico-Spain Bilateral Investment Treaty is that 
Spain's administration of the demise of Banco Popular amounted to unlawful expropriation of the 
                                                     
shareholders with shares that reflect how much in excess of €100,000 they had in their accounts.  This template has not, 
in the event, been fully followed, and there have thus far been no pay-outs from national deposit schemes.  
137 Directive 2014/59/EU. 
138 There are additional EU "state aid" rules which are applied at the discretion of the European Commission to similar, 
though less prescriptive, effect in this context. 
139 The TLAC standard is to be implemented in the EU through changes to the CRR, with related changes being made to the 
EU's "minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities" (MREL) in the BRRD. 
140 Andriopoulos, D. and Asimakopoulos, I.G., "Does Investment Arbitration Threaten the Effectiveness and Integrity of EU 
Bank Resolution?", Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 29 October 2019. 
141 In Italy, the SRB took the view that BRRD—and therefore the 8% rule—did not need to be applied because the failure 
of the banks was not expected to have a significant adverse impact on financial stability and neither bank provided critical 
functions (SRB (2017a) Decision of the Single Resolution Board in its executive session of 23 June 2017 concerning the 
assessment of the conditions for resolution in respect of Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A., non-confidential version, 
(SRB/EES/2017/12) and SRB (2017c) Decision of the Single Resolution Board in its executive session of 23 June 2017 
concerning the assessment of the conditions for resolution in respect of Veneto Banca S.p.A., non-confidential version, 
(SRB/EES/2017/11)).  In Greece, the resolutions were rushed through before the 8% write-down rule came into effect 
and local legislation was re-written to prioritise Greek government debt (World Bank 2016.  Bank resolution and bail-in 
in the EU:  selected case studies pre and post BRRD (English).  Washington, D.C.:  World Bank Group).  In Cyprus, a 
bank was recently resolved with an overt avoidance of the application BRRD on the purported basis that its resolution 
involved a continuation of steps taken before the law came into force (which is not an approach generally recognised as 
legitimate in law).  See European Commission press release, "State aid:  Commission approves aid for financing the 
orderly market exit of Cyprus Cooperative Bank Ltd, involving sale of some parts to Hellenic Bank", 19 June 2018.  In 
December 2019, the European Commission approved a €3.6bn package of restructuring aid for German state-owned bank 
NordLB, which was stated not to breach the 8% rule on the basis that private investors would, the EC determined, have 
accepted similar terms so no state aid was provided. 
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claimants' investment.  The situation should ultimately largely be superseded once the TLAC 
requirements are fully implemented, although this implementation is rendered questionable by 
uncertainties as to where exactly the banks will raise the additional capital (if they are not to reduce 
lending) and by the competing claims for new capital caused by Basel III. 
In the EU-Singapore Investor Protection Agreement approved by the European Parliament in February 
2019,142 there is a commitment to give equal treatment to sovereign debt holders both outside and inside 
the EU.  This previously uncommon measure restricts the ability of member states to write off 
foreigners' debt (in this case, EU member state debt owned in Singapore), whilst preserving domestic 
investors.  If this commitment became a common feature of investor protection agreements, it would 
have the effect of exacerbating systemic risk issues in the context of the way the Eurozone is 
constructed, since it removes a lever for debt refinancing.  Nevertheless, it is a provision which should 
be included in a future UK-EU, post-Brexit trade deal since the UK will need fair treatment for its global 
investors when managing Eurozone risk if it is not to be forced to assume the worst-case valuation for 
member state debt as well as for any public sector and other debt which is dependent on the financial 
backing of member states. 
Factor 2: Pressure to maintain local member state banks 
Second, there is a lack of cross-border intra-Eurozone bank mergers and acquisition activity.  The 
logical and intended result of the creation of the Eurozone is a pan-Eurozone market for banks and 
investment firms.  Intrazone cross-border bank takeovers should occur, with stronger firms taking over 
weaker ones, regardless of where those are located within the Eurozone as a whole.  This amalgamation 
process should, if it happened, reduce very significantly the likelihood of resolution or insolvency of 
local banks in distress, since there would be a larger pool of more successful financial institutions 
available to take over less successful ones, including in other Eurozone member states.  Non-viable 
("zombie") banks would be absorbed or put out of business, rather than being kept going for lack of a 
buyer.  The result could be that, for some smaller Eurozone member states, the number of financial 
institutions would decline.  Ultimately, of course, they might no longer have a major domestic bank.   
However, such a situation has so far proven to be politically unpalatable.  Cross-border mergers within 
the Eurozone have not occurred in circumstances involving potential BRRD resolution action.  Instead, 
it has invariably been a large, domestic bank that has stepped in.143  In particular, cross-border mergers 
could expose the contributors to the deposit guarantee scheme of the acquirer's country to the balance 
sheet, NPLs and any partiality in the application of law and regulation of the target bank144 and its 
domestic framework.  For example, when the EU and Eurozone authorities were considering the rescue 
possibilities for depositors in the Co-op Bank of Cyprus, Cypriot legal difficulties in recovering local 
mortgage debt by way of repossession were seen as a risk that those in other Eurozone member states 
and in financial institutions located in those states should not accept. 
Also, were such cross-border takeovers to be permitted, they would reduce significantly the ability of 
the target's country to raise capital by issuing bonds to its local financial institutions, since those 
institutions would become foreign-owned and controlled.  This would deprive the state of ready buyers 
for their debt.  It would also, even if such extra confirmation were necessary, dissolve the illusion that 
there was ever a real possibility of the member state leaving the Eurozone.  Such a step would require 
the repatriation of central bank and regulatory functions from the ECB and necessitate the re-
establishment of a local financial market.  This is rendered all the more difficult if major local market 
actors are owned by foreign institutions headquartered elsewhere in the Eurozone. 
                                                     
142 The Investment Protection Agreement between the European Union and its Member States and the Republic Of 
Singapore, 14 November 2019, available at https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961. 
143 Santander in the case of Banco Popular Espanol; Hellenic Bank in the case of CoOp Bank of Cyprus; Intesa SanPaolo in 
the case of Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza. 
144 This can arise, in practice, even when overseen by the pan-Eurozone authorities. 
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Factor 3: Central counterparties used to offload additional member state risk into 
global markets 
Third, a regulatory incentive is created for central counterparties to accept additional risk, which is 
then effectively borne by the global markets.  CCPs act as buyer to every seller and seller to every buyer 
in certain financial transactions.  The CCP automatically assumes such a role when a contract is entered 
into across an exchange; and it does so through a novation process when the contract is initially entered 
into bilaterally or "over the counter".  They are particularly important in the derivatives markets.  Their 
role has been bolstered by various post-2007-8 crisis measures, requiring the clearing by a CCP of 
certain liquid derivatives contracts (and the trading on an exchange of many such contracts), reflecting 
a new understanding of the importance of CCPs.  EU law regulates EU CCPs and non-EU CCPs 
recognised by the EU as legitimate venues for EU customers to use for their clearing.  CCPs are only 
permitted to accept cash or certain government bonds (including EU and US bonds) as collateral.  CCPs 
may themselves determine which issuers to accept and some of them will not accept all EU issuers' 
bonds as collateral, even though by regulation they are eligible.145  EU law also mandates the investment 
of cash held by CCPs into such assets and other high-quality sovereign debt instruments, but again 
CCPs may currently choose between these instruments when making their decisions. 
Revisions to the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), known as EMIR 2.2,146 enhance 
the ECB's role in the regulation of CCPs and include new regulatory restrictions and processes for CCPs 
to change the kinds of sovereign debt that they will accept.  The introduction of these new provisions 
has, in part, been a response to the Eurozone crisis of 2009–2011 when certain major CCPs, including 
those outside the Eurozone, ceased accepting, as collateral, Greek and other perceived lower credit 
quality Eurozone member state debt.  They also introduced haircuts, which had not been applied before, 
on certain other Eurozone member state debt, reducing the collateral value attributed to that debt.  
Concerns were expressed147 that the application of these haircuts resulted in market price reductions in 
certain Eurozone member state debt and a decrease in demand for that debt.  Although these decisions 
were appropriately made for risk reasons by financial infrastructure providers whose main role is to 
manage risk in the financial markets, the Eurozone now wishes its regulators to be directly or indirectly 
in control of any decisions to apply haircuts.  The aim is for the Eurozone to determine for itself the 
level of risk arising from its member states' debt.  Yet any meaningful control by the Eurozone of the 
risk-weighting and acceptance of its member state bonds as collateral gives rise to a significant source 
of systemic risk for the financial markets,148 and is yet another example of the EU's refusal to accept 
the markets' assessment of the risks that it generates. 
Under EMIR 2.2, an EU-based CCP's college of regulators has the power to prevent a CCP from 
changing accepted collateral classes on risk grounds.  Because the members and users of CCPs are the 
main global financial institutions, a decision to force CCPs to treat collateral as having an artificially 
high value would mutualise the risk of that mispriced collateral.  CCPs hold collateral for their members 
and users and would, in such a case, be forced to apply a lower haircut to the value of that collateral 
than if they were applying their own bona fide assessment of the credit risk arising from the collateral.  
The composition of the college is weighted in favour of the Eurozone.  As a general matter, the college 
will comprise the CCP's home regulator and other relevant regulators, such as those of the trading 
venues served by the CCP and the national regulators of those clearing members of the CCP who make 
largest contributions to the CCP's default (or guarantee) fund.  The ECB is required to be a member of 
a college in its capacity as supervisor of large banks that are clearing members of the CCP and in its 
                                                     
145 EMIR, art. 46, read with the related Regulatory Technical Standards (Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 
153/2013). 
146 Regulation (EU) No 2019/2099. 
147 Armakola, A., Douady, R., Laurent, J-P. and Molteni, F., Repurchase Agreements and Systemic Risk in the European 
Sovereign Debt Crises:  The Role of European Clearing Houses, 2017 (https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01479252v1), 
cited by ESMA in Report on securities financing transactions and leverage in the EU, 4 October 2016, ESMA/2016/1415.  
See also Stephen Morris and Patrick Jenkins, Financial Times (December 23, 2018); Isabel Schnabel, Financial Times 
(28 August 2018); Helen Chandler-Wilde, Daily Telegraph (2 December 2018). 
148 Reynolds, B., "Rebutting the argument of various Eurozone politicians and central bankers that the Eurozone should not 
be able to control euro clearing", Financial Times, 15 May 2017. 
Technical Analysis Exacerbating Factors 
 
63 
capacity as a central bank where the CCP clears financial instruments denominated in euros.  If the ECB 
is a member in both of those capacities, it will have two votes in the college, giving it a strengthened 
say.149  Where the CCP is also based in a Eurozone state, the national regulator will be particularly 
incentivised to preserve the system, as will the regulators of the clearing members that are based in the 
Eurozone.  Christian Noyer, the former Governor of the Banque de France, has made it clear that CCPs' 
margining policies will be set to "protect the euro area".  He also said he wanted to see the bulk of euro 
derivatives clearing – currently 75% of the global clearing of euro derivatives is executed in London – 
moved to the Eurozone and ideally Paris "since no other city in Europe has the same pool of talent that 
Paris has".150  "In the end", he said, "you are only sure of what's under your control and jurisdiction.  
We need the legislative power, the judiciary power, supervisory power, the central bank control of 
liquidity".151  Yet, no systemic risk implications are considered, nor any effects on the cost of financial 
services for EU businesses and consumers. 
Factor 4: Use of securitisations in a manner that obscures member state bank risk 
Fourth, an "arbitrage" is being permitted in the context of reducing non-performing loans for EU banks 
that apply the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach, which obscures the risk occurring on the books 
of member state banks.  The issue arises in the context of the securitisation of Eurozone banks' 
NPLs.152,153  A programme to securitise the €75 billion nominal of NPLs in the Greek banking system, 
known as "Hercules", was recently approved by the European Commission.154  The NPLs are sold by 
the bank that generated them to a special-purpose securitisation entity, which then issues tranches of 
bonds to finance the purchase.  The sale value is the gross book value of the NPLs, less write-downs 
already taken by the bank; the sale takes the NPLs off the bank's books.  This programme will result in 
large volumes of the senior tranches of bonds issued by the securitisation entities being guaranteed by 
the Republic of Greece towards their holder.  The structure was pioneered in Italy.155  The NPLs on a 
bank's balance sheet would be tying up 20–25% of their value in CET1 capital156 because they would 
be subject to a Credit Conversion Factor (CCF)157 in the range of 300–400% through the bank's IRB 
                                                     
149 See the revisions in EMIR 2.2 to arts. 18, 19 and 49. 
150 Hawkes, A., "'London must lose euro trading':  On eve of crucial Brexit talks, continental bankers close ranks threatening 
83,000 jobs in City", Financial Mail on Sunday, 17 June 2017; https://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/news/article-
4613874/Countdown-Brexit-London-lose-euro-trading.html.  France has repeated this demand again following Brexit, as 
reported in Jones, H., and Thomas, L., "Exclusive:  France ramps up pressure to shift $200 billion euro clearing away 
from London – sources", Reuters Business News, February 7, 2020; https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-clearing-
exclusive-idUKKBN2011SH. 
151 Nikolaeva, M., and Jones, H. "Noyer says Brexit banks taking formal steps to secure EU business in Paris", Reuters, 27 
June 2017; https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-paris-banks/noyer-says-brexit-banks-taking-formal-steps-to-
secure-eu-business-in-paris-idukkbn19i1ae. 
152 The ECB accepts that "NPL risk transfer and securitisation transactions can be beneficial for banks in terms of funding, 
liquidity management, specialisation and efficiency".  However, it acknowledges that these are usually complex processes 
and should be conducted with care.  Consequently, institutions wanting to engage in such transactions are expected to 
"conduct robust risk analysis and to have adequate risk control processes" (ECB (2017).  Guidance to Banks on Non-
performing Loans, March 2017, page 13; 
 https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/legalframework/publiccons/pdf/npl/comparison.en.pdf). 
153 The Governor of the Greek central bank, Yannis Stournaras, recently revealed a figure of €75 billion in NPLs in the Greek 
banking sector as of mid-2019, equivalent to 43.6% of all loans.  Ambitious targets for NPL reduction have been agreed 
between the four largest banks and the ECB/SSM, and under a similar framework by the Bank of Greece for smaller 
banks:  NPL ratios are to fall to 35% by the end of 2019, and close to 20% by the end of 2021.  Even so, they will still at 
that point be five times the euro area average.  See Stournaras, Y., "Greek economy – Current developments", speech at 
the Belgian Business Club, 5 September 2019. 
154 See https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-6058_en.htm. 
155 The Republic of Italy agreed to provide €12 billion of guarantees to assist with securitisation of NPLs.  See Italy:  
Liquidation of Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza, Economic Research Department, BNPParibas, 12 July 
2017; https://economic-research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/Liquidation-Veneto-Banca-Banca-Popolare-Vicenza-
7/12/2017,30109.  See also https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2017/html/ssm.pr170623.en.html. 
156 Value, in this sense, is the so-called "carrying value", which will differ from the loan's nominal value by the write-downs 
already taken by the bank.  In the speech at the Belgian Business Club, Yannis Stournaras said:  "Over the past three years 
to mid-2019, the absolute stock of NPLs fell by about €30 billion, largely through write-offs and sales".  For this reason, 
it can reasonably be assumed that the current carrying value of the stock of €75 billion nominal of NPLs is €50 billion. 
157 The factor within an IRB model that converts the nominal amount of a piece of risk-bearing business into its value as a 
risk-weighted asset. 
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model, reflecting a high risk of loss.  The value prior to the application of this calculation, thanks to 
earlier write-offs, would be €50 billion in the case of Greece.  The CET1158 needed to support that 
portfolio would be €50 billion x 7% multiplied by the CCF of 300–400%, giving a range of €10.5–14.0 
billion.  To release this capital, the bank sells the NPLs to a securitisation vehicle in return for two assets 
that carry a 0% CCF:  around 10% of the sale value in cash and 90% in the form of the bonds guaranteed 
by their own sovereign.  This transaction releases the entirety of the €10.5–14.0 billion of CET1 capital 
tied up behind the NPLs, when the sovereign issuing the guarantee is only just investment grade 
(Republic of Italy – BBB) or is speculative grade (Republic of Greece – BB-).159  
Factor 5: Control of ratings of credit rating agencies 
Fifth, the EU has introduced regulations for credit rating agencies, allowing it to control the ratings 
given by those agencies.  Credit rating agencies are generally expected to observe international 
supervisory standards set primarily by the International Organization of Securities Commissions.  Those 
credit rating agencies which operate in the EU are subject to direct regulation under the Credit Rating 
Agencies Regulation of 2009160 and to direct supervision by the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA).  This Regulation came into force after a series of downgrades by rating agencies of 
Eurozone member state government debt, and it was intended by many of those framing the Regulation 
that it would permit ESMA to control the judgements of those rating agencies in a manner acceptable 
to the Eurozone.161  This, of course, places severe limits on independent objective analysis of Eurozone 
debt and is, therefore, a very troubling development given the intentions at play and the level of 
Eurozone risk at stake.162 
We have used public credit ratings, as the Basel Rules themselves do, to illustrate the misapplication of 
the Basel Rules to Eurozone sovereign claims.  For instance, we noted that the Republic of Italy is 
accorded a 0% risk-weighting when it is rated BBB.  This does not necessarily mean that we agree with 
the public credit ratings.  They are prone to the same problem we are illustrating – overrating Eurozone 
sovereigns in comparison with true sovereigns without fully factoring in the difference in quality 
between the two that rests on sovereign monetary powers over the currency.  It is of prime importance 
to the Eurozone that the credit rating agencies continue to treat Eurozone members as genuine 
sovereigns, and not ones that had surrendered important sovereign powers to Eurozone institutions – 
which means the agencies must be closely controlled by Eurozone institutions. 
It is notable that Italy—and Portugal—sit in the bottom-most level of "investment grade".  A single 
downgrade would convert the bonds into "speculative grade" and compel many institutional investors 
                                                     
158 Common Equity Tier 1, the quality of capital needing to be issued under the Basel regime and in a specific minimum 
proportion to the bank's RWA.  For non-systemically important banks this is 7%, plus any counter-cyclical buffer that its 
financial regulator imposes from time to time. 
159 https://tradingeconomics.com/greece/rating. 
160 Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009. 
161 At the height of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis in 2011, Christian Noyer, head of the French central bank, "lashed out 
at Britain after credit rating agencies warned that France's AAA credit rating could be downgraded amid fears that the 
Eurozone have failed to do enough to prop up bankrupt economies in the single currency or overstretched Eurozone 
banks", David Richards, "France lose its credit rating? It should be the UK! blasts head of central bank amid rising 
tensions between London and Paris", Daily Mail, 16 December 2011; https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2074450/France-lose-AAA-credit-rating-It-UK-Blasts-head-central-bank.html. 
162 In a speech in 2011, Michel Barnier raised the possibility of banning sovereign debt ratings of EU Member States that 
were receiving state aid:  Barnier, M. (2011) "The new European Securities and Markets Authority:  Helping enhance the 
resilience of financial markets", Speech/11/514 (11 July, Paris).  The EU also considered establishing a public European 
rating agency to issue sovereign debt ratings.  However, this was not progressed in the face of market challenges over its 
credibility and objectivity.  See European Parliament resolution of 8 June 2011 on credit rating agencies:  future 
perspectives (2010/2302(INI)) OJ C 380E , 11.12.2012, p. 24–31, Opinion of the European Economic and Social 
Committee on the 'Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) 
No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies' COM(2011) 747 final — 2011/0361 (COD) and Commission Staff Working 
Paper Executive Summary Of The Impact Assessment, SEC/2011/1355.  On the purpose of the CRA Regulation, see, for 
example, the Memo from the Commission, New rules on credit rating agencies (CRAs) enter into force – frequently asked 
questions, 18 June 2013.   
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to sell out of their holdings.  This would be very damaging and, of course, the European authorities are 
very keen to avoid it happening. 
Clearly there is a public interest in credit rating agencies carrying out their work properly, and the 
current structure must be questioned.  A regulatory framework that gives supervisory authority to one 
of the EU financial authorities, and the power to regulate other authorities and the credit rating agencies 
themselves, quickly becomes fraught with conflicts of interest.  The credit rating agencies provide credit 
ratings for EU financial supervisory authorities and their governors (the member states directly or 
indirectly), the financial institutions they supervise, and ultimately the EU institutions (the EU, ESM, 
EIB and EIF), while at the same time being supposedly regulated "independently" by ESMA, one of 
that same group of authorities. 
As these various authorities have a vested interest in having high ratings for their members and 
stakeholders (especially that the ratings should sit within the level of "investment grade"), there must 
be questions about apparent or potential breaches of those conflicts.  If it becomes apparent that pressure 
has been applied to credit rating agencies, how will the investor community judge the published ratings? 
Factor 6: Potential offloading of member state risk into global financial market through 
pan-EU deposit insurance 
Finally, there is a further likely mutualisation of Eurozone risk across the financial sector by virtue of 
the proposed European Deposit Insurance Scheme.  An intended new pre-funded163 European deposit 
insurance scheme (EDIS)164 would mutualise risks of the failure of a Eurozone bank by sharing losses 
of local deposit-takers across the banking community operating within the Eurozone.  If the scheme 
were to proceed by replacing current national deposit guarantee schemes (NDGS), losses incurred by 
local Eurozone member state retail (and certain other) depositors would be made whole by the EDIS 
scheme, exposing the taxpayers of all member states collectively rather than just exposing taxpayers 
within the member state where the failing bank was located.  The EDIS in this form would therefore 
create an additional degree of moral hazard, since local regulators would be further incentivised to 
protect their institutions as the ones purchasing many of their bond issuances, given that third-country 
and third-party monies contributed to the EDIS would be used to bail out their local bank depositors.  
The scheme would also increase the exposures for individual banks operating across the Eurozone, 
including international banks operating through subsidiaries there, by virtue of the requirements for the 
funding and replenishment of funds for the scheme.   
The UK's ring-fencing initiatives take the opposite approach to EDIS.  Ring-fencing is premised on 
limiting the degree to which taxpayers are required to cover bad lending, whereas EDIS, on the above 
model, exposes all Eurozone taxpayers to bad lending wherever it was generated.  Ring-fencing, in 
other words, is a preventative measure, aimed at disincentivising bad lending.  By contrast, EDIS is an 
attempt at a curative measure, accepting that bad lending will happen and seeking to share the burden.  
The EU has abandoned its proposed ring-fencing measures, the Liikanen bank reform proposals.165  The 
risk is that the EDIS approach will incentivise irresponsible lending, leading to significant numbers of 
new NPLs to add to existing NPL inventories that are still in excess of 40% of the gross book value of 
banks' loans in both Cyprus and Greece. 
                                                     
163 Funding mechanisms remain as yet uncertain.  If member states contributed their own bonds, the mechanism would 
effectively be the same as them agreeing to a mechanism through which any pay-out from the scheme generated a claim 
on each member state, in line, for example, with their ECB capital key. 
164 For further details on original proposals for the EDIS, see Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme, COM(2015) 
586 final, 24/11/2015. 
165 See the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Commission Work Programme 2018, An agenda for a more united, 
stronger and more democratic Europe, 24 October 2017, and the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on structural measures improving the resilience of EU credit institutions, COM/2014/043 final, 
2014/0020 (COD), 29 January 2014. 
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On the other hand, we have the version of EDIS as propounded by Olaf Scholz, the German Finance 
Minister, in a speech delivered in London in early November 2019166 and accompanied by a "Position 
paper on the goals of the banking union".  However, in common with many other Eurozone structures, 
this EDIS would be a limited overlay on top of existing national schemes.  Mr Scholz admitted by 
inference that a claim by a depositor under current national schemes is really a claim on that country's 
Exchequer, which in most cases can only be met by extra borrowing.  He proposes that a country that 
could not borrow more on the open market to meet a claim should have recourse to a bail-out fund – 
the ESM.  Only as a very final backstop would there be a drawing on the EDIS.  
Mr. Scholz flagged the success of the current deposit protection arrangements on the basis that no claim 
had so far been made on them, but he did this without recognising that member states wanted to avoid 
claims on their own Exchequers and that bank rescues had so far been conducted in a way that did not 
comply with the terms of the EU BRRD.  Nor is it recognised as a supervision failure that so many 
banks have collapsed or found themselves in serious difficulties, relying on Eurosystem funding. 
Mr. Scholz's proposal is a quite small step, and is contingent upon the acceptance by other member 
states of difficult medicine:  a single EU-wide tax base for corporates and banks, limitation of the 0% 
risk-weighting for sovereign bonds to the portfolios that banks are obliged to hold as a "base 
concentration", and a reduction of NPLs to no more than 5% of all loans.  Further integration of banking 
supervision and resolution procedures is also demanded.  In addition, the proposed EDIS is not 
envisaged as a normal deposit insurance scheme.  Member states would only gain access to it after 
exhausting their own options for meeting depositor claims – pay out their own cash, or, failing that, 
borrow on the open market to raise the cash, or, failing that, borrow from the ESM to raise the cash.  It 
will not elude member states' attention that their availing themselves of the ESM will bring with it an 
EU (and probably the International Monetary Fund) austerity and supervision regime at a time when 
their country is in economic and financial difficulty, of which a leading symptom is the failure of a bank 
of such size that compensating its depositors requires the member state to exhaust its own cash and 
borrowing resources, and fall back on the ESM.  These cannot be regarded as realistic quid pro quo 
conditions for German agreement to an EDIS which will only be drawable as a final backstop. 
Indeed, this turned out to be the case.  Within a month of his London speech, Mr. Scholz lost significant 
political influence in Germany by failing to win the leadership of the Social Democratic Party.  The 
Financial Times reported that "Scholz is now a lame duck.  He has no backing to agree anything – let 
alone EDIS".167 
 
6. Risk transmission and exposure of the global financial system to potential 
contagion and a doom loop 
The Eurozone set-up is not cost-free.  Importantly, it has implications for the rest of the world, since 
risks within the Eurozone can be transmitted across the rest of the world, leading to a potential risk of 
contagion and a doom loop that could have a damaging effect on the global economy. 
6.1 Risks within the Eurozone 
The factors discussed in the earlier sections of this paper have created an unquantified amount of 
unmanaged risk that has been transmitted throughout the Eurozone and, in particular, an unmanaged 
risk on the balance sheets of Eurozone banks and investment firms.  The liabilities and contingent 
liabilities built up by Eurozone and other EU member states as a result of TARGET2, the QE 
programme and in the EIB Group, while certainly significant, are only part of the total amount of 
unrecognised risk hidden beneath the surface.   
                                                     
166 See Scholz, O., "Germany will consider EU-wide bank deposit insurance", Financial Times, 5 November 2019. 
167 Khan, M, and Chazan, G., "Weakened Scholz puts brakes on Eurozone reform", Financial Times, 4 December 2019. 
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The key issue in TARGET2 is the under-collateralisation of the Eurosystem lenders on their loans to 
banks; a secondary issue is the potential creation of more public debt.  The key issues with QE are the 
lack of an adequate loss-absorption layer inside the Eurosystem, given the size of QE, and what is 
contained in the portfolio of bonds purchased:  although the bonds are on the eligible collateral list, 
there is no publicly available information on their quality.  The key issue with the EIB Group is the low 
level of regulatory capital available to support their investments; a secondary issue relates to the size of 
the Group's leveraged loan book and the potential obligations of member states to inject more capital.  
The key issue with NPLs is that many of them are in reality "zombie" loans that will never be repaid, 
which is damaging to both banks and the wider economy.  Banks are needlessly devoting capital to 
supporting loans to "zombie" companies.  This represents a massive distortion of economic resources.  
Such companies should be allowed to fail and their capital and workforce should be reallocated to more 
productive uses and banks should be redirecting their lending to new companies with a brighter future.  
The "zombie" loans should be written off.   
These issues lead to a chain of consequences for the Eurozone.  The EU's approach has allowed weaker 
Eurozone member states to issue more debt than would otherwise be possible and to service existing 
debt at lower cost than would otherwise be possible.  Evidence of this for weaker Eurozone member 
states can be seen in the total debt-to-GDP ratios of Italy and Spain of up to 167% and 138% of GDP, 
respectively, which are significantly higher than would normally be expected, given S&P's credit ratings 
of BBB for Italy168 and A for Spain.169  
As regards lower servicing costs, the zero-weighting of government bonds would tend to reduce their 
yield (i.e., interest rate), making it cheaper for governments to borrow.  Indirect support for this comes 
from Figure 14, which shows that banks with larger domestic sovereign exposures do not seem to face 
closer credit default swap (CDS) spread correlations with their sovereign than their peers with smaller 
exposures.  This indicates that the markets do not yet appear to be penalising banks that hold higher 
amounts of government bonds ‒ which, if they did, would lead the banks to demand higher yields on 
those holdings.   
                                                     
168 https://tradingeconomics.com/italy/rating. 
169 https://tradingeconomics.com/spain/rating. 
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Figure 14:  Correlations between bank and sovereign CDS spreads for banks with low and  
high sovereign bond holdings 
 
Note:  The sample consists of euro area monetary financial institutions (unconsolidated data).   
The low/high holdings refer to below and above-median holdings in the sample. 
Source:  Chart 3 (right panel) in European Central Bank (2019) Financial Stability Review, May; 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/financial-stability/fsr/html/ecb.fsr201905~266e856634.en.html. 
It is not certain, of course, whether there is any linkage between the two points.  It is unclear whether 
lower yields led to more borrowing (because cheaper) or less borrowing (because of smaller expenditure 
to service the debt) – as compared to the counterfactual of a positive risk-weighting of government debt.  
It is conceivable that lower yields did induce some peripheral Eurozone governments (e.g., Greece) to 
borrow more during 1999–2008, whilst the main cause of the lower yields was not zero-weighting but, 
rather, the implicit backing of other EU members.  This view is shared by some commentators:  "Club 
Med debt was [believed by Moody's to be] as good as German debt because Europe was sacred.  That 
delusion enabled Greece to borrow for 10 years at 21 basis points over Bunds even when the structural 
imbalances from the bubble screamed impending disaster.  Moody's kept Greece on a strong A-rating 
even as it became clear that the public accounts were spiralling out of control.  It continued to dismiss 
fears of a Greek default as absurd even after the incoming Papandreou Government discovered that the 
deficit was more than 12% of GDP, rather than 6% as claimed (actually 15%), and funding markets 
were jamming shut.  The rating was still A-grade when Athens was negotiating a $147 bn (£115 bn) 
rescue with the EU and International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Only after the bail-out did it slash Greek 
ratings four notches to junk.  The reason for Moody's mispricing of Club Med risk was based on political 
calculations.  [Moody's] was convinced that the EU would never allow a Eurozone state to spiral into 
insolvency.  Solidarity would prevail".170 
Another consequence relates to the structure of the ECB's QE programme, which involves NCBs 
purchasing sovereign bonds of their own member state in the secondary market and in large quantities, 
albeit that they cannot exceed 33% of the member state's outstanding debt.  Purchases of seasoned 
                                                     
170 Evans-Pritchard, A. "Moody's UK bombshell is about political religion and Brexit heresy, not credit-worthiness", Daily 
Telegraph, 12 November 2019. 
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bonds171 in such quantities reduce the secondary market supply, increase bond prices and reduce yields.  
This, in turn, creates a shortage of supply in the secondary market, which can only be met by new 
issuance in the primary market by the sovereign and at the lower yields brought about by QE.  QE thus 
reduces the interest payments of the sovereigns on their new issuance and artificially creates a need for 
new supply in the primary market, which might not otherwise exist amongst investors if they could 
meet their needs from the secondary market.  This works to the benefit of the sovereigns who have a 
need for new funding, because they can make new issues that will be taken up by investors denied 
supply from the secondary market.  The main purchasers of member state bonds in the primary market 
are typically their domestic banks and investment firms, concentrating risk in the economy of the home 
member state by putting at risk the balance sheets of banks and investment firms located there.   
6.2 Risk transmission to the rest of the world 
The effects of the Eurozone's actions run much wider than the Eurozone.  Eurozone banks offload some 
of the risk they have acquired into global financial markets through, for example, the derivatives, repo 
and other interbank markets.  Further, once Eurozone member state government bonds enter the global 
financial system, the credit risk can no longer be accurately identified, isolated and managed either by 
firms dealing with counterparties exposed to the risk or by the regulators outside the zone.  This is 
because regulatory interventions within the EU or Eurozone do not address the systemic risk that results 
from Eurozone member state debt.  Indeed, in order to do so, the supervisors would have to reverse the 
effects - of the EU rules assuming sovereign treatment - through their supervision of individual financial 
institutions and their oversight of the whole EU financial market.  Such a step has not so far been taken.  
Furthermore, global financial institutions with Eurozone subsidiaries will in practice need to stand 
behind them, so risk on the books of those subsidiaries will also be transmitted into the global financial 
system. 
This does not, of course, prevent financial institutions outside the Eurozone from taking some protective 
measures of their own.  Financial counterparties engaged in market activities could seek to address the 
risk of Eurozone member state government debts in a private capacity by minimising their exposures, 
direct and indirect, to those debts.  For example, non-EU banks do not have to accept Eurozone member 
state government debts or, if such debts were to be accepted, they could apply a discretionary risk 
weighting to the value of their holdings of those debts.  Indeed, many banks and insurers as a matter of 
good risk management have decided to limit their exposures voluntarily, betraying a more realistic 
assessment of the creditworthiness of those debts.  Furthermore, banks and insurers applying more 
sophisticated regulatory capital models based on their own internal risk modelling (i.e., the IRB 
methodology) can find that this results, depending on the workings of the model, in higher capital 
charges for Eurozone sovereign issuers with higher debt-to-GDP ratios, causing them to reduce their 
holdings.  
However, such steps can only be of limited use in the case of a systemic risk, like Eurozone risk.  This 
is because systemic risk can lead to contagion if the markets begin to question the stability and viability 
of institutions within the whole financial system.  This will be true however well-insulated a bank tries 
to make itself and however distant it is geographically from the source of the risk – as we saw with the 
California sub-prime crisis.  
6.3 Risk of contagion 
Since the global financial markets are now highly interconnected, contagion in one particular area can 
spread across sectors and geographies.  The result could be the creation of a domino effect, impacting 
banks in the UK, the US and beyond, given the indirect exposures of banks in those jurisdictions to 
Eurozone banks and investment firms.   
                                                     
171 A seasoned bond is one which has been publicly traded in the secondary market long enough to eliminate any short-term 
effects from its initial offering to the public. 
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Bloomberg identifies Italy's debts as being the "Big Problem":  "Europe's most dangerous stock of 
public borrowing—some €1.5 trn ($1.7 trn) —is concentrated on the balance sheets of banks in Rome 
and Milan.  But a rout could quickly sweep in lenders in Frankfurt, Paris and Madrid – the main banks 
in the rest of Europe are holding more than €425 bn of sovereign and private Italian debt.  …French 
banks [with €285.5 bn in loans] are the most exposed if a sell-off in Italy starts to affect the economy 
and spread through Europe's financial system.  The country's two largest banks, BNP Paribas SA and 
Credit Agricole SA, own retail units in Italy".172  The direct exposure of UK banks to Italy is small in 
comparison (€17.4 bn), but UK banks have lent heavily to French banks and so have significant indirect 
exposure.  See Figure 15.173  
Figure 15:  Key foreign banks' exposure to Italian debt ($bn) 
 
Source:  BIS data contained in a graph produced by The Telegraph:  https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2018/10/28/italy-
careening-recession-wall-bank-crisis-warns-societe-general/ 
The situation would become even riskier for the global markets – introducing conflicted regulatory 
oversight into the global system – were banks headquartered outside the EU to relocate business to the 
Eurozone after Brexit, which is something the Eurozone is keen to encourage.174  Global banking groups 
in practice stand behind their subsidiaries, so the EU's desires, if acceded to, would introduce a greater 
direct impact from its conflicted and flawed oversight into the market through the global financial 
institutions.  As noted by the Basel Committee itself, the risks of sovereign exposures can affect the 
banking system through various channels, including sovereign credit rating downgrades, which 
generate cliff-edge contagion effects and may precipitate downgrades to the ratings of other entities in 
the economy given that sovereign ratings set a "ceiling" on other credit ratings.175  There would also be 
                                                     
172 Salzano, G., Pogkas, D., Sills, B., "Why Italy's Debts Are Europe's Big Problem", Bloomberg  4 February 2019; 
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2019-italian-banks/. 
173  https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2018/10/28/italy-careening-recession-wall-bank-crisis-warns-societe-general/. 
174 See, for example, the opinions and other papers issued by the three ESAs, the first of which were:  Opinion of the European 
Banking Authority on issues related to the departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union, EBA/Op/2017/12, 
12 October 2017; General Principles to support supervisory convergence in the context of the UK withdrawing from the 
EU, 31 May 2017, ESMA42-110-433; and Opinion on supervisory convergence in light of the United Kingdom 
withdrawing from the European Union, EIOPA-BoS-17/141, 11 July 2017.  See also Paul Clarke, "City banks under 
pressure to strengthen Brexit hubs in Europe", Financial News, 20 January 2020; https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/city-
banks-under-pressure-to-increase-brexit-hubs-in-europe-20200120. 
175 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, The Regulatory Treatment of Sovereign Exposures, Discussion Paper, 9 March 
2018, page 4. 
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implications for the global economy itself.  The risk would be exported to the rest of the world which 
would suffer macro-economically from the doom loop imploding in another Eurozone crisis ‒ just as it 
did in the last one in 2009–11.  The fall in Eurozone GDP would reduce imports from the rest of the 
world and spread the recession globally.  Market participants, investors and jurisdictions hosting 
significant financial markets, such as the UK and US, should regard this matter as of very significant 
concern.   
6.4 The doom loop 
What the data also shows is the strong mutual dependency between Eurozone governments and 
Eurozone banks (and other, non-bank, MFIs).  The former rely on the latter to buy their bonds, while 
the latter rely on the former to pay coupons and repay principal on these bonds when due.  However, 
this mutual dependency creates a potential "doom loop" which links risks on the bonds with risks to 
banks themselves.  This loop has a negative feedback in both directions:  as sovereign risk rises, it raises 
bank risks, and as bank risks rise, these raise sovereign risks through the effects on the economy.  As 
the ECB itself warns:  "weaker economic growth and a further rise in political uncertainty could 
intensify sovereign risks.  …  [D]eteriorating macroeconomic conditions may pose a challenge to the 
sustainability of public finances.  The materialisation of any of these risks may reignite concerns 
regarding public debt sustainability in the more vulnerable euro area countries".176 
The risk to banks is threefold.  First, as the economy weakens, the banks will experience an increase in 
NPLs and an associated reduction in interest receipts.177  Second, reduced tax receipts as employment 
falls increase the risk that governments will be unable to pay interest on their debt, since they cannot 
issue additional currency to do so, as a conventional sovereign can.  Third, the combined effect of these 
two factors increases the risk that bank depositors will take flight and move their accounts from banks 
in weaker Eurozone member states to banks in stronger ones.  Normally banks would be required to 
issue a block of regulatory capital to take account of their holdings of bonds that have these risks 
embedded in them, but, as we have seen, in the case of Eurozone sovereign bonds, they do not.  Figure 
16 illustrates how policy uncertainty relating to these issues can trigger sovereign debt sustainability 
concerns. 
  
                                                     
176 European Central Bank (May 2019) Financial Stability Review, p.21. 
177 NPL levels are above 40% in Greece and Cyprus and 25% in Italy. 
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Figure 16:  Interlinkages between policy uncertainty and sovereign debt sustainability concerns 
 
Source:  Chart B in European Central Bank (2019) Financial Stability Review,  
May; https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/financial-stability/fsr/html/ecb.fsr201905~266e856634.en.html. 
This doom loop could spread to the UK, and then out into the global economy.  Global financial 
institutions, in practice, stand behind their subsidiaires, which creates a level of contagion risk from the 
typically small subsidiaries of global (UK or US headquartered) financial institutions located in the 
EU27.  Furthermore, as the Bank of England warned in its 2018 Financial Stability Report,178 a banking 
crisis in Italy could threaten UK financial stability and could eventually be transmitted to the UK 
economy through French and German banks, which have massive exposure to Italy.  While UK financial 
institutions' ownership of Italian debt is relatively small (as Figure 15 showed), they have "much higher 
claims on countries with close links to Italy, including France and Germany.  …If financial strains were 
to spread across the euro area, there could be a material risk to UK financial stability".  Italian NPLs 
account for a quarter of all Eurozone NPLs.  The Report says that UK banks might have to price down 
their Italian sovereign debt holdings due to the increased risk.  This increased risk could then be passed 
on to households and businesses, through increased interest rates on loans and mortgages.  This could, 
in turn, lead both to an increase in NPLs and have a negative effect on the economy as consumers have 
less money to spend and businesses find it more expensive to borrow to invest.  The Bank of England 
conducts "stress tests"179 which model financial risk to the UK originating from the rest of the world, 
including from Italy.  The Report says that "UK banks were resilient to the 2018 stress test, which 
incorporated a synchronised global downturn in output growth as vulnerabilities across financial 
markets and the global economy crystallise".  Without this resilience, an Italian banking crisis could 
easily be transmitted to the rest of the world, creating a doom loop that could have a damaging effect 
on the global economy.  Not only do global banks stand behind their subsidiaries in other countries, 
governments generally stand behind their banks, as the sovereign debt crisis in Eurozone countries, 
such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Cyprus between 2009-14 showed.180 It is clear from this 
experience the damage a doom loop can do. 
 
                                                     
178 Bank of England (2018) Financial Stability Report; https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financial-stability-
report/2018/november-2018. 
179  Examined in more detail in the next section. 
180 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_debt_crisis. 
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7. How the UK currently mitigates Eurozone risk – and how the EU27 and US do 
not 
Banks and their regulators identify risks through stress tests and manage these risks mainly through 
requiring the issuance of loss-absorbing capital through Basel Pillar 2.  In this section, we examine how 
Eurozone risk is mitigated in the UK, but not in the EU27 or the US.  It should be noted that the UK is 
limited in its ability openly to manage Eurozone risk under current EU law arrangements, which will 
last during the transition period for the UK's exit from the EU's legal arrangements until the end of 
2020, since under those arrangements the UK is required to respect the ability of EU27 regulators to 
manage financial risk.  The UK nevertheless manages to mitigate the risk in the manner we explain in 
this section. 
Stress tests.  Central banks and bank regulators apply annual stress tests to the financial institutions they 
supervise.  These stress tests require the banks to analyse the implications of certain market stress 
hypotheticals specified by the relevant regulator or under applicable law.  The effect is that banks are 
occasionally required to issue more regulatory capital under Basel Pillar 2 to cater for specific 
exigencies.  In principle, stress tests could offset problems in the risk-weighting system by effectively 
subjecting banks to higher standards.  However, this offsetting effect is only realised if the stress testing 
is robust and designed to be a real test of a bank's resilience.  The Bank of England stress test meets 
these goals by ensuring that its stress tests do not constrain the losses that can arise.  Different types of 
tests lead to different outcomes, of course.  For the Bank of England, the process of test selection is 
robust and transparent.  Its methodologies across the board are designed, in principle, to offset the zero 
risk-weight treatment.  The EBA applies stress tests also, but it is constrained in doing so under the 
SSM,181 resulting in a situation where its tests do not negate the zero risk-weight issue for Eurozone 
sovereign debt. 
Pillar 2.  The UK and the SSM have both implemented some corrective measures for the under-
capitalisation of sovereign risk through Pillar 2.  However, while the UK Prudential Regulation 
Authority (PRA),182 for example, employs a Pillar 2 methodology for sovereign risk, which is based on 
IRB modelling rather than standardised rules, the EBA does not require any rigorous corrective 
measures to be adopted.  A further problem relates to consistency of application and transparency.  At 
the EU level, while regulators allow banks to disclose the aggregate Pillar 2 requirements, banks are 
prohibited from informing the market of the individual components.  The result is that it is impossible 
to assess the adequacy of counterparty capital.  Similarly, while market pressure has led to some EU 
banks under the SSM regularly disclosing their positions in some of the weaker Eurozone sovereigns, 
this also suffers from credibility issues.  For instance, disclosures may be made on a point-in-time basis, 
and therefore subject to "window-dressing"; and disclosures may reflect the impact of hedging 
transactions which may have been contracted with other banks which themselves have significant 
Eurozone sovereign exposure and hence are subject to the same credit risk issues. 
We now consider the most recent stress tests applied by the UK and EU, and then examine US practice. 
7.1 The UK approach 
The UK is, along with the US, co-host of the global financial markets.  While a member of the EU, the 
UK had to mitigate the systemic risk arising from the Eurozone through stress tests and supervisory 
discretions exercised under the discretionary limb of the Basel Rules—Pillar 2.  The Bank of England 
                                                     
181 The SSM is the system of banking supervision in the European Union.  It comprises the ECB and the national supervisory 
authorities of the participating countries.  Its main aims are to: 
• ensure the safety and soundness of the European banking system; 
• increase financial integration and stability; and 
• ensure consistent supervision. 
The SSM is one of the two pillars of the EU banking union, along with the SRM. 
Source:  https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/thessm/html/index.en.html. 
182 This is part of the Bank of England. 
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has conducted annual stress tests and the regulators have applied discretionary Pillar 2 top-up 
requirements to financial institutions by way of additional protection to depositors.   
For example, in its 2019 stress test reported in its Financial Stability Report, the Bank made the 
following assumptions in respect of Eurozone risk:183 
 
Euro-area GDP contracts by 4.0% in 2019, with growth resuming in late 2020.  Euro-area 
unemployment rises by 4.7 percentage points to peak at 12.6% in 2020, before falling to 11.6% 
by the end of the scenario (Chart 11).  Headline euro-area inflation turns negative in 2019, 
reflecting weaker demand and lower commodity prices, and does not rise above zero until 
2021 H1.  Core inflation remains weak throughout the scenario. 
 
Residential property prices fall by 20% across the euro area, while CRE prices fall by 26% in 
the stress (Chart 12).  In particular, French CRE prices184 fall by more than the euro-area 
average.  Aggregate euro-area property prices recover modestly over the final years of the 
stress. 
 
Further, the UK PRA employs a Pillar 2 methodology for sovereign risk which is based on the IRB 
model rather than standardised rules.  The same is not true of the EBA's application of its stress tests 
for the Eurozone. 
It is important to recognise that the UK does not actually apply capital standards to EU27 banks 
operating through branches in London.  The EU's capital standards are applied by the regulator of the 
bank located in its jurisdiction of incorporation.  Generally, all the global banks have their European 
and rest-of-the-world headquarters in the UK.  However, that is not true of the EU27 banks, some of 
which passport into the UK by establishing a branch in London from which they conduct their business.  
This is the case, for instance, with French and German banks – the main Eurozone banks with presences 
in London.  This allows them to avoid the capital costs of running a UK subsidiary.  As a result, French 
and German banks have their capital charges determined by the SSM.  The EBA runs the stress tests 
for the SSM, but does not model the risk arising from the sub-sovereign nature of Eurozone member 
state government bonds.  However, French and German banks are of modest size in global terms and 
have been dwindling significantly.185  Thus, the vast bulk of global banking in the European time zone 
operates out of London under UK supervision and Bank of England stress tests. 
Separate from the capital position, the UK has taken measures to improve the quality of bank 
management in response to the 2007-8 financial crisis.  The UK was the only EU member state to have 
implemented tougher controls on bank governance.  The Senior Managers Regime is intended, in part, 
to change the mindset of a bank's management when it comes to determining the appropriate level of 
capital for the risks that the bank faces.  It is designed to move the bank management's mindset from 
viewing capital rules mechanically as determining the minimum level of required capital to a position 
where managers apply thought to assessing whether the risks facing their bank warrant more than the 
minimum requirements.  EU rules on bank governance are relatively weak by contrast, which has 
resulted in banks claiming ample CET1 ratios at the same time as their shares trade in the market at 
                                                     
183 https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/financial-stability-report/2019/december-
2019.pdf?la=en&hash=99431A541357AC6D601A99B950455E2344C12901#page=12. 
184  https://www.cre.fr/en/Electricity/Wholesale-electricity-market/wholesale-electricity-market. 
185  Daniel Pinto, London-based head of JPMorgan's corporate and investment bank, argues that consolidation among 
Europe's investment banks is needed to avoid them falling too far behind US investment banks:  "The challenge is the 
lack of scale, European banks were not at a size to allow them to adjust to the post-crisis level of leverage and regulation.  
You need scale to be profitable and when you are in that situation you try to solve the issue by reducing costs".  In 2019, 
there were only 155 mergers and acquisitions deals completed by European banks worth $18.1bn, the lowest on record.  
In November 2019, Olaf Scholz, the German finance minister, called for the completion of the European banking union.  
But this would require cross-border mergers between banks, which EU regulators and politicians have long sought to 
block, in part because of the resulting job losses as well as the potential disappearance of domestic banks in some of the 
smaller states (Clarke, P., "JPMorgan's Pinto:  European banks need scale to compete with US rivals", Financial News, 
13 January 2020). 
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major discounts to their book values.  The inference of this is that equity investors do not have 
confidence in the CET1 ratios as an adequate protection against the full set of risks inherent in the banks' 
on- and off-balance sheet business.186   
After Brexit, the UK cannot safely operate under EU-made rules without being able to participate in the 
making of those rules.  After the transition period contained in the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement, at 
the end of 2020, the UK can take its own path on the treatment of exposure to sovereign risks to 
individual EU member states and has already indicated it intends to do so. 187 
The conclusion of the Bank of England's 2019 stress test was that "[t]he 2019 annual cyclical scenario 
stress test (ACS) shows the UK banking system would be resilient to deep simultaneous recessions in 
the UK and global economies that are more severe overall than the Global Financial Crisis, combined 
with large falls in asset prices and a separate stress of misconduct costs.  It would therefore be able to 
continue to meet credit demand from UK households and businesses even in the unlikely event of these 
highly adverse conditions", and the key components of conditions were that "world GDP falls by 2.6%, 
UK GDP falls by 4.7%, Bank Rate rises to 4% and the UK unemployment rate rises to 9.2%". 
The key triggers cited for these conditions arising are a US/China trade war and the situation in Hong 
Kong, rather than a Eurozone crisis.  The main policy response is to increase UK banks' countercyclical 
buffer (CCyB) from 1% to 2% by the end of 2020, meaning that 2% becomes the CCyB in "standard 
conditions", i.e., in non-stressed conditions.  This would enable the Bank of England to moderate the 
CCyB in times of stress so as to "preserve up to £500 bn of banks' capacity to lend to UK households 
and businesses". 
Increasing the CCyB now is somewhat counter-cyclical to the logic for the CCyB existing, namely it 
should be increased in times of high credit demand, to dampen down banks' capacity to lend, rather than 
increased in a time of normal credit demand so as to create a way of supporting credit availability were 
times to become stressed.  Nevertheless, an increased CCyB will mean that the UK's banks are better 
capitalised, and better able to withstand shocks.  Such protections, however, only apply to UK banks, 
as only UK banks issue this additional capital. 
This approach helps to counteract the Bank of England's setting of a 0% extra CET1 capital buffer for 
Other Systemically Important Institutions (O-SIIs), where the maximum extra buffer was 2%.  The 
UK's banks are therefore, as of the end of 2019, subject to extra CET1 capital buffers of a 1% CCyB 
across the board, plus an uplift if the institution is one of the UK's four GSIFIs (HSBC 2%, Barclays 
1.5%, Santander 1% and Standard Chartered 1%).  These CET1 buffers sit on top of the global standard 
for minimum Core Capital (4.5%) and Capital Conservation Buffer (2.5%), or a combined minimum of 
7% of RWA.  HSBC's UK requirement is therefore currently 7% + 1% CCyB + 2% GSIFI = 10%, of 
RWA.  This will rise to 11% by the end of 2020 due to the CCyB increase to 2%. 
As regards the contents of the UK stress tests undertaken, while the 2019 stress tests emphasised the 
US/China trade and Hong Kong scenarios, there is also mention of Brexit, with the predominant factor 
considered in 2019 being a disorderly Brexit.  The Financial Policy Committee188 "judges that its 2019 
stress test of the core UK banking system was sufficiently severe to encompass the range of economic 
shocks that could be associated with a disorderly Brexit" (page 21 of the Financial Stability Report189).  
A disorderly Brexit did not occur in January 2020, but the possibility still exists for the end of 2020 – 
so we can expect UK banks to cope with that scenario should it occur. 
                                                     
186  The share price discounts also reflect overcapacity as well as the market's assessment that the profitability of the banking 
sector is expected to remain poor for some time, due to low interest rates.  This is considered below. 
187  See fn 238 below. 
188  https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/people/financial-policy-committee. 
189  Bank of England, Financial Stability Report 2019; https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/financial-
stability-report/2019/december-2019.pdf 
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Looking further out, though, the Bank of England examines how the US/China and Hong Kong 
situations could develop (including debt vulnerabilities in China), but then notes as a new risk (page 29 
of the Report) that there are "risks in the euro-area banking sector", as follows:  "[e]uro-area bank 
resilience has improved in recent years, with aggregate CET1 capital now at 14% of risk-weighted 
assets.  But, as noted in the ECB's latest Financial Stability Review,190 the improvement in capital ratios 
has been reliant on falling risk weights, and the European authorities have yet to implement some 
elements of the Basel III capital standards.  Price to book ratios for euro-area banks remain low in 
comparison to international peers, possibly reflecting overcapacity in the sector as well as challenges 
to some bank business models posed by low, and in some cases negative, interest rates.  These issues 
mean that the euro-area banking system may be less able to cushion future shocks". 
The set of Eurozone risks that are the subject of this paper have therefore been recognised in form, 
though not yet in substance or timing by the Bank of England:  other factors are considered more 
imminent and substantial.  Nevertheless, it is welcome to see this aspect mentioned.  Of course, it would 
not affect the integrity of the results of the stress tests if the adverse conditions (world GDP falls by 
2.6%, UK GDP falls by 4.7% and so on) were triggered by different events than the ones stated as 
predicates. 
7.2 The EU approach 
The CCyBs set by the regulators of EU member state financial systems are visible on this ECB website, 
which is updated monthly.191  As of 26 January 2020, 14 out of the 19 Eurozone countries had a 0% 
CCyB, Luxembourg and France had a CCyB of 0.25%, Lithuania and Ireland had a CCyB of 1%, and 
Slovakia had a CCyB of 1.5%. 
Whilst CCyBs have been kept low or non-existent for the majority of Eurozone financial institutions, 
Eurozone regulators have used the O-SII structure to impose extra buffers on individual institutions:  
the 2018 extra O-SII buffers (the latest ones available) show regulators adding between 0.25% and 2%, 
differentiated by bank name.  This contrasts with levels set out at the inception of the CCyB regime in 
2015 and referred to in Annex 4, which were customarily set by national regulators at the same level 
for all their nominated O-SIIs.  The Eurozone had 113 O-SIIs in 2018, including 8 GSIFIs.  However, 
there is no correlation between the country's GDP and the number of O-SIIs in it.  They range from 
Cyprus with 10 O-SIIs to Greece with 4, from Germany with 13 to Italy with 3.  See Tables 9 and 10. 
Table 9:  Number of O-SIIs, and O-SII and CCyB buffers in the 19 Eurozone countries 
COUNTRY 
# of O-
SIIs 
O-SII BUFFER 
RANGE CCyB COUNTRY 
# of O-
SIIs 
O-SII BUFFER 
RANGE CCyB 
Austria 7 1-2% 0% Portugal 6 0.25-1% 0% 
Estonia 4 1-2% 0% Spain 5 0.25-1% 0% 
Latvia 6 1.25-2% 0% Italy 3 0.25-1% 0% 
Lithuania 4 1-2% 1% Malta 3 0.5-2% 0% 
Finland 3 0.5-2% 0% Cyprus 10 0.5-2% 0% 
Germany 13 0.5-2% 0% Greece 4 1% 0% 
Netherlands 5 1-2% 0% Slovenia 7 0.25-1% 0% 
Belgium 8 0.75-1.5% 0% Slovakia 5 0.5-1% 1.5% 
Luxembourg 8 0.5-2% 0.25% Ireland 6 0-1.5% 0% 
France 6 0.25-1.5% 0.25%     
 
Source:  2018 update of O-SIIs notified to the EBA 
CCyBs set by the regulators of EU member state financial systems: 
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/national_policy/ccb/html/index.en.html 
                                                     
190  European Central Bank, Financial Stability Review, November 2019 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/financial-
stability/fsr/html/ecb.fsr201911~facad0251f.en.html#toc1. 
191  https://www.esrb.europa.eu/national_policy/ccb/html/index.en.html. 
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Table 10:  Eurozone GSIFIs 
INSTITUTION COUNTRY GSIFI LEVEL EXTRA CET1 BUFFER 
BNP Paribas France 2 1.5% 
Deutsche Bank Germany 2 1.5% 
Groupe BPCE France 1 1% 
Groupe Credit Agricole France 1 1% 
ING Bank Netherlands 1 1% 
Santander Spain 1 1% 
Societe Generale France 1 1% 
Unicredit Italy 1 1% 
 
Source:  Financial Stability Board listing of November 2019 
 
One thus has a subset of all institutions that are subject to an O-SII buffer, and a sub-subset – 8 
institutions in France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Spain ‒ that is subject to a further GSIFI buffer.  
There is also the possibility that the total buffer for an O-SII is higher than the total buffer for a GSIFI.  
The ECB justifies this is in its SREP process (see below in Annex 5) on the basis of the performance of 
GSIFIs in stress tests, but this turns the logic of having GSIFIs on its head:  because they are of crucial 
importance to the global financial system, they should have larger capital buffers than institutions which 
are not. 
The remaining institutions are subject only to the CCyB, which in the main countries is set at 0%, and 
must therefore carry only the base figure of 7% of RWA.  Recall that the UK has a 0% O-SII buffer but 
a 1% (rising in 2020 to 2%) CCyB, applicable to all, meaning that the base figure is 8% in the UK. 
Turning to the issue of collateral, the Eurosystem eligible collateral list by its nature consists of 
securities that will be liquid right across the Eurozone and outside it (such as French government bonds) 
and those that will only be liquid in one compartment, such as municipal bonds.  The regulator with the 
clearest overview of municipal bonds will be the one that sponsored them onto the list to begin with:  
the national regulator has a vested interest in these bonds being listed with the lowest possible haircut 
and remaining in good standing within the list.  The Eurosystem regulator relies on the opinion of the 
national regulator, an opinion that is not disinterested. 
The ECB's 2019 report on its Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) published at the end 
of January 2020 shows a similar picture and the weak foundations upon which ECB supervision is based 
– see Annex 5. 
7.3 Comparing the EU and UK approaches 
The Eurozone's approach is country-by-country, with institution-specific buffers playing a greater role 
than system-wide buffers.  If certain buffers like CCyB are meant to cater for systemic risks, as opposed 
to institution-specific risks, then the UK approach is clearly superior. 
The UK approach is also superior in the case where the banking market is not concentrated on a small 
number of very large institutions.  Germany has 13 O-SIIs, but these do not encompass the large number 
of independent savings and co-operative banks, so a low CCyB supplemented with an O-SII buffer 
leaves a large number of institutions only needing to hold the base of 7% of RWA. 
The UK financial system and its claim of robust stability can further be contrasted to the Eurozone's 
claim by a series of absences: 
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• Unlike in the TARGET2 payment system, the participants in the UK's CHAPS system192 cannot go 
overdrawn on their Settlement Accounts during the day, and therefore not overnight either.  A 
Settlement Account must be in credit throughout the day, and the end-of-day credit balance is moved 
to the participant's Reserve Account. 
If a CHAPS participant lacks funds during the day with which to settle the CHAPS payments it 
orders, its main option is to enter into a repurchase agreement with the Bank of England, selling 
eligible securities for cash, with a re-exchange in the future.  The participant delivers the securities 
to the Bank of England in the CREST system193, and receives the cash on its CREST settlement 
account.  It then transfers the cash from its CREST settlement account to its Bank of England 
Settlement Account in order to use the cash to meet its CHAPS payments. 
• TARGET2, by contrast, allows the participants' "RTGS Accounts" to go into overdraft at the 
discretion of the participant's sponsoring national central bank, and against any collateral on the 
Eurosystem list (there is no limitation, as exists in the UK, whereby only Type A collateral – the 
collateral of the highest quality – can be used for payment operations). 
• TARGET2 also allows the NCBs to go overdrawn on their accounts with one another that are used 
for cross-border payments, against any eligible collateral – the TARGET2 imbalances issues 
described at length in sections 2.1 and 4.4 of this paper. 
• There has been no programme in the UK for the securitisation of NPLs as has been used in Italy and 
Cyprus and now – under Project Hercules – in Greece.194 
• There has been no systematic programme to reduce banks' reported levels of NPLs through 
"forbearance" and "restructuring" techniques that return the loans to performing status without the 
borrower needing to bring forth any cash from its own resources as debt service.  This has arguably 
created a portfolio of "zombie" loans reliant wholly on the liquidation of security as the source of 
eventual repayment, and where the cash debt service must remain low or non-existent for the loans 
to remain as performing. 
• Both these "zombie" performing loans and the current carrying-value of NPLs (loan face value less 
write-downs made so far) are assigned a risk-weighting through the bank's IRB model and treated 
as if there were no current or past delinquency. 
With these problems latent within the accounts and IRB models of the Eurozone institutions subjected 
to the EBA stress tests, it is difficult to regard the results with the same degree of confidence as the 
Bank of England's exercise, carried out upon a marketplace in which the above indicators are absent. 
Given these qualitative differences, it is questionable whether the EBA stress tests have served their 
purpose in reassuring markets that banks are sound, only one of the aspects of which is their ability to 
withstand times of stress in financial markets. 
EU financial institutions subject to stress tests are covered by the SSM.  Some, but by no means all, of 
the institutions within the SSM have been notified to the EBA by national authorities as "O-SII", the 
EU's version of the Basel Committee's "domestic systemically important banks" (D-SIBs). 
In Annex 4, we look at the respective lists of SSM institutions and O-SIIs around the time the system 
was introduced and when the first stress test was run – based on figures and portfolios as at 31 December 
                                                     
192  https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/payment-and-settlement/chaps. 
193  https://www.euroclear.com/dam/PDFs/Settlement/EUI/MA2740-CREST-settlement.pdf. 
194  See fn 154 above and the surrounding text. 
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2013.  We then look at the bank failures since then, and at a non-exhaustive list of the banks that are 
potentially unviable but which have been kept alive and not resolved. 
The conclusions are clear: 
• The banks that have failed have all been within the SSM since its inception, as have the banks that 
continue, but which are at significant risk. 
• The construct of the SSM, O-SIIs, the SRM and the stress tests has not ensured that the Eurozone 
banking system is sound. 
• The market does not believe the system is sound since, despite the impressive CET1 ratios claimed 
by institutions and the improvements attested to by the Eurozone authorities, Eurozone banks, as a 
generality, trade at a discount to their book values. 195   Luis de Guindos has attributed this 
principally to weak profitability and high costs. 196  A 2018 study by ZEB Consultants for the 
European Banking Federation197 addressed the issue on p.12 in the section entitled "Market prices 
reflect disbelief from investors" and stated that "investors are clearly not buying into the equity 
stories of most banks that at the same time fall short of expectations in terms of growth and/or 
innovation".198 
• Under ZEB's "equity stories of most banks", we read that investors believe that bank assets are 
overvalued, and specifically that the "RWA" figures (which are the denominators in the calculation 
to determine the CET1 capital ratio in which the banks' CET1 capital amounts are the numerators) 
understate the risk in banks' on- and off-balance sheet business. 
• Put another way, the market believes that the CET1 ratios are overstated because the "RWA" figures 
derive from IRB methodologies that assign generous Credit Conversion Factors to numerous asset 
classes, starting with Eurozone sovereigns, and trickling up to the Eurozone's supra-sovereigns and 
down to the Eurozone sub-sovereigns in the first instance, and trickling further down into other asset 
classes such bank NPLs, as well as auto receivables-backed, residential mortgage-backed, credit 
card receivables-backed financial institutions and so on. 
• The cornerstone of this overstatement of CET1 ratios is the treatment of Eurozone member state 
credit risk – it is significantly understated. 
7.4 The US approach 
In terms of risk-weighting of Eurozone bonds, the US Federal Reserve typically grants these bonds a 
0% risk weight under 12 CFR 217.32 (the standardised approach), based on their OECD country risk 
classification (CRC), which treats European countries as "high-income Euro area countries not 
reviewed or classified."  Some very small EU states have, at times of crisis, been given a risk-weighting 
above 0%, such as:199  
• Cyprus has received CRC ratings of 3 and above ‒ a 3 rating results in a 50% risk weight. 
• Estonia has received CRC ratings of 2 and above ‒ a 2 rating results in a 20% risk weight. 
                                                     
195 Keynote speech by Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB, at the ABI annual conference "Banking Union and Basel 
III – risk and supervision 2019", Rome, 25 June 2019, 
 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2019/html/ecb.sp190625~6d33411cff.en.html accessed on 1/6/20. 
196  Ibid. 
197 "European Banking Study – Navigating the Road Ahead – Market Trends & Strategic Options for European Banks – 
2018" by ZEB Consultants for the European Banking Federation. 
198  Ibid. 
199  https://www.oecd.org/trade/topics/export-credits/documents/cre-crc-historical-internet-english.pdf. 
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• Latvia has received CRC ratings of 2 and above. 
• Malta has received CRC ratings of 2 and above. 
The Federal Reserve's stress tests do cover the scenario of weakened economic conditions in the EU.  
For example, the results of the 2019 stress tests200 describe the "market shock" component (which is 
applied to the 11 firms with large trading and private equity portfolios) of the severely adverse scenario 
as follows: 
 
The global market shock component for the severely adverse scenario features a significant 
weakening in European economic conditions and spillover effects that lead to sell-offs in 
financial assets more broadly.  The European distress leads to global market dislocations, 
affecting U.S. and developing Asian and other emerging markets.  There is a sudden increase 
in implied volatilities broadly, a large decline in industrial and energy commodity prices, and 
a significant widening in credit spreads, with an associated decline in market liquidity…. 
 
Flight-to-quality capital flows push interest rates down across the term structure in the U.S. 
and certain European countries, while emerging markets and countries that are part of the 
European periphery experience sharp increases in government yields.  Countries that are 
affected by flight-to-quality experience currency appreciation, while European and emerging 
market currencies experience currency depreciation against the U.S. dollar. 
  
The scenarios and the market shock change from year to year.  As the Fed further explained: 
  
The major differences relative to the 2018 severely adverse scenario include a heightened stress 
to European assets; a decline in the U.S. yield curve; an appreciation of the U.S. dollar relative 
to most other currencies; and more muted shocks to U.S. based assets, such as U.S. agency and 
municipal products.  These differences are intended to reflect the more Europe-focused nature 
of the stress and a general flight-to-quality to U.S. markets. 
 
The key problem with these scenarios is that they involve "general purpose" economic shocks that could 
apply equally to any other economic region in the world, such as South America or SE Asia.  They do 
not come close to modelling the huge Eurozone-specific risks that we have identified in this paper.  In 
February 2020, the Fed announced its 2020 stress test scenario:  "[t]he harshest scenario includes a 
severe global recession with heightened stresses in corporate debt markets and commercial real estate, 
and for banks with large trading operations, additional pressure on leveraged loans".201  The Fed's 2020 
assumptions recognise a relatively greater degree of economic vulnerability in the Eurozone compared 
to the UK, for example, but only at a high level, and without acknowledging the additional risk to the 
global economy deriving from Eurozone financial risk.202 
                                                     
200  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Stress Test 2019:  Supervisory Stress Test Results, June 2019; 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2019-dfast-results-20190621.pdf.  
201  Federal Reserve Board releases hypothetical scenarios for its 2020 stress test exercises, press release, 6 February 2020; 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20200206a.htm. 
202 The stress test scope is the 34 large banks in the USA with more than $100 billion in total assets 
(https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20200206a.htm, accessed on 2/8/20).  The 34 banks 
include the US subsidiaries of Barclays, HSBC, BNP-Paribas, Santander, Deutsche Bank, and UBS, and the US operation 
of the German DWS investment management group.  RBS exited its ownership of Citizens Financial Group, which is on 
the list, in 2015 (https://investor.citizensbank.com/about-us/newsroom/latest-news/2015/2015-11-03-190856894.aspx, 
accessed on 2/8/20). 
There are two scenarios for the tests (2020 Supervisory Scenarios for Annual Stress Tests Required under the Dodd-Frank 
Act Stress Testing Rules and the Capital Plan Rule, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).  They are based 
on specific data points of domestic and international economic performance going back to 2000 (Tables 1A+B).  The Fed 
then supplies, in Tables 2A+B and 3A+B, the variations to these data points for 2020 to 2023, upon which the two stress 
test scenarios will be run. 
The baseline scenario, to which Tables 2A+B apply, "follows a profile similar to average projections from a survey of 
economic forecasters" (p3).  The other, "Severely Adverse" scenario, to which Tables 3A+B apply, "features a slightly 
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7.5 Conclusion on the current management of Eurozone risk 
The Bank of England's approach is characterised by comprehensiveness, diligence, clarity, good 
governance, and coherence.  There are no filtration points between the raw data and the data as used,203 
and there is one output ‒ a CCyB applicable to all ‒ and set by a single regulator.  The Bank also has a 
structurally easier task in gaining a complete overview of the UK financial market, including the 
important matters of the liquidity and price performance of the types B and C of collateral,204 that are 
ineligible as payment system collateral or for operational standing facilities or short-term repurchase 
agreements. 
 
The Eurozone approach is not as clear, has certain measures set by the ECB and some set nationally, 
and some data sourced directly and some sourced through national bodies and subject to possible 
filtration ‒ with the yardstick for identifying O-SIIs being the clearest indicator of inconsistency ‒ 
followed by the range of O-SII buffers set.  There are also multiple regulators across the member states.  
Further, the EU has yet to implement some elements of the Basel III capital standards, implying that 
"the euro-area banking system may be less able to cushion future shocks".205 
 
So despite the fact that the UK has made considerable efforts to protect itself and the global financial 
system from Eurozone risk, it is clear that a significant amount of this risk remains hidden and 
unmanaged in the Eurozone itself, in the UK and in the wider global financial system.  What is 
particularly concerning is that the US does not appear to be aware of the extent of the risk and instead 
treats Eurozone members in the same way that it treats other OECD members. 
 
8. Can the EU fix the problem? 
There are a number of measures that the EU might consider in an attempt to fix the problem. 
8.1 Rectifying the EU's capital rules 
As discussed above, following the Basel Rules in the normal way would mean that EU banks and 
investment firms would be required to apply the analogue position (in terms of risk and capital costs) 
contained in the Basel Rules for municipal debts or debts of public sector entities, which do not have 
sovereign backing. 206   The risk-weighting would then be significantly higher, starting at 20%, as 
                                                     
greater increase in the unemployment rate in the United States compared to last year's severely adverse scenario".  The 
worsening of the data for 2020 compared to 2019 is caused, not by any opinion of the Fed, but the policy framework:  it 
"reflects the Board's Policy Statement on the Scenario Design Framework for Stress Testing, which calls for a more 
pronounced economic downturn when current conditions are stronger".  
The international variables (Table 3B) in the "Severely Adverse" scenario show Eurozone real GDP growth in the four 
quarters of 2020 as -6.9%, -8.0%, -5.9% and -4.0%, compared to the UK variables for the same period of -5.1%, -6.2%, 
-5.0% and -3.6%.   
203  A filtration point is an intermediary point in the data collection process where someone can apply an editorial decision 
on what to include and how to include it.  This could lead to a potential inconsistency with the base data supplied by 
different sources.  In this case, this would typically be happening at one of the Eurozone NCBs.  This is always a risk 
with a decentralised system, where the centre (i.e., ECB and EBA) relies on national supervisors.  It can materialise 
however strict the data definitions. 
204  See https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/eligible-collateral. 
205 European Central Bank, Financial Stability Review, November 2019 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/financial-
stability/fsr/html/ecb.fsr201911~facad0251f.en.html#toc1. 
206 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III:  Finalising Post-crisis Reforms, December 2017.  The Basel standard 
generally applies a material risk-weighting for bank exposures to all non-central government public sector entities (PSEs), 
although it exceptionally allows a national discretion for exposures to PSEs in that jurisdiction to be treated as sovereign 
exposures, instead of as an exposure to a PSE.  There is no hard and fast rule as to when governments may exercise that 
discretion.  However, the guidance incorporated in the Basel III framework suggests that PSEs would receive a similar 
treatment to claims on the sovereign or central government only if the government is standing behind the PSE.  For 
example, factors to be considered in the exercise of the discretion are the extent of any guarantees provided by the 
government or whether the PSEs have revenue-raising powers and arrangements in place which effectively reduce the 
risk of default. 
 Jurisdictions may therefore choose to apply risk-weights according to either (1) the rating afforded the PSE, or (2) the 
sovereign.  The Eurozone does not stand behind member state debt and so sovereign treatment would appear to be 
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opposed to the 0% rating for exposures to the most creditworthy sovereigns, and going up to 150%.  
However, such an approach would most likely face political resistance within the EU and Eurozone 
(particularly amongst its weaker members, such as Italy, Spain and Greece) since it would, if adopted, 
hamper the ability of Eurozone member states to borrow.  Apart from the costs of finding new capital, 
a proper approach would mean that banks and investment firms within the EU would be able to acquire 
far less Eurozone member state government debt and those governments would most likely be unable 
to issue anything like the current levels of debt to finance their activities at current yields.  
Further, having enjoyed the benefits of the privileged risk-weighting rules for some time, the Eurozone 
banking system would likely take actions, in the event that the Basel Rules were applied without such 
privilege, that would, in turn, cause other problems.  Its banks would cut back other lending as many 
routes to raising capital are closed off.  The Eurozone would grow even more slowly than it has since 
the euro was introduced in 1999.  The ECB would have to buy more government bonds through QE.  
These bonds would move from bank to ECB balance sheets, while private credit would contract.  QE 
would fail to prevent falling money supply.  The result is that even if all these Eurozone banks were to 
recapitalise according to the Basel Rules genuinely applied, it is not clear that the Eurozone would be 
in better shape.  In the end, it is perhaps the case that there is no regulatory answer to the economic 
transition required by the iterative formation of the Eurozone.  In the meantime, the Eurozone's structure 
threatens another crisis which would spread financial and the economic damage to the rest of the world.  
The only viable answer in the longer term is to create a genuine Eurozone sovereign, but that would 
require a degree of political will, the current absence of which Mr. Scholz's failed EDIS proposals 
demonstrate.207 
There is ample evidence for the lack of political will within the EU.  This is compounded by the potential 
lack of legitimacy of actions already taken by or proposed by the EU.  For example, there has been legal 
action challenging the exercise of powers that the ECB has used so far under its QE programme, as well 
as further challenges to its plan for a programme of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT).  The ECB 
outlined OMT in 2012, but it has not yet implemented it, primarily as a result of the Gauweiler case,208 
heard in front of the German constitutional court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVG).  The BVG first 
ruled that implementing OMT was outside the competence of the ECB but made a preliminary reference 
to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ahead of its final ruling.209  The CJEU ruled that 
OMT was within the ECB's powers, subject to certain loose conditions on its exercise.  Once the case 
was back in the German courts, the BVG upheld the legality of implementing the OMT programme but 
interpreted the CJEU's conditions on its exercise in a stricter manner than the CJEU itself.210  Crucially, 
the BVG ordered the Bundesbank not to participate in any OMT offering unless "the volume of the 
purchases is limited from the outset".  Although not widely reported at the time, the apparent intention 
of this part of the judgment was to weaken severely the ECB's latitude to mobilise OMT as a means for 
fighting a crisis situation.  In practice, such obstacles were easily overcome by the ECB, which simply 
set a stated, but very high, limit "from the outset".211 
                                                     
unwarranted.  However, even where the rating of the sovereign is used, the risk-weight is:  AAA to AA-:  20%; A+ to A-
:  50%; BBB+ to BBB-:  100%; BB+ to BB-:  100%; below B-:  150%; unrated:  100%.  That is, in every case, this is 
meaningfully higher than applying 0%. 
Article 116(4) of the CRR allows exposures to PSEs to be treated as central government, regional government or local 
authority exposures only in "exceptional circumstances" and where the competent authority deems that "there is no 
difference in risk between such exposures because of the existence of an appropriate guarantee by the central government, 
regional government or local authority".  Bonds that are not guaranteed by the government in such a way are assigned a 
higher risk weight. 
207 See fn. 166 above.  A study for the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament has proposed 
the EU should introduce regulatory disincentives against highly concentrated sovereign exposures of euro area banks, 
proposing a Sovereign Concentration Charges Regulation (SCCR):  Sovereign Concentration Charges:  A New Regime 
for Banks' Sovereign Exposures, Véron, November 2017.  Like the Scholtz proposals, this fails to grasp the magnitude of 
the problem, but instead attempts to limit its impact. 
208 Gauweiler I, BVerfGE 134, 366 - 2 BvR 2728/13 (2014).   
209 Gauweiler v Deutscher Bundestag (2015) C-62/14. 
210 Gauweiler II, BVerfG, Judgement of the Second Senate of June 21, 2016 - 2 BvR 2728/13. 
211 See Yowell P., "Why the ECB Cannot Save the Euro" in Wolf-Georg Ringe and Peter M. Huber (eds).  Legal Challenges 
in the Global Financial Crisis.  Bailouts, the Euro and Regulations, Hart Publishing Ltd, 2014, pp. 81–119. 
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Subsequent challenges to the exercise of powers by the ECB have also come in front of the BVG in the 
first instance, and been referred up to the CJEU and back.  A report in the Suddeutsche Zeitung212 gives 
a summary of the main points raised in the most recent hearing on QE, in which the plaintiffs maintain 
that the ECB has exceeded its powers by instituting the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) 
element of QE, thereby pursuing economic policy and monetary financing of public debt.  The plaintiffs 
maintain that the CJEU has exceeded its powers by permitting the ECB to do this or, put another way, 
by not blocking the ECB from instituting QE. 
8.2 Joint-and-several liability – and political integration 
The solution in the longer term would be fiscal and political integration within the Eurozone, with the 
issuance of pan-Eurozone debt backed jointly and severally by Eurozone member states.  While this is 
consistent with "ever closer union" – as laid out in the Treaty on European Union213 – it is not, as we 
have seen above, currently a very popular aim amongst the EU population.  Insights into the economic 
dangers arising from the Eurozone and some degree of support for an integration-based route out of the 
current situation can be obtained from several recent studies, albeit none has examined the legal aspects 
considered here.   
For example, Baum et al. (2016) provide evidence that, while member state downgrades and negative 
outlook announcements by credit rating agencies had no impact on the value of the euro currency, they 
increased the yields of French, Italian and Spanish bonds and even affected the yields on German 
bonds.214  This means that the standard transmission of rating shocks to currency value and sovereign 
bond yields is not operating within the Eurozone.  The entire shock is absorbed by an internal repricing 
of sovereign bonds, giving a false sense of security for the euro currency itself.  De Grauwe and Ji 
(2012) argue that there is systematic mispricing of sovereign risk in the Eurozone which has intensified 
macroeconomic instability, leading to bubbles in good years and excessive austerity in bad years.215  De 
Grauwe (2012) recognises the significance of one of the key points we have discussed earlier:  "[w]hen 
entering a monetary union, member countries change the nature of their sovereign debt in a fundamental 
way; that is, they cease to have control over the currency in which their debt is issued.  As a result, 
financial markets can force these countries' sovereigns into defaulting.  This makes the monetary union 
fragile and vulnerable to changing market sentiments".  He argues that, to reduce this fragility, the 
governance of the Eurozone needs to change, with the ECB becoming a lender of last resort, as is 
standard with other central banks, and with Eurozone member states accepting budgetary union in 
addition to monetary union.216  
The establishment of joint-and-several liability on the part of Eurozone member states for Eurozone 
member state government debt would justify the current regulatory capital treatment of those bonds.217  
However, with the northern European members states strongly opposed to "picking up the tab" for what 
they see as southern members states' fiscal profligacy,218 such an outcome is highly unlikely, at least in 
the near future.  It would involve mutualising the exposures of member states and allowing the national 
balance sheets of the northern member states, especially Germany, to support the weaker member states.  
As a clear indication of the difficulties that would arise from such a proposition, the (relatively modest) 
Scholz proposal for a Eurozone-wide bank deposit scheme was shot down.219  And, of course, this by 
no means addressed the sub-sovereignty issue, which could only be dealt with by mutual guarantees.  
The Eurozone structure is both inherently unsound and, in practice, very difficult to fix.  
                                                     
212 https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/bundesverfassungsdgericht-griff-nach-der-seifenblase-1.4547814, accessed on 
28/12/19. 
213 13 December 2007.  Formerly, the Treaty of Rome. 
214 Baum, C., Schäfer, D., and Stephan, A., "Credit Rating Agency Downgrades and the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crises", 
Journal of Financial Stability, 24, 2016, 117–131. 
215 De Grauwe, P. and Ji, Y., "Mispricing of Sovereign Risk and Macroeconomic Stability in the Eurozone", Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 50, 2012, 866–880. 
216 De Grauwe, P., "The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone", Australian Economic Review, 45, 2012, 255–268. 
217 Cf. the EU itself, which has an internationally accepted 0% risk weighting. 
218 Koukakis N., "Facing slow to no growth, EU's poor nations plot next move", CNBC, 9 September 2018. 
219 See fns. 166 and 167 above.  
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8.3 In the short term, EU27 supervisors cannot be relied upon to fix the problem 
EU27 supervisors cannot be left to supervise the current risks in the Eurozone.  There is a single conflict 
of interest, lying at the heart of the Eurosystem, that is unprecedented in modern times.  
Given the existing regulatory capital treatment of Eurozone member state government debt and the 
political incentives to maintain this treatment, it is apparent that Eurozone member states, the 
Eurozone220 and EU authorities have a conflict of interest between protecting the Eurosystem (and the 
EU), on the one hand, and applying normal regulatory practices to ensure the financial markets are safe 
for users, taxpayers and others affected around the world, on the other.  Member state authorities face 
an inherent desire to keep their local banks in business, almost whatever the cost, given the role of those 
banks as key purchasers and market-makers in the primary and secondary markets of their member state 
government debt.  As we have seen, the EU's approach to rulemaking focuses on protecting the euro 
project as its absolute and overriding priority.221  This has led to an (unsuccessful) attempt to remove 
supervisory discretions within EU member states, specifically in the case of the UK, restricting 
supervisors so far as possible from having an ability to impose higher regulatory capital requirements.222  
The UK has resisted the EU's attempts to constrain its powers to impose additional capital requirements 
on businesses incorporated in the UK on a discretionary basis.223  The UK has imposed higher capital 
standards than the EU and, through an application of Basel Pillar 2,224 protected against risk that is not 
properly captured through the Pillar 1 non-discretionary element of the Basel Rules.225  This is the 
purpose of Pillar 2.  The two Pillars of the Basel Rules, together, seek to ensure that risks arising from 
the state, from the markets and elsewhere are acknowledged and addressed.  The EU's conflict of interest 
has led to perverse argumentation and promotes questionable regulatory outcomes, increasing the risks 
for Eurozone banks – as well as the whole global financial system. 
The conflict of interest extends to the implementation of Basel III.  As Deloitte points out:  "EU 
regulators (led by the EBA and the ECB's Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)) have emphasised the 
importance of the EU not deviating from the rules agreed by the BCBS [Basel Committee] in December 
2017.  There is, however, increasing pressure for the EU to modify the Basel III framework in 
implementation in order to mitigate the expected capital impact of the revised rules (projected by the 
EBA's August report to be a 24.4% increase in minimum capital requirements for EU banks)".226 
The EU faces a difficult choice over the forthcoming years.  Were the Basel regulatory capital 
framework to be normally applied in a manner which captures the risk arising from Eurozone member 
state government debts, this would give rise to significant financial difficulties for the zone.  In the 
meantime, the markets cannot sensibly assume that Eurozone member state authorities will apply an 
objective non-conflicted approach to their regulatory discretions, including to elements of the chain that 
links the Eurozone to the rest of the global financial system.   
 
                                                     
220 See fn 6 above. 
221  Eg https://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/news/article-4613874/Countdown-Brexit-London-lose-euro-trading.html, 
where Christian Noyer, the former Governor of the Banque de France makes an interesting point about managing clearing 
houses' margining policies to "protect the euro area". 
222  See fns 224 and 225 below. 
223  Ibid. 
224  See, eg, the Financial Times article of 8 November 2011:  https://www.ft.com/content/5471afde-096a-11e1-a20c-
00144feabdc0.  And Financial Times, 2 May 2012:  https://www.ft.com/content/82eab320-949c-11e1-bb0d-
00144feab49a. 
225  https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2012/05/03/986921/basel-iii-bunfight-is-this-the-beginning-of-the-end/. 
226  Implementing Basel III in the European Union:  Preparing for the legislative proposal of 'CRD6/CRR3' in 2020, Deloitte 
Regulatory News Alert, 2 December 2019; https://www2.deloitte.com/lu/en/pages/risk/articles/implementing-basel-iii-
in-european-union.html. 
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9. Enhanced Equivalence:  a comprehensive solution for dealing with the EU's 
sovereignty problem 
It would be possible for the status quo to be maintained by way of a permanent new UK-EU arrangement 
in financial services after Brexit, allowing the UK to continue addressing Eurozone risk in the way it 
does now.  This can be achieved by enhancing the existing EU law concept of "equivalence", using 
drafting already produced and ready to be finalised, whose framework and rationale has been set out at 
length in previous publications.227  Such an arrangement would be in conformity with WTO and 
international law norms.  The key amendments that would require to be made to the existing equivalence 
regime have been set out above, in pages 9 to 11 of this paper.228  These include the need for data sharing 
on the level and extent of Eurozone/EU27 risk. 
Unlike the passport regime, where mutual recognition is premised on home and host states applying 
identical rules through a common rulebook, the equivalence concept provides for the recognition of 
home state regimes where the home state rules achieve similar high-level outcomes to those of the host 
state.  Thus, the UK and EU could recognise each other's laws as equivalent in achieving certain high 
level Basel-driven outcomes.  The existing passporting regime, with its common rulebook, would not 
work as a solution because it would introduce systemic risk into the UK markets by requiring UK 
regulators to give up sovereignty in rule-making, which is a key element in the supervision of safe 
markets.  The Bank of England has already made its views clear on that possibility.229  
An Enhanced Equivalence arrangement would reduce the costs to EU27 businesses.  It would allow 
global financial businesses located in the UK to continue to provide services cross-border to EU27 
customers under (solely) UK law and regulation, in the manner they do now.  This would avoid the 
establishment and operation of unnecessary business presences for those financial institutions in the 
EU27 and would avoid the redundant costs of duplicative regulation and supervision by those EU27 
authorities where the customers are located.  Such a system is already in use by the EU with dozens of 
countries around the world.230  It would minimise disruption to existing customer service models. 
The Enhanced Equivalence model would also permit EU banks and investment firms to operate in the 
global financial markets by means of branches established in the City of London, avoiding the massive 
costs of managing separately capitalised and collateralised subsidiaires.  Their regulatory capital and 
collateral arrangements would be governed by EU law and would not be subject, any more than now 
(under the EU's passporting regime), to the UK's Basel Pillar 2 top-up capital requirements and more 
intrusive prudential supervision.  It has to be acknowledged that this would continue to put German, 
French and other EU banks at a competitive advantage by continuing to allow them, as now, to operate 
on the basis of the hugely advantageous EU assumptions on Eurozone sovereign risk, without mitigating 
those assumptions through the UK's supervisory discretions.  This is because under Enhanced 
Equivalence, were inward branching to be permitted in the manner it is permitted under the passport 
regime, regulatory capital and other prudential regulatory matters would be subject to a firm's home 
state jurisdiction and supervision.   
The question arises as to whether the UK should be willing to permit such risk to be injected into the 
global market through an Enhanced Equivalence arrangement.  It is our view that it should do so, subject 
                                                     
227 Reynolds B., A Template for Enhanced Equivalence:  Creating a Lasting Relationship in Financial Services between the 
EU and the UK, Politeia, 10 July 2017.  The enhanced equivalence model was subsequently adopted by the UK 
Government in the post-Chequers White Paper and forms the basis for the future UK-EU legal and regulatory relationship 
in financial services.  See also:  Reynolds B., EU-UK Financial Services After Brexit:  Enhanced Equivalence – A Win 
Proposition, Politeia, 14 March 2018, and Reynolds B., Free Trade in UK-EU Financial Services:  How Best to Structure 
a Brexit Trade Deal, Reynolds B., Politeia, 17 October 2018. 
228  See section headed 'An Enhanced Equivalence Agreement could address the problem in full', which starts on page 9. 
229 "Stylish Regulation", speech by Sam Woods, Deputy Governor for Prudential Regulation and Chief Executive Officer, 
PRA, 16 May 2019:  https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2019/sam-woods-ubs-20th-annual-financial-institutions-
conference-lausanne.  This was reaffirmed by the outgoing Bank of England Governor, Mark Carney, in a Financial 
Times interview on 8 January 2020, when he said that "[i]t is not desirable at all to align our approaches, to tie our hands 
and to outsource regulation and effectively supervision of the world's leading complex financial system to another 
jurisdiction". 
230 A summary of the regime can be found in Reynolds B., A Blueprint for Brexit:  The Future of Global Financial Services 
and Markets in the UK, Politeia, 2 November 2016. 
Technical Analysis Enhanced Equivalence: a Comprehensive Solution 
 
86 
to very careful management of the position of the global market and also to careful oversight of the 
local UK branches of EU banks and investment firms.  The UK has managed successfully to mitigate 
Eurozone risk under the passporting regime, despite its obligations under the passport to defer to the 
notional application of the EU's regulatory capital rules by regulators elsewhere in the EU, and 
regardless of the efficacy of EU27 supervision.  After Brexit, under Enhanced Equivalence, the UK can 
more openly manage Eurozone risk and ensure that the global markets are protected sufficiently from 
the false assumptions embedded in the EU's regulatory capital and accounting regimes.  This does give 
EU banks and investment firms a competitive advantage.  However, the point would be out in the open 
and the Enhanced Equivalence arrangement would be an accommodation to the EU to allow it gradually 
to complete the euro project and to access global capital flows in the most efficient manner to facilitate 
its growth, pending its ability to pay for the system it is attempting to create.  Such an outcome is in the 
interests of the world at large since a low-growth EU, isolated from the global markets and running 
unnecessary frictional costs for financial services would be a more explosive risk for the rest of the 
world. 
Three additional points should be noted.  First, any such UK-EU deal should also contain a continuity 
of contracts provision, ensuring that if the future trade treaty, whether in the form of a Free Trade 
Agreement or otherwise, is terminated (in whole or part), all contracts in existence at that moment in 
time can continue to be performed in accordance with their terms.  This would ensure that never again 
would there be any discussion of a "cliff edge" for "in-flight" contracts akin to the discussion over the 
continuity of existing contracts in the event of a so-called "no-deal" (or "hard") Brexit.  It is highly 
questionable whether these concerns were actually valid, given the international law on "acquired 
rights" and the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights 
provisions on the rights to property.231  It is also likely to be the case that the threat of a reversion to no 
market access is inconsistent with GATT and the WTO and contrary to the intentions of international 
trade law.232  However, the mere possibility of an interpretation of the law which involves ambiguity 
on this point has led to considerable market uncertainty and expensive manoeuvres by business to 
protect themselves.233  Such a situation cannot be allowed to repeat itself.  Secondly, certain other 
longer-term exposures to the Eurozone, particularly through the EIB, should be addressed.234  Thirdly, 
                                                     
231 The protection of contractual rights by the right to property under the European Convention of Human Rights and the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the doctrine of "acquired rights" under public international law, is explained in 
"Continuity of Contracts and Business on a "Hard" Brexit:  Human Rights and Reverse Solicitation to the Rescue!", 
Shearman & Sterling LLP, 31 October 2017:  
https://www.shearman.com/perspectives/2017/10/continuity-contracts-business-on-hard-brexit. 
232 The history and intention of GATT are discussed in Grant, T. D., "Brexit and the World Trade Organization", Briefings 
for Brexit, 12 July 2019; Grant, T. D., "Brexit, Tariffs, and GATT's original intent:  Why a forgotten MFN exemption 
merits a closer look", Briefings for Brexit, 9 July 2019, and Grant, T. D., "Leave as You Entered Brexit in International 
Law", Politeia, 2019. 
233 Bank of England, Financial Policy Summary and Record of the Financial Policy Committee Meeting on 20 and 27 
November 2018, and again in Financial Policy Summary and Record of the Financial Policy Committee Meeting on 2 
October 2019.  The Financial Policy Committee notes that extensive Brexit preparations have been made by the private 
sector.  See also Ring, S., Mayes, J. Seal, T., Dakers, M., Suzara, P. and Scott Diamond, S., "How Businesses Are 
Preparing for Brexit, Deal or No Deal", Bloomberg, 24 October 2019. 
234 In relation to the EIB, the Report of the House of Lords (2019), Brexit:  the European Investment Bank, January 31st, 
stated:  "[u]nder the Withdrawal Agreement, the UK will, over a period of 12 years, receive the €3.5 billion of capital it 
has paid in to the EIB.  However, the UK will not receive any share of the profits that the EIB has accumulated, nor any 
interest or dividends, [which] could amount to €7.6 billion.  …As the EIB's shareholders, member states have committed 
to €243.3 billion in capital.  Of this, €21.7 billion is paid in, the rest callable by the Board of Directors in the event of this 
being necessary for the EIB to meet its obligations.  …The UK will remain liable throughout the period for the uncalled 
subscribed capital.  The amount for which the UK will be liable will depend on the underlying events that trigger the 
liability, specifically whether they are attributable to financial operations approved by the EIB before the entry into force 
of the Withdrawal Agreement (calculations are also included for liabilities that will not reduce over time)".  The House 
of Lords recognised that this was a poor outcome for the UK:  "The EIB has been profitable over its life, raising the 
question of whether the UK might be expected to benefit from a share of these profits.  We asked the Minister whether 
the Government had attempted to secure any share of the retained earnings of the EIB, which at the end of 2017 stood at 
approximately €47.3 billion.  A 16.1 percent share of those retained earnings would have amounted to approximately 
€7.6 billion, more than twice the paid-in capital.  David Lunn, Director of EU Exit, HM Treasury, told us that the UK's 
capital could not be compared to an investment in a private sector entity, emphasising that 'there is nothing in the treaty 
and the EIB statutes that says what happens when the shareholder leaves the bank, and how the shareholder gets his 
money back'.  He was then pressed further on this point:  'Clearly, we are aware of how you would value a shareholding 
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any deal should also contain a provision similar to that in the EU-Singapore Investor Protection 
Agreement, 2019, protecting UK holders of EU sovereign debt by giving equal treatment to sovereign 
debt holders inside and outside the EU.235 
 
10. What is the fallback option for the UK and US if the EU does not cooperate in 
managing the risk it has created? 
If the EU does not agree to an Enhanced Equivalence arrangement as discussed in section 1 above, it is 
of crucial importance that the UK works with the US, as the other host of the global financial market, 
to counteract Eurozone risk and to protect against any impending Eurozone crisis.  The EU's opening 
response to the post-Brexit negotiations on the future UK-EU relationship has been overwhelmingly 
negative when it comes to financial services in particular.  In January 2020, it was reported that 
European Commission officials had told EU diplomats they had identified 40 different types of UK 
financial services that could be frozen out of the EU's single market.236  These relate to the 40 areas 
where the EU has equivalence arrangements with third countries.237   
The UK has already indicated that the preferential 0% treatment for EU member state government bonds 
will come to an end on Brexit,238 but it has yet to determine its future approach.  The protective measures 
that should be taken have been set out in pages 12 to 16 of this paper. 239  In preparation for taking those 
protective measures, there should be an evaluation of the exposures of global financial institutions to 
Eurozone government bonds, directly through Eurozone member state issuers and indirectly through 
interactions (direct or indirect) with Eurozone banks and other financial institutions.  This should be 
followed by an evaluation of the methods and options used to assess and manage the exposures of global 
banks to EU27 banks.  Consideration should also be given to the extent to which global financial 
institutions may be exposed to the supervision and regulatory architecture of Eurozone or Eurozone-
connected bodies, such as the Eurozone member state regulators, the ECB and the ESAs,240 and the 
risks posed by the conflicts of interest embedded within that regulatory architecture.  There should be 
an assessment of the extent to which the UK and US should recognise the legal validity of any locally 
executed resolution of a Eurozone financial institution under local Eurozone member state law, 
Eurozone or pan-EU law.  There should be an evaluation of whether CCPs and banks should be 
permitted to accept Eurozone member state government bonds as collateral and, if so, which of those 
bonds and what the appropriate collateral discounts or haircuts should be on a dynamically adjusted 
basis.   
Finally, it should be recognised that it is perfectly possible for the global financial markets to service 
Eurozone customers without meaningful exposure to the Eurosystem and Eurozone regulators.  This 
                                                     
in a conventional organisation.  All I can say is that this is not a conventional organisation, and the negotiation was driven 
by the statute and our rights under that statute.  I am not sure that there is much more I can say'.  …While we recognise 
that this was part of a complex and wide-ranging negotiation on the financial settlement, and that the EIB's statute is silent 
on the issue, we regret that the Government failed to provide a cogent explanation of the rationale for the position taken 
in the negotiations". 
235 See fn 142 above. 
236 Crisp, J., "Brussels draws up hit list of UK financial services as row over EU rules after Brexit intensifies", Daily 
Telegraph, 22 January 2020. 
237 European Commission (2019) Equivalence in the Area of Financial Services, Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions, COM(2019) 349 final, July 29th,  Brussels, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52019DC0349. 
238 Article 114 of the Capital Requirements (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018 (SI 2018/1408) removes the 0% 
treatment for EU member state government bonds after Brexit – a step recommended in Reynolds B., The Art of the No 
Deal, Politeia, 29 November 2017.  A consolidated mark-up of the UK's CRR is available on the Shearman & Sterling 
LLP Brexit Resource page, https://www.shearman.com/key-issues/brexit-resource-center. 
239 See the section headed 'UK/US Regulatorsm must mitigate risk jointly if no agreement on Enhanced Equivalence', which 
starts on page 12. 
240 The ESAs comprise the EBA, ESMA and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA).  They 
were each established by their own founding EU regulation, common components of which are the establishment of a 
single rulebook for financial services and harmonising the approach of national regulators across the EU. 
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requires the adoption of a cross-border and financial centre-based approach to global financial market 
activity that avoids a presence on-the-ground within the Eurozone or EU and hence preserves the safety 
and soundness of the global financial system.241  The default scenario, if the EU fails to agree to a 
mutual recognition and mutual access arrangement on the basis of "Enhanced Equivalence", is for the 
UK to revert to its traditional "financial centre" model, where EU customers come to the market, as 
they already do from the rest of the world, and historically did so from the EU before the early-stage 
beginnings of the financial services passport in 1995.242  This would involve EU customers accessing 
financial services in the City through the "reverse solicitation", which permits EU customers to reach 
outside the EU regulatory perimeter where, instead of being protected by EU regulation, they are 
protected by UK law and regulation.  Customers could also be encouraged to set up UK presences from 
which they could access the UK's markets solely within the UK's jurisdiction.  The UK's regulators 
would need to work with their US counterparts to reverse out the effects of the EU's treatment of sub-
sovereign bonds as sovereign, and also of the consequent over-estimation of the creditworthiness of 
state-connected bonds whose value depends on that of their member state sovereign.  The regulators, 
applying the global rules, will need to apply a normalised Basel approach to the risks arising from the 
EU and the Eurozone, counteracting the treatments adopted by the EU itself.  
For some types of business, such as lending and primary insurance, the remote management of 
subsidiaries based in the EU27 will be required.  In those cases, international businesses continuing to 
serve EU27 customers will need to do so from on-the-ground EU27-incorporated subsidiaries.  EU27 
supervision is conflicted and cannot be expected to undo the effects of EU regulation of sub-sovereign 
state debt.  In practice, global financial institutions do not allow their locally incorporated and regulated 
entities to go bankrupt and to walk away from those entities for reputational reasons.  So, the UK and 
US will need to ensure the amount of risk taken on by EU27 incorporated subsidiaries is minimised and 
that exposures of the global market to EU27-incorporated entities is instead addressed through capital, 
collateral and liquidity treatments in their headquarters which apply properly to neutralise the risk that 
arises from within the EU27.  Reliance cannot be placed to a meaningful degree on EU27 on-the-ground 
supervision, so risk will need to be backed out to the UK or US for management there. 
 
11. The UK and US, the UK's European Connectivity and the importance to the 
financial markets of the common law 'method' 
The UK is a tried-and-tested host for such business.  It was unable fully to prevent some of the effects 
of the 2007-8 financial crisis, but at that time it operated under EU regulation which, at least in part, 
drove certain regulatory distortions which exacerbated the situation.  For instance, although there was 
a pan-EU financial regulatory regime at the time, it was applied by a small number of member states in 
a manner designed to attract business rather than to regulate safely.  Some states offered not to apply 
pan-EU rules at all or to apply them in a very lax manner if businesses relocated there.243  The UK 
responded with a "light touch" approach to regulation.  Although this did not cause the financial crisis, 
which was instead caused by the lack of proactive management by the world's central banks of systemic 
risk arising from Californian sub-prime debt, the overall effect was that the ability to identify and 
manage risk in the financial system across Europe was distorted.  In fact, as can be seen from this paper, 
                                                     
241 Various law-based solutions are set out in Reynolds B., The Art of the No Deal, Politeia, 29 November 2017. 
242 With the Investment Services Directive (Council Directive 93/22/EEC).  This provided for the mutual recognition of 
home state prudential rules for investment firms.  A similar regime was introduced for banking (Council Directive 
93/6.EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC).  Full recognition of prudential and conduct of business rules was introduced in 
2007 with the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (Commission Directive 2006/73/EC) and also for banking 
(Directive 2006/49/EC and Directive 2006/48/EC) and insurance (Solvency II - Directive 2009/138/EC; Insurance 
Mediation Directive II - Directive 2016/97/EC).  Summaries of these regimes can be found in Reynolds B., The Art of 
the No Deal, Politeia, 29 November 2017 and Reynolds B., A Blueprint for Brexit:  The Future of Global Financial 
Services and Markets in the UK, Politeia, 2 November 2016. 
243 For commentary of this see:  House of Lords EU Committee's The post-crisis EU financial regulatory framework:  do 
the pieces fit?  This discusses how the post-crisis framework allowed Member States to compete with each other on 
different levels of regulation; https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldeucom/103/103.pdf. 
Technical Analysis The UK’s EU Connectivity and the Common Law Method 
 
89 
the EU's overly prescriptive approach to regulation244 – which is contrary to the UK's common law 
method and often seen as anti-market – and its desire to control perceptions of the euro's true value245 
actually injects huge systemic risk into the market. 
The main other global financial centre, the US, is not the natural host for the management of this 
business.  This is so, in part, because of its time zone and the fact that much financial business (and its 
management) is face-to-face.  In part, it is also because the UK's methods of managing risk do not 
require US levels of disclosure or involve unpredictable liability, such as exposure to penal regulatory 
fines and punitive damages, including in class actions, which can potentially put businesses into 
bankruptcy or cause unanticipated knock-on consequences for bank investors and counterparties.  Such 
exposure could, in fact, be counterproductive in terms of injecting more systemic risk into the market.  
The US regime operates well to protect US consumers but the punitive liabilities nevertheless 
exacerbate systemic risk.  The UK's regime achieves its results instead through highly proactive 
supervision and a legal regime which provides for damages for those suffering loss, but not at a penal 
level. 
Within the EU, it had become increasingly difficult for the UK to mitigate let alone manage Eurozone 
risk on the basis of reliance on EU supervisors, given the conflicts of interest to which those supervisors 
are subject,246 and given the imperfect information which is provided by the Eurozone.  Some of these 
issues were under discussion by UK Prime Minister David Cameron when he was seeking to renegotiate 
the intra-EU arrangements in 2015-16.  One of the goals was to create a situation in which the Eurozone 
recognised the equal coexistence of sterling.247  Those attempts were ultimately rejected by the EU and 
subsequently by the UK in the Brexit Referendum on 23 June 2016.  Brexit now precipitates a much-
needed re-think.  The Eurozone needs a stable environment in which it can benefit from the 20–30 years 
(at least) that it needs to complete the project. 
Following the Brexit Referendum, some in the EU sought to lure more financial companies to the EU, 
or even introduce rules to require them to relocate, such that more financial business is booked and 
located within the EU27 – seeking to take advantage of Brexit to fulfil ambitions to attract financial 
services business and control over Europe's financial markets.248  There has even been a wish to pull 
euro clearing into the EU in order to be in a position to control the margining on euro exposures and 
thereby to manage the value of the currency.249 
In view of our analysis above, it is clear that this would be very risky.  It needs to be acknowledged that 
the systemic risks described above are only contained as a result of the fact that the majority of financial 
transactions in the EU take place in and from the UK, in the global financial markets which it hosts, 
and that the UK successfully mitigates and oversees Eurozone risk and has done so since the euro 
started.250  Given the scale of systemic risk introduced by the false assumption of Eurozone member 
state sovereignty, it is important that no material amount of global financial business is re-booked or 
located within the EU27, and in particular the Eurozone, and that this business continues to be 
                                                     
244  Eg https://www.ft.com/content/5471afde-096a-11e1-a20c-00144feabdc0. 
245  See fn 161 above and surrounding text, and fn 221 above. 
246  For instance, the EU wishes to control every aspect of regulation, including the haircutting of Eurozone debt and the 
application of Basel Pillar 2 capital requirements:  see fns 221, 224 and 225 above.  
247 European Council press release, 2 February 2016, "Letter by President Donald Tusk to the Members of the European 
Council on his proposal for a new settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union" (with links to the 
proposed agreements); Prime Minister's statement on EU renegotiation:  3 February 2016 and PM Commons statement 
on EU reform and referendum:  22 February 2016.  This issue is also discussed in Reynolds B., A Blueprint for Brexit:  
The Future of Global Financial Services and Markets in the UK, Politeia, 2 November 2016. 
248 For a recent example of this see:  Brunsden, J., Fleming, S., and Stafford, P., "EU chief issues Brexit warning over City 
of London access:  Dombrovskis says UK could be cut out if it diverges from Brussels standards", Financial Times, 2 
December 2019; https://www.ft.com/content/59569142-12c9-11ea-a7e6-62bf4f9e548a. 
249 Reynolds, B., "EU-managed control of euro clearing is not viable", Financial Times, 15 May 2017, 
https://www.ft.com/content/64f5d320-3403-11e7-99bd-13beb0903fa3. 
250 The Impact of the UK's Withdrawal on EU Integration, Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 
June 2018, describes the UK's role, particularly in the euro's early years, as the "de facto banker of much of the Eurozone"; 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/604973/IPOL_STU(2018)604973_EN.pdf. 
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conducted elsewhere.  A technical ring-fencing of Eurozone risk in EU27 subsidiaries of global 
financial institutions cannot be relied upon to contain the risk since global businesses tend, in practice, 
to stand behind their subsidiaries.  Nor can the EU be relied upon to supervise its regulated financial 
businesses in a manner that would counteract the entire regulatory and accounting edifice it has created.   
The Eurozone's use of financial services needs to be transacted and monitored in real time and based in 
a compatible time zone.  The advantages of financial centre hubs are well-known and require no detailed 
exposition here.  The only realistic place where that can happen is the UK, with its sophisticated legal 
and regulatory framework, democratically accountable system and skilled workforce.  The UK's manner 
of lawmaking and regulation is based on the common law, which is "self-executing" in the sense that 
the law is sufficiently clear for its requirements to be capable of accurate independent analysis and the 
exercise of reliable predictive judgement, in most cases, as to the application of the law to new 
situations.  Any such judgement will be considered in independent courts if challenged by officials, 
with no bias favouring the view expressed by officials.  The common law regime permits financial 
innovation but legislates for restrictions that make it safe.  It should be noted that all four major global 
financial centres are located in common law jurisdictions.251  Further, the financial markets sector as a 
whole has expressed a clear preference for common law systems, with many international contracts 
subject to English law. 
The common law approach is entirely different from the civil law and EU approach of legislating for 
rights, as well as restrictions.  An analysis as to whether a common law or civil law system is "better" 
has been considered many times and at greater length than can be developed here.  The two systems 
have often sat awkwardly together during the period of the UK's EU membership, and the resulting 
tension has led to uncertainties to be resolved through determination of the lawmakers' "purposes" at 
the CJEU.  The UK's approach is just different.  It is interlinked with those of other common law 
jurisdictions such as the US and most of the Commonwealth.  After Brexit, the uncomfortable 
juxtaposition of the UK and EU systems will come to an end and the UK's regime will need to operate 
autonomously in its own manner.  The question is how it can continue to connect with, and thus provide 
a realistic service to, the EU system after Brexit.  Enhanced Equivalence provides the best solution. 
Financial regulation is at its best when it occurs in a manner that is connected to dynamic, 
democratically accountable lawmaking that allows the market to flourish, while addressing the risks 
borne by individual institutions as well as systemic risk.  A false narrative was allowed to develop after 
the financial crisis of 2007-8 that somehow the UK "Anglo-Saxon" market model was responsible and 
needed to be reined in by the EU and, ultimately, by the financial services division of the European 
Commission led then by internal market Commissioner Michel Barnier.252  In fact, the issue was one of 
systemic risk, which had been allowed to build up by all central banks, arising in particular from 
Californian sub-prime debt.  The result of this false narrative has been a major programme of EU 
lawmaking in financial services.  This has included the creation in 2010 of EU federal oversight bodies, 
the ESAs, to oversee national regulators.253  The EU has also been implementing an ambition to create 
a single financial services rulebook across the EU.254  This regime has severely strained the UK's ability 
to mitigate, let alone manage, Eurozone risk and has in fact involved the enhancement of Eurozone 
systemic risk.  
 
                                                     
251 The top four financial centres are New York, London, Singapore and Hong Kong, according to The Global Financial 
Centres Index, 26 September 2019. 
252 Christine Lagarde, French Minister of Finance when the ESAs were introduced, said at a conference one of the authors 
spoke at in New York after the 2007 financial crash:  "I can't tell you how much it means to me for the City of London to 
be regulated in Paris".  This is because the main ESA is ESMA, which is based in Paris. 
253 Each of the ESA's specific oversight responsibilities are summarised in the European Parliament's Fact Sheet on the 
European System of Financial Supervision, available at: 
 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/84/european-system-of-financial-supervision-esfs. 
254 The Council of the European Union first recommended the establishment of a single rulebook for financial services in its 
cover note to the 18/19 June 2009 Presidency Conclusions, 11225/2/09, REV 2, 10 July 2009. 
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Conclusions 
At the heart of the problem has been an attempt to create a sovereign EU-wide currency without 
accepting and addressing the resulting loss of sovereignty at the member state level and the 
consequences for each member state's banking system.  The situation has created extraordinary systemic 
risk in the financial market.  The EU has attempted to use financial regulation and accounting treatments 
to protect the euro project and to control the financial market's reaction to possible events, minimising 
potential shifts in perception of the creditworthiness of Eurozone member states and the Eurosystem.  
However, in doing so it has created further systemic risk.   
The underlying political obstacles are too fundamental for there to be a simple workable fix.  Instead, 
it needs to be accepted that the Eurozone is incomplete and will remain so for the foreseeable future.  
This incompleteness leads to a market in Eurozone debt that is characterised by heightened risk and 
diminished transparency, thereby elevating the risks for those global investors and financial institutions 
that operate within it or who are indirectly affected by it.  That must be unacceptable to the participants 
in the global market.  The solution, however, is straightforward.  As part of a post-Brexit UK-EU trade 
deal, "Enhanced Equivalence" arrangements should be established to allow the UK to continue safely 
mitigating and indeed managing this risk on behalf of the global financial system. 
The problem has meant that much more Eurozone government debt is issued and at lower costs by 
weaker member states than is justified by their credit ratings.  The regulatory framework of the EU and 
Eurozone is not capable of properly addressing the systemic risk that results from this debt, nor can it 
address the resulting risk of contagion if the markets begin to question the safety and soundness of 
institutions within the financial system as a result of this unmanaged risk.  
Over and above this, the assets of the Eurozone banking system, including its NPLs, are overvalued.255  
The Eurozone banking system is currently able to meet its liabilities as they fall due only thanks to the 
ECB's QE programme of €2.9 trn and the Eurosystem's lending to banks of €3.1 trn, totalling €6 trn of 
monetary support from the European authorities.  All this is compounded by the opaqueness of the EU 
accounting system. 
It might be argued that the EU is not unique in having a central bank with an overstretched balance 
sheet.  As one commentator observes:  "[a]ssets of major central banks—the US Federal Reserve, 
the ECB and the Bank of Japan—collectively stood at $14.5 trn in November 2019, which is…more 
than 3.5 times the pre-crisis level of $4 trn.  A similar conclusion comes from scaling assets by the size 
of their respective economies:  Japan leads the way at 102% of nominal GDP, followed by the ECB at 
39%, and the Fed at a mere 17%".256   However, there is a crucial difference.  The Bank of Japan and 
the Federal Reserve Bank are backed by sovereign states that control their own currency; the Eurozone's 
central bank is not.  This is the key irrefutable point of this paper. 
The implications of this for the global economy are enormous, as another commentator recognises:  
"Europe looks more like a basket case.  Americans and Asians scratch their heads and wonder whether 
the EU will ever get its act together.  It wasted a decade trying to save its dysfunctional monetary 
union….  The world watched amazed as the EU authorities pushed the Eurozone into a double-dip 
recession through fiscal and monetary overkill when everybody else was recovering from the Lehman 
crisis, and gasped as the ECB compounded a debt-deflation crisis by failing to act as lender-of-last 
resort to illiquid sovereign states for three grueling years.  The legacy of those errors remains:  the 
Eurozone is stuck in a deflationary trap with interest rates at minus 0.5% and exhausted monetary 
                                                     
255 For reasons explained in fn. 21 above. 
256 Roach, S. (2019) "Playing the fool's game:  predicting the 2020 crisis", Financial News, 27th December:  
https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/playing-the-fools-game-predicting-the-2020-crisis-20191227. 
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policy, paralysed on the fiscal front as well by the Stability Pact and rigid rules embedded in EU treaty 
law.  In short, it is a sitting duck waiting for the next global downturn".257 
And the next global downturn could actually begin in Germany:  "The nation once known as Europe's 
powerhouse, and the locomotive of the entire Eurozone, is slowly turning into its sick man instead.  
…Germany's stagnating economy will make the Eurozone more unstable than ever, it will make the 
European Union more protectionist, it will destabilise global trade at the worst possible time, and may 
well trigger a financial crisis.  It is going to be one of the most dangerous trends of the 2020s.  When 
Germany released its industrial production figures yesterday, they were predictably awful.  Output 
dropped by 5.3% over the same month a year ago, the worst reading since the depths of the last recession 
in 2009".258 
Finally, we should recall that in the last forty years, there have been three massive debt waves whose 
economic impact spread across the whole global economy. These followed periods of low interest rates, 
allowing governments to borrow heavily, building up debts that could not be serviced when interest 
rates subsequently rose.  The first happened in 1982, when Mexico informed the IMF that it could no 
longer repay its international loans. This created a domino effect which led to 16 Latin American 
countries and 11 other developing countries being forced to reschedule their debts.  The second 
happened in 1997, when Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand – which similarly increased 
their debts during the 1990s when interest rates were again low ‒ went into recession with falling 
exchange rates, making international debt servicing impossible, again with global repercussions.  The 
third was, of course, the 2008 US subprime mortgage crisis, which led to the Global Financial Crisis, 
followed by the Great Recession. The World Bank has just warned of a fourth debt wave that could be 
even bigger – again precipitated by low interest rates.259  It points out that in emerging economies the 
debt-to-GDP ratio is at a record 170%.260 But what the World Bank does not do is highlight the scale 
of the debt in the Eurozone, where Italy and Spain have similar high debt ratios, up to 167% and 138%, 
respectively. Given the size of the Eurozone economy relative those of emerging markets, if the debt 
wave lands on the shores of the Eurozone, the domino effect will be much larger than in the previous 
three cases. We should not forget that there was a huge Eurozone sovereign debt crisis in 2011-12. 
 
                                                     
257  Evans-Pritchard, A., "Our Brexit destiny in the 21st Century is a watershed philosophical choice, far beyond immediate 
trade", Daily Telegraph, 31 January 2020; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2020/01/31/brexit-destiny-21st-century-
watershed-philosophical-choice-far/. 
258  Lynn, M., "Germany's troubled economy a warning to the EU and beyond", Daily Telegraph, 7 December 2019; 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2019/12/07/germanys-economy-deep-trouble-wont-country-suffer/  
259 World Bank, Global Waves of Debt: Causes and Consequences, 19 December 2019; 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/publication/waves-of-debt. 
260 Basu, K., Where will the approaching global debt wave make landfall?, Financial News, 10 February 2020. 
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Annex 1:   
Shortcomings of Information and Areas of Enquiry into the Eurosystem 
1.1 Summary 
In summary, the sources of data for understanding the financial state of the Eurosystem are as follows: 
SOURCE 
BONDS LOANS 
Supra Sov 
Sub-
sov 
Other 
PSE 
Bank/ 
Corp Supra Sov 
Sub-
sov 
Other 
PSE 
Bank/ 
Corp 
Eurostat           
Eligible 
collateral list           
QE           
EIB loans           
 
There are numerous missing data points that would need to be known in order to achieve a full picture 
of Eurozone public sector indebtedness by member state.  This would require the research set out below 
in this Annex to be undertaken in order to achieve an understanding of the situation regarding: 
1. Bonds issued by "other public sector entity"; 
2. EIB loans to "other public sector entity"; 
3. Loans from other lenders to "other public sector entity"; 
4. Downstream guarantees issued by sovereigns, sub-sovereigns or an "other public sector entity" for 
bonds and loans where the borrower is a bank or corporate (such as a securitisation vehicle for bank's 
NPLs); and 
5. Upstream guarantees issued by sovereigns, sub-sovereigns or an "other public sector entity" for 
bonds and loans where the borrower is a supra-sovereign. 
It is not necessary to discern the guarantees issued by sovereigns, sub-sovereigns or an "other public 
sector entity" for one another's bonds and loans, as these will be captured by the other measures. 
The liabilities of sovereigns for pay-in of subscribed-but-not-called capital of the supra-sovereigns ESM 
and EIB are known, as are the liabilities of sovereigns to meet the Commitments Appropriation of the 
EU Budget. 
There is currently no liability for sovereigns (acting through their central banks) for pay-in of 
subscribed-but-not-called capital of the ECB, as their entire subscribed capital has been called. 
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In diagrammatical form, the scope of the main information sources can be depicted as follows: 
Figure 17:  scope of the main information sources 
Scope of Eurostat database on Eurozone 
"general government debt" 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scope of Eurosystem eligible collateral list: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supra
Sovereign
Sub-sovereign
Other PSE
Bank/Corporate
• Sovereign and sub-sovereign 
only 
• Both debts on bonds and on 
loans 
• No "Other Public Sector 
Entity" 
Supra
Sovereign
Sub-sovereign
Other PSE
Bank/Corporate
• All levels of institution 
• But debts on bonds only 
• No loans 
• Corporate includes 
securitisation vehicle 
company 
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Eurosystem QE programme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EIB loans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following areas should be examined in order to complete the picture as to the situation within the 
Eurosystem. 
1.2 Further inquiries required 
(a) Eurosystem eligible asset list 
The collateral arrangements for Eurosystem monetary and payment operations are laid out in 
this section of the ECB's website: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/assets/html/index.en.html.  
The arrangements are explained in the ECB's Occasional Paper Series issue 189 of May 2017:  
"The Eurosystem collateral framework explained". 
Supra
Sovereign
Sub-sovereign
Other PSE
Bank/Corporate
• Subset of Eurosystem eligible 
collateral list 
• No supra-sovereigns 
• Debts on bonds only 
• Concentrated on public sector 
issuers 
Supra
Sovereign
Sub-sovereign
Other PSE
Bank/Corporate
• Loans only, no bonds 
• Major emphasis on Sub-
sovereign and "Other Public 
Sector Entity" 
• Banks, via SME programme 
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A first question is whether all the assets on the list can be used as collateral against credit at 
every NCB, and not just at the one where the issuer resides.  Ever since 1 January 1999, there 
have been assets that could be used for credit at any NCB, but to start with, there was a 
subsidiary list of assets that could only be used in one country.  In other words, not all assets 
were de iure mobilisable anywhere in the Eurosystem.  This rule seems to have been removed, 
although the ECB website contains a section named "Cross-border collateral in Eurosystem 
credit operations" 261   as if there were a separate classification of "National collateral in 
Eurosystem credit operations".  There is no indication within the database of eligible assets 
whether a particular asset can be mobilised only in one country or at any NCB.  This point 
needs to be clarified. 
Even if assets are de iure mobilisable at any NCB, it is a moot point whether they are liquid 
in any market but one.  For example, bonds of Stad Ronse, a town in Belgium, cannot be 
necessarily considered as liquid anywhere except in Belgium and through one of the 
secondary market-makers in Belgium.  In that case, this bond should be considered as de facto 
national collateral, and the concept of a single Eurosystem-wide haircut as is carried on the 
list is unrealistic:  the bond should have one haircut when used as collateral at the National 
Bank of Belgium, and a much larger one if used at any other NCB. 
The eligible assets list of the Eurosystem runs to around 25,000+ bond issues, with the issuers 
falling into the categories of Eurozone sovereigns, supranational entities, public sector 
entities/state, regional and municipal authorities, public sector entities/national government 
agencies, public sector entities/publicly controlled private companies (such as transport, 
water, electricity and gas utilities), banks, non-bank financial institutions and special purpose 
securitisation vehicle companies.  It is uncertain, without more detailed study, whether the list 
also contains private corporates and the type of public sector entity which has been established 
solely to undertake the construction and offtake of supply to another public sector entity.  This 
would be a Private Finance Initiative structure in the UK; in the EU, it could be a structure 
into which the EIB is injecting funds both through its normal portfolio and also taking a higher 
level of risk as a financing within the so-called EFSI. 
The eligible assets list does state the respective haircut in its Column T, but it states neither 
the size of each issue, nor the credit rating of the issuer, nor any totals across categories such 
as issuer, country, rating grade, issuer type and so on. 
An enquiry would need to establish how many of these issues, not actually issued by the 
sovereign borrower in the country concerned, were being treated as quasi-sovereigns, 
enjoying a haircut in the list on a level with sovereign issuers, and in consequence being 
accorded a 0% risk-weighting by banks, allowing banks then to give them a 100% weighting 
as an HQLA for LCR purposes.  As it is, the haircuts in column T appear low if they are meant 
to cater for both credit risk (deterioration in the credit quality of the bond's issuer) and market 
risk (changes in absolute interest rates and in the shape of the yield curve).  An under-
weighting of the credit risk element in the haircut would be another result of the misleading 
application of the Basel Rules.  It would be a major concern were the misleading application 
of Basel Rules for Eurozone sovereigns to have been allowed to trickle down into the other 
categories of public sector entity and to have trickled into banks' IRB methodologies and LCR 
computations. 
A further enquiry would need to establish the degree to which the bonds on the list were 
actually liquid and traded actively, and with narrow bid-offer spreads, in the secondary 
market. ESMA is just beginning to make bond liquidity data available.  ESMA's website states 
that "there are currently 520 liquid bonds subject to MiFID II transparency requirements", 
which intimates that the scope of their reports will be limited to this small subset of the list.  
                                                     
261  https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/payment_statistics/cross-border_collateral/html/index.en.html. 
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ESMA's reports will consist of "a quarterly assessment of quantitative liquidity criteria, which 
include the daily average trading activity (trades and notional amount) and percentage of days 
traded per quarter", as if a bond might still be classified as liquid even if there were one or 
more business days upon which there were no trades in it.  What is needed is not a report on 
a small subset of the list, but a report on the whole list, deriving from an application of market-
based indicators of liquidity to every issue on the list.  That report should then be cross-
checked against the liquidity returns (e.g. for the purposes of the LCR) filed by market actors.  
One could then to see the degree to which market actors are classifying – as HQLAs – bonds 
that fail the market-based indicators of liquidity, putting in question the substance of those 
actors' claims to be meeting their regulatory claims to being liquid, and in turn putting into 
question the entire regulatory framework for ensuring the liquidity of the Eurozone banking 
system. 
(b) Amount of Eurozone sovereign bonds owned or controlled (as collateral) by the 
Eurosystem 
Financial commentators normally attest that the Eurosystem had a QE portfolio as at 
31/12/18 of €2.6 trn, and it is commonly assumed that this is all invested in Eurozone 
sovereign bonds, ones that all appear in the Eurosystem eligible assets list.  However, 
the exact make-up of the QE portfolio is unclear. 
Financial commentators accept the QE figure as being €2.6 trn:  position 7.1 in the 
Eurosystem consolidated balance sheet of 31/12/18.  The Eurosystem aggregated 
balance sheet on 30/8/19, though, showed the Eurosystem owning €2.9 trn of "debt 
securities issued by euro area residents", being €2.2 trn issued by "central government", 
€357 bn issued by "other euro area residents" and €422 bn issued by "monetary 
financial institutions".  Did QE go down to €2.2 trn because all of QE is invested in 
sovereign bonds?  Or did it increase to €2.9 trn because it is invested in other types of 
security as well? 
It is assumed as well that the QE holdings are in every case a subset of the figure that 
Eurostat issues for the "general government gross debt" of a Eurozone country, and for 
three reasons.  First, the Eurostat figures (€9.9 trn as at 31/12/18) embrace the debts of 
at least state, regional and municipal authorities as well as those of the sovereign, if not 
also of national government agencies.  Secondly, the Eurostat figures are for debts 
based on loans and on bonds, and QE is invested solely in bonds.  Thirdly, the QE rules 
dictate that the programme cannot own more than 33% of the outstanding bonds of any 
one Eurozone sovereign.  QE of €2.6 trn was 26% of Eurostat's €9.9 trn on 31/12/18. 
As well as owning bonds through QE, the Eurosystem also accepts them as collateral, 
and the Eurosystem aggregated balance sheet on 30/8/19 showed "loans to euro area 
residents" of €3.2 trn, of which only €10 bn were to "central government" and €2 bn 
were to "other euro area residents".  That left €3.1 trn to "monetary financial 
institutions", which cannot be NCBs or else the figures would have been netted, as the 
TARGET2 balances are.  Instead, they must be to banks.  It is possible that "longer-
term refinancing operations" may be included in this figure (and these stood at €723 bn 
on 31/12/18 as per position 5.2 in the Eurosystem consolidated balance sheet).  Either 
way, the Eurosystem is lending €3.1 trn to banks, and they are only allowed to do this 
against eligible collateral. 
Assuming that €723 bn of this is through Long-Term Refinancing Operations, by a 
process of elimination, the remaining €2.4 trn must be being lent through modules of 
TARGET2, because the Eurosystem does not have any other lending programmes. 
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There are three modules of TARGET2 through which NCBs take deposits and make 
loans with the banks they have sponsored into the system, whether or not those banks 
have their TARGET2 RTGS account 262  directly on the TARGET2 Single Shared 
Platform or have it with their sponsoring NCB. 
The modules are "Proprietary Home Account", "Home Accounts Module" and 
"Standing Facilities".  Banks have their RTGS account and all their TARGET2 
payments debited or credited to this account.  At end-of-day, the RTGS account is zero-
balanced and banks must maintain their Minimum Reserves in one of these other three 
modules:  they may have to borrow to do that, and, in effect, borrow from their NCB 
in order to re-deposit with it.  Indeed, they could borrow through "Standing Facilities" 
and redeposit into "Proprietary Home Account" or "Home Accounts Module", of which 
a bank will have one or the other but not both. 
Through QE and this lending to banks, the Eurosystem owns €2.9 trn of debt securities 
and controls collateral to secure loans of €3.2 trn – meaning that even with a haircut as 
low as 5%, the face value of securities held as collateral must be €3.4 trn.  This adds 
up to €6.3 trn owned or controlled. 
We may ask, but we do not know, what the make-up of these portfolios is, how much 
of Eurostat's reported "general government gross debt" is owned or controlled by the 
Eurosystem (when the total for the 19 Eurozone countries as at 31/12/18 was €9.9 trn), 
and indeed what the total nominal amount of the eligible assets list is, and what their 
total value is as collateral (nominal multiplied by the stated haircut). 
This is vital information for a proper risk assessment of the Eurozone but it is not 
provided in the data issued by the Eurozone financial authorities. 
As it is, one can say that the Eurosystem owns or controls as collateral an amount that 
equates to 64% of the "general government gross debt" of the 19 Eurozone countries 
as at 31/12/18, granting that we do not know if all of the QE and all of the collateral 
consists of Eurozone sovereign bonds, or of a blend of the many different types of debt 
security on the eligible asset list. 
(c) Public sector entity debt supplied by the EIB 
The debts of the supranational borrower EIB are 0% risk-weighted for banks that hold 
them and count as a Level 1 HQLA, and a further, detailed investigation is required 
here.   
The EIB's loan portfolio is predominantly to public sector entities across all of the types 
listed above, including into structures where the EIB takes a higher degree of risk 
through the EFSI.  The borrower in this latter case would be a special purpose entity 
established solely to undertake the construction of an asset, say for power generation, 
and sell the supply so created to another public sector entity.  The financing template 
would involve the EIB injecting one of its normal senior unsecured loans and then a 
junior-subordinated unsecured loan enabled by a guarantee (second loss) or "equity 
commitment" (first loss) issued by its subsidiary, the EIF.  The presence of the EIF-
backed financing as a first- or second-loss absorber after the shareholders is intended 
to encourage the participation of third-loss absorbers in the shape of suppliers of senior-
subordinated financing.  The EIF's commitment, though, contains significant facility 
risk due to its subordinated position, long term and lack of security.  The EIF's 
                                                     
262 An institution's TARGET2 RTGS account is the one to which the payments it orders are debited and to which payments 
are credited that are due either to it as beneficiary or to payment service users for whom the institution is acting as Account 
Servicing Institution. 
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commitment is also off-balance sheet, both its own balance sheet and that of the EIB, 
but it enables a very significant amount of funding to be raised. 
The EIB does not have significant loans to Eurozone sovereigns, although a portion of 
its loans to public sector entities said to be is guaranteed by the respective sovereign in 
the same country. 
The balance of the EIB's loans is under its small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME) 
programme, where the EIB lends (and takes the credit risk on) a major commercial 
bank in an EU member state, and the bank on-lends to its SME clients.  The default 
risk on the SME client lies with the bank; the default risk on the bank lies with the EIB. 
The EIB's annual report gives no transparency on which banks it has lent to and their 
individual credit ratings, but they will, perforce, be the largest banks in each EU 
member state, and on whose individual credit rating the credit rating of the sovereign 
borrower acts as a ceiling. 
The Moody's rating report on the EIB (referenced above) gives some measure of 
breakdown where the EIB has a sovereign guarantee on a loan to a public sector entity, 
but not indicating if this is occurring on the EIB's loans inside the EU, or the ones 
outside it.  There is also mention of separate security being taken in some cases but the 
detail is absent for what security has been taken, on which loans, and to secure what 
portion of the loan. 
The EIB benefits from first-loss guarantees from the EU (under the EU's Commitments 
Appropriation and established in each case through an EU legal instrument) for the 
EIB's loans to borrowers outside the EU, and for the EIB's loans in the context of the 
EFSI.  These guarantees will find a place as a credit enhancement within the EIB's IRB 
model but overrating the enhancement because the claim on the EU is a claim on the 
same member states as are the EIB's shareholders. 
The EIB's loans are also long-term.  The typical profile would be a two-year availability 
period and then a repayment in equal semi-annual instalments starting six months or a 
year from full drawdown.  The average duration of the loan would be around nine years.  
The loans are also on a fixed rate of interest, which amplifies the risk since, if the 
borrower defaulted, the EIB would have to redeploy the funds it had borrowed itself to 
make that loan and might not achieve the same return on them.  These two elements 
indicate both a significant facility risk and a market risk, independent of the risk on the 
counterparty.  The two elements should result in a conservative CCF through which the 
loan's face value is converted to its risk-weighted asset value within the EIB's IRB 
methodology. 
In the case of the EIF's financings in the context of the EFSIs, the EIF's commitment is 
subordinated as well, and the EFSI-related portion of the EIB's loan portfolio should 
attract a larger CCF than its normal loans direct to public sector entities because the 
borrower in an EFSI structure is a special purpose company, even if it has a supply 
contract with a public sector entity.  The EIF, not being a bank, does not have to 
maintain regulatory capital.  By having the EIF make the high-risk commitments that 
would attract a large CCF if the EIB had made them, the EIB manages to limit the 
appearance of the risks in the business it and its subsidiary are undertaking. 
The EIB also had derivatives, swaps and forward foreign exchange in a nominal 
amount of €1,041 bn at 31/12/18, and the purpose of the portfolio is to match the 
currency and interest rate basis of the EIB's funding with that of its loans.  As such, the 
duration of this portfolio will approximate to that of the loans, meaning it carries a 
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significant market risk, and should be converted through a commensurate CCF into a 
substantial risk-weighted asset.  The original counterparty of the majority of this 
portfolio will have been other financial institutions, not one of the EIB's public sector 
borrowers.  It is opaque what proportion was contracted with a CCP as opposed to with 
a financial institution, and it is opaque what proportion of the contracts entered into 
with a financial institution has been novated to a CCP for clearing and settlement.  As 
such, it is opaque what the risk profile is of the counterparties to this portfolio of off-
balance sheet business, as well as of the portfolio itself due to its intrinsic 
characteristics. 
However, we can calculate the average CCF that the EIB applies to all of its business.  
The EIB's 2018 annual report showed its Own funds (Capital, Reserves and 2018 
unappropriated Profit & Loss account) as being €71 bn on 31/12/18.  With total on-
balance sheet assets of €556 bn and off-balance sheet contracts in a nominal amount of 
€1,041 bn, the EIB claimed to have a CET1 ratio of 35.1%. 
This means that the EIB's RWA were €202.3 bn (€71 bn / 35.1%), when the aggregate 
nominal value of its loans and off-balance sheet contracts was €1,597 bn.  The average 
CCF applied to each loan and contract was 12.73% (€202.3 bn / €1,597 bn). 
The off-balance sheet contracts include its subscribed-but-not-called capital in the EIF 
of €2.1 bn, and the paid-in capital in EIF €528 mn appears on the EIB's balance sheet, 
but it is opaque what size of risk-weighted asset each converts into and whether this is 
realistic given the amount of debt (€300 bn) that the projects have contracted from other 
financiers where the EIF sits in either the first-loss position ("equity commitments" of 
€15 bn) or second-loss (guarantees of €27 bn).  A conservative risk-weighted asset for 
a "capital commitment" would be 1-to-1, as capital sits in the first loss position.  The 
guideline for this treatment is the way in which Basel rules insist that a bank deduct 
back from its own capital the capital it holds in other banks, thereby reducing the 
amount of its own capital that it can leverage up with deposits.  The risk-weighted asset 
for EIF's guarantees must differ from the way a commercial bank weights its guarantees 
(such as rent guarantees, performance guarantees, bid bonds and standby letters of 
credit), because EIF guarantees correspond to a second-loss position in an EFSI 
financing.  A weighting of 0.75-to-1 would be realistic.  The EIF should thus hold a 
risk-weighted asset of €15 bn + €20.25 bn = €35.25 bn, or else the EIB should hold that 
amount due to consolidation as the EIF's owner, but it is opaque whether either is 
holding an appropriate loss-absorption cushion, or whether they are both relying on the 
EU's first-loss guarantee. 
The CCF on the EIB's business should be substantial across the board if much of it runs 
out to 15 years with nine years' average life, and because the EIB's loan book is by no 
means all collateralised with tangible security, the facility and market risks are 
substantial.  Certain parts of the loan book are secured with first-loss guarantees from 
the EU:  first, €36 billion for loans made to borrowers outside the EU under previous 
Multiannual Financial Frameworks (MFFs), an amount which would run off if total 
loans outstanding to such borrowers had fallen beneath this figure.  Secondly, €16 
billion for loans made to borrowers outside the EU under this MFF through to the end 
of 2020:  it would be surprising if this whole amount was not already outstanding, and 
as medium-/long-term loans.263  Finally, there is €26 billion for loans under the EFSI, 
and this figure has certainly been drawn and more.  The EIB thus benefits from up to 
                                                     
263 Loans outside the EU are invariably to public sector borrowers, and the loan term will match the project profile, with 
loans having final maturities out to 30 years:  https://www.eib.org/en/products/loans/public-sector.htm, accessed on 
1/6/20. 
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€82 billion of EU guarantees on loans outstanding of €451 billion and loans committed 
but not drawn of €106 billion as at 31/12/18. 
The preface to the EIB 2018 Financial Report states that "on July 18, 2018, the EIB 
and the European Commission announced that EFSI had exceeded its original €315 bn 
investment target.  In 2017, given EFSI's success, the European Council and the 
European Parliament had agreed to extend its capacity and duration to total investments 
of €500 bn by end-2020".  This confirms that the first-loss guarantee of €26 billion has 
been fully mobilised and, by implication, that a new EU legislative instrument will be 
passed before the end of 2020 to put in place a new first-loss guarantee from the EU, 
and within the ceiling of the current MFF.  The table on page 10 of the same document 
shows that the UK had the lowest signatures for EFSI funding of any member state.  
Nevertheless, the increased first-loss guarantee—from which the UK will draw no 
benefits—would form part of the UK's commitments obligation under the Withdrawal 
Agreement. 
The existence of the EU guarantees should not distract attention from where the EIB 
has lent most of its money and to whom.  The EIB's loan book at 31/12/18 was for 
18.4% into Spain, where the sovereign was rated BBB+, and for 11.6% into Italy, where 
the sovereign was rated BBB-.  These ratings at the sovereign level set the ceiling for 
ratings of public sector entities in the same countries—the EIB's borrowers—and those 
ratings can only be lower. 
However substantial are the components in a calculation of RWA for facility and 
counterparty risk, they are brought to nought if the counterparty risk component is 
unrealistically low.  This has to be happening at the EIB:  the facility and counterparty 
risks are substantial, due to the term of their business and the lack of tangible security.  
An average CCF of 12.73% is only possible, given those other two factors, if 
counterparty risk receives an extremely low weighting – which does not reflect the true 
extent of the risk borne by the EIB. 
The prima facie conclusion is that the misleading application of the Basel Rules at the 
Eurozone sovereign level has trickled down into the IRB methodology employed by 
the EIB, leading to a substantial understatement of the credit risk the EIB is taking and 
an overstatement of its CET1 ratio. 
(d) Amounts of other public sector entity debt controlled as collateral by the Eurosystem 
The Eurosystem list of eligible collateral contains many bonds issued by public 
borrowers, both the ones whose debts are within the Eurostat figures and the other 
public sector entities whose debts fall outside. 
The Eurosystem makes loans between Eurosystem members, and loans by Eurosystem 
members to banks, accepting these public sector bonds as collateral. 
The amounts of the loans are on top of the QE amount of bonds—drawn from the same 
list of eligible collateral—which the Eurosystem owns. 
We can thus say that the Eurosystem owns or controls as collateral an amount that 
equates to 64% of the "general government gross debt" of the 19 Eurozone countries 
as at 31/12/18, but we do not know if all of the QE and all of the collateral consists of 
Eurozone sovereign bonds, or of a blend of the many different types of debt security 
on the eligible asset list.  Logically, it must be the latter, at least in the case of the 
collateral taken by NCBs in exchange for the credit they have extended to banks. 
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As a result, we have no insight into the quality of the collateral lodged by any one bank 
in terms of the type of issuer and the issue's credit rating. 
(e) The true extent of the imbalances in the TARGET2 system and the efficacy of the 
legal means by which the gross balances are reduced to what the ECB reports 
The ECB's monthly reports of TARGET2 balances broadly show NCBs having long 
balances of €1.2 trn and short balances of €1 trn, with only the difference between them 
being shown by the ECB on its balance sheet at year-end.  The ECB's accounting 
treatment thereby denies its responsibility for the entire €1.2 trn of liabilities. 
This does not tally with the supposed legal arrangements for converting the balances 
on the 600 TARGET2 accounts264 into the one asset or liability of each NCB towards 
the ECB that the ECB reports.  This conversion is achieved firstly by Article 6 of the 
2012 TARGET guideline, which supposedly combines the balances on the nostro and 
vostro accounts that each NCB holds with every other NCB into one bilateral balance.  
Then, specifically at end-of-day, the Multilateral Netting Agreement kicks in, which 
purports first to novate each bilateral NCB-to-NCB balance into two balances:  an asset 
of one NCB towards the ECB, and a liability of the other NCB towards the ECB.  This 
results in each NCB having 23 positions towards the ECB.  Finally, these are combined 
with the balances that the NCB has on its nostro and vostro directly with the ECB, to 
produce the figures the ECB reports. 
Under the combination of Article 6 and the Multilateral Netting Agreement, the ECB 
should become the obligor of the TARGET2 liabilities in full, since they are novated 
to it, and the ECB should carry an extra €1 trn of assets and liabilities on its balance 
sheet, rather than netting off the amount by which the assets and liabilities match.  
There is no clause in the Multilateral Netting Agreement stating that the ECB is allowed 
to implement this final element of netting.  The NCBs are not a "single counterparty" 
and are not made one vis-à-vis the ECB under the terms of the agreement. 
This is just one anomaly in the agreement that needs further investigation. 
Another is whether balances on the 600 TARGET2 NCB/ECB accounts remain intact 
as they stand at the close of the normal processing day and are legally reconstrued 
through the documents only or are zero-balanced overnight and are reconstrued both 
operationally by accounting entries and legally through the documents.  If it is the latter, 
it is unclear both what the construction of the zero-balancing arrangement is and 
whether the operational treatment and the documentation are symmetrical (i.e., whether 
every operation can be tracked back to a clause in the agreement).  
The Multilateral Netting Agreement contains no mention of zero-balancing, but it has 
been explained to us verbally by the TARGET2-responsible director at an NCB that 
the 23 vostro accounts held by NCBs at any one NCB (e.g., the 23 TARGET2 vostro 
accounts held by other NCBs at the Banque de France) are zero-balanced into the vostro 
account that the ECB holds at that NCB (e.g., the ECB's vostro account at the Banque 
de France) and that there are therefore 24 zero-balance structures running in parallel, 
with every zero-balancing at end-of-day being reversed as the first movement of the 
following day. 
This begs the question of what the balances are intraday, since the Multilateral Netting 
Agreement specifically limits its validity to the end-of-day balances, TARGET2 is only 
                                                     
264 These are the nostro and vostro accounts held by the 24 TARGET2 participating NCBs with one another, plus the 24 
nostro accounts of these NCBs with the ECB, and the ECB's 24 vostro accounts held with the NCBs. 
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closed for an hour or so each evening, and the operating manual sets out the order in 
which different zero-balancing cycles are undertaken and then reversed.  It is possible 
that the situation as reported by the ECB may only be valid for 20 minutes each day.  
Indeed, since the ECB's reports are only ever for the final business day of the month, it 
would be important to know what the situation was at the close of the remaining 
business days, as well as intraday on all of them. 
This brings us on to some questions which need to be asked of the Multilateral Netting 
Agreement itself.  It contains only three pages of legal text and is governed by the laws 
of whichever country the ECB is located in from time to time.  This means that it is 
currently subject to German law, although it could become subject to the laws of any 
Eurozone member state that the ECB moved to, apparently without review. 
The agreement contains no representations and warranties from the participants, such 
as that they are duly empowered to enter into the agreement, and that nothing in their 
own constitution restrains them from executing the agreement and fulfilling its terms. 
Participants are not required to furnish an external legal opinion covering such issues 
as the lack of or inapplicability of laws governing the participant that might frustrate 
the accomplishment of the agreement, notably a law that precluded the participant from 
allowing its different balances held with other NCBs to be novated and netted. 
In a corporate banking situation, and to achieve the endpoint the ECB presents in its 
accounts from the startpoint, extensive representations and warranties would be 
required of the participants, and each participant would need to furnish a legal opinion 
that met several criteria.  In addition, the legal opinion would need to be refreshed 
regularly to ensure continuing validity. 
One of the related problems that arises from the zero-balancing (assuming it does occur 
within the construction as explained verbally to us) is that the physical balances come 
to reside on the vostro accounts of the ECB at each NCB, in its books, rather than on 
the nostro accounts of the NCBs in the ECB's books.  The balances then reside on 
accounts that are subject to the laws and regulations of the country of that NCB, not on 
accounts that are subject to the governing law of the agreement and of the ECB.  There 
is the potential for a conflict of law as a result. 
The novation construct is an unusual one to adopt for dealing with balances on current 
accounts, where the accounts themselves remain open and the balances are returned to 
them, and especially where the current accounts are established in 24 different 
jurisdictions265 and subject to local terms and conditions and governing law. 
Novation is much more common in the area of exchange-traded derivatives where the 
contract is a finite item, is subject to a single governing law (whoever is buying and 
selling the contract), and the contract is traded over an exchange located in the country 
of that same law.  The contract under no circumstances is reversed the next day:  it runs 
to maturity in its original form. 
The TARGET2 legal construct appears to be at risk of conflict of law, and this area 
needs to be thoroughly investigated. 
The final point is obvious:  if the ECB reports long balances of €1.2 trn and short 
balances of €1 trn as being the result of both the application of Article 6 of the 2012 
TARGET2 Guideline and the Multilateral Netting Agreement, the original balances on 
                                                     
265 Germany for the ECB and the Bundesbank, then the 23 others where the national central bank participates in TARGET2:  
the other 18 Eurozone countries and five non-Eurozone ones. 
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the 600 nostro and vostro accounts that the NCBs and the ECB maintain for processing 
TARGET2 payments must be larger than this, at the end of the normal processing day 
on the final business day of the month.  This multi-stage netting can only have the effect 
of reducing the balances from what they were at that point.  The balances prior to the 
netting—intraday and at the close of the processing day—need to be revealed on every 
TARGET2 opening day, not just the last one of the month. 
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Annex 2:   
The European Investment Fund 
The European Investment Fund (EIF) is the subsidiary of the EIB that is responsible for equity 
investments and the issuance of guarantees to other financiers in order that projects are able to obtain 
the entire financing they need.  Equity investments are mainly made into funds, which then make 
investments into projects.  It is known that these funds are leveraged, i.e., that they take on debt to 
supplement their equity in order to make larger investments. 
Although the EIF existed long before the EFSI was set up, the EIF is the vehicle through which the EIB 
makes its permitted EFSI commitments to high-risk tranches of finance in the manner described in 
Annex 3.  The scale of EIF's operations has expanded rapidly since the creation of the EFSI.  
The EFSI was established specifically to insert European funding into projects at a junior level, in order 
to furnish a cushion of credit enhancement for the greater comfort other lenders, who would thereby be 
induced to supply funds at a more senior level into the same project.  This is the leverage effect, and 
EIF annual reports testify to the EIF's own transaction and then to the amount of finance "leveraged" 
by that transaction.  This will include the EIB's loans into the same project, which meet EIB's 
underwriting criteria in part thanks to the insertion of credit enhancement by the EIB's own subsidiary. 
If the EIF's financings fail, they can claim more money from their shareholders—including the EIB and 
the EU—and if the claim on the EIB derives from failed EFSI financings, the EIB can claim from the 
EU up to €26 bn under a first-loss guarantee from the Commitments Appropriation of the EU Budget. 
The EIF is owned for 58.645% by the EIB, for 29.710% by the EU, and for 11.645% by 33 financial 
institutions.  EIF's total subscribed capital is €4.5 bn, but only €900 mn of that is paid-in.  There is a 
further €438 mn of share premium and €653 mn of reserves, retained earnings and unallocated profits, 
resulting in an on-balance sheet capital of €1,991 mn.  
EIF uses the same structure for its share capital as the ECB, EIB and ESM:  in the EIF's case, the part-
paid portion is 20% and the subscribed-but-not-called portion is 80%.  The financial institutions 
shareholders appear to have pre-deposited that 80% already in the form of the €438 mn of share 
premium.  Were a call to be made on the part-paid shares, the EIF would convert the share premium 
into paid-in capital without having a credit risk on the financial institutions.  
The credit risk on the remaining shareholders—the EIB and EU—is considered acceptable as they are 
both AAA-rated.  The 80% callable from the EIB would then be 80% × 58.645% × €4.5 bn = €2.1 bn, 
and from the EU 80% × 29.710% × €4.5 bn = €1.1 bn.  The subscribed-but-not-called portion acts as a 
reserve fund of €3.3 bn.   
The EIF is thus another creature of the EU, enjoying high credit ratings because of the line of recourse: 
• to the EU Budget and then to the member states for 29.71% of the callable capital; 
• to the EIB and then to the member states for 58.645% of the callable capital; and 
• to the EU Budget through the EIB for losses on EFSI transactions of up to €26 bn, as long as this 
amount had not already been exhausted by the EIB's losses of its own on EFSI transactions. 
The original EFSI programme which Annex 3 describes had reached its funding total of €315 bn by 
mid-2018.  This was later extended to €500 bn by 2020.  The EIB Group now enjoys, complemented 
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by a €7.5 bn allocation of the EIB's own capital, a total of €33.5 bn that it is permitted to commit in the 
context of EFSI financings.266 
The key point about the EIF is that it is the EIB's (and the EU's) vehicle for enabling the higher-risk 
portions of EFSI financings. 
EIF does not advance these funds:  indeed it owns only €790 mn of investments, €570 mn being private 
equity holdings and €200 mn being debt investments.267  Instead, EIF enables these financings by 
issuing guarantees in favour of banks and by making so-called "equity commitments". 
Regarding guarantees and judging from the list of guarantee beneficiaries (a list of new signatures for 
the year is included in the EIF annual report), the beneficiaries are banks who will then be willing to 
make a loan into the project concerned at a junior level.  This enables the same bank, other banks and 
the EIB itself to make further loans but at a level senior to the one enabled by the EIF.  EIF takes a high-
risk tranche; not necessarily the highest-risk equity tranche, but certainly a tranche subordinated to 
senior lenders.  The resultant amount of financing enabled by the EIF guarantee is then the guarantee 
amount plus the "leveraged amount" stated in the EIF's annual report.  This reading is the logical one, 
although it is not explicitly stated that the guarantee amount and the "leveraged amount" are cumulative. 
The total nominal amount of guarantees issued has not been given since the 2010 annual report where, 
on p. 43, it was stated as €14.7 bn.  What we are given instead is an on-balance sheet provision for the 
likelihood of losses under guarantees (only €47,370 in the 2018 annual report) and a statement of the 
"exposure at risk".  This is determined through the EIF's IRB model, which presumably will bear great 
similarity to the EIB's one. 
As can be seen below from the tracking of the EIF's portfolio of guarantees from 2009 to 2018, the 
volume of new issuance has increased sharply, and so has the average maturity – the percentage of 
guarantees of maturity over five years was 17.49% in 2014 but had risen to 80.89% in 2018 – see Table 
11. 
Table 11:  EIF portfolio of guarantees from 2009 to 2018 
Guarantees – with run-off – in Euro millions 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Average 
New nominal 
written 
191 611 1,126 1,180 1,844 1,616 4,697 6,153 5,905 6,500 2,982 
Balance sheet 
provision 
65 107 162 175 177 146 82 29 15 0 96 
"Exposure at 
Risk" on entire 
portfolio 
3,588 3,329 4,372 4,696 3,281 3,121 3,511 5,959 6,712 8,537 4,711 
Percentage with 
life over 5 years 
4.31% 9.58% 1.97% 25.81% 17.61% 17.49% 81.03% 67.18% 75.19% 80.89% 38.10% 
Cumulative new 
nominal written 
191 802 1,928 3,108 4,952 6,568 11,265 17,418 23,323 29,823 n/a 
Increment to 
"Exposure at 
Risk" 
n/a -259 1,043 324 -1,415 -160 390 2,448 753 1,825 n/a 
Leveraged 
amount 
0 3,138 6,061 5,111 8,611 5,574 16,628 23,587 18,995 23,900 11,161 
Total finance 
enabled 
191 3,749 7,187 6,291 10,455 7,190 21,325 29,740 24,900 30,400 14,143 
            
Estimated total of EIF guarantees book – 9 years of the average of new nominal written 26,842 
            
Estimated book of finance enabled – average of Total of finance enabled multiplied by 9 years 127,285 
                                                     
266 https://www.eib.org/en/efsi/what-is-efsi/index.htm. 
267 EIF 2018 Annual Report p.11 of the accounts/p.97 out of 184 in the document. 
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The increments to the "exposure at risk" figure, however, do not correlate to the rising volume of new 
business being written, especially given the increasing maturity of the new business. 
Our extrapolation of the current total size of the guarantees book—based on nine years of the average 
of new nominal written amount to take some account of the increase in scope and maturity since 2015—
is €26.8 bn, double the last amount stated in an EIF annual report in 2010. 
This book delivers a total of finance enabled by EIF guarantees of €127.2 bn, based the average annual 
total finance enabled (€14.1 bn), multiplied by nine years to take account of the expansionary trajectory. 
As regards the so-called "equity commitments", the type of operation involved is not explained in detail.  
The EIF supposedly commits to buy equity—in funds and not directly in projects—but the nominal 
amounts it commits are a large multiple of the equity investments that appear in the EIF balance sheet.  
The most plausible explanation of this is that the EIF uses the technique favoured by itself, the EIB, 
ECB and ESM:  the EIF buys part-paid shares, in which the paid portion is very low.  The EIF does not 
commit cash, but the subscribed-but-not-called portion of its shares acts as a reserve fund for the fund 
the shares are in.  The EIF, being a shareholder, takes the highest slice of risk and makes the first loss.  
Again, it can claim these amounts back through a capital call of its own, or through a call by the EIB 
on the EU's EFSI guarantee – as long as the EIB has not exhausted the guarantee with claims of its own. 
Once again, we assume that the fund that has issued the shares can make borrowings of its own, first 
against the EIF's subscribed-but-not-called capital at a junior level and then further borrowings at a 
more senior level from banks and from the EIB.  We take these further borrowings to be the "leveraged 
amount" stated by the EIF in its annual reports and that the total amount of finance enabled is the 
"leveraged amount" plus the EIF's "equity commitment". 
We have extrapolated the development of the book, the part-paid percentage and the callable amounts 
from the EIF's 2009–2018 annual reports as follows– see Table 12. 
Table 12:  EIF Part-Paid Percentage and Callable Amounts 
Equity Commitments – without run-off other than via sale or failure – in Euro millions 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Average 
New nominal 
written 
733 930 1,126 1,350 1,468 1,650 2,180 3,171 3,324 3,500 1,943 
Book value at end 
of year 
165 194 212 243 270 315 346 387 466 570 317 
Book value at 
start of year 
159 165 194 212 243 270 315 346 387 466 276 
Change in book 
value during year 
6 29 18 31 27 45 31 41 79 104 41 
Estimated part-
paid amount 
6 29 18 31 27 45 31 41 79 104 41 
Estimated callable 
amount 
727 901 1,108 1,319 1,441 1,605 2,149 3,130 3,245 3,396 1,902 
Percentage of 
part-paid to 
nominal 
0.82% 3.12% 1.60% 2.30% 1.84% 2.73% 1.42% 1.29% 2.38% 2.97% 2.05% 
Percentage of 
callable to 
nominal 
99.18% 96.88% 98.40% 97.70% 98.16% 97.27% 98.58% 98.71% 97.62% 97.03% 97.95% 
Leveraged amount 0 4,589 6,061 7,078 7,147 8,200 9,841 18,507 15,727 19,000 9,615 
Total finance 
enabled 
733 5,519 7,187 8,428 8,615 9,850 12,021 21,678 19,051 22,500 11,558 
            
Estimated total of EIF equity book – average book value at end of year divided by average part-paid to nominal 15,483 
            
Estimated book of finance enabled – average of total finance enabled multiplied by 15 years due to no run-off 173,373 
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This portion of the EIF's book is even more highly leveraged than the guarantees:  equity commitments 
of €15.4 bn enabled total finance of €173.4 bn to be raised. 
Totalling the EIF's guarantees and equities books and the totals of finance enabled by both results in: 
Overall estimate total of EIF book – aggregate of estimated total of EIF guarantees and equity books 42,324 
            
Estimated total book of finance enabled – aggregate of estimated books of finance enabled by EIF guarantees and equity 
books 
300,658 
 
The total book of finance enabled at €300.1 bn is not far from the size of the initial EFSI, which is 
supposed to have reached its initial target of €315 bn in 2018.  This would be consistent with a picture 
where the EIF's smaller, pre-EFSI business was running off, with the initial EFSI moving rapidly 
towards filling its initial target in 2018 and then being extended in 2019. 
In fact, our extrapolation may be slightly conservative, as it was reported that the EFSI had reached its 
initial target by mid-2018, and would then have expanded beyond that in the second half of 2018. 
Whatever the detail, the overall trajectory is clear – rapid expansion, with the member states bearing 
the first loss either through the EU's EFSI guarantee of €26 bn or through capital calls on the EIB and 
the EU if the first-loss EU guarantee does not cover the problem. 
The degree of risk being taken is opaque as regards "equity commitments" because the shares are shares 
in funds, and the EIF annual report provides no clues about what projects the funds have invested in.  
As a shareholder, the EIF has no recourse to any party involved in the project if the project fails. 
The degree of risk being taken is opaque as regards guarantees as well because the list of new signatures 
(e.g., pp. 73–75 in the 2018 annual report) is of guarantee beneficiaries (also known as the EIF "deal 
name") which is not the same as the "Account Party" – the party that asked for the guarantee to be 
issued and that signs the EIF's counter-indemnity (presuming they have one), and which must reimburse 
the EIF for any call on the guarantee.  This would normally be the project sponsor, and the EIF would 
retain recourse to that sponsor if the project failed and the guarantee was called.  The EIF annual report 
does not provide a list of Account Parties for its guarantees. 
In both cases, we are entitled to make an assumption based on the criteria of the EFSI: 
• EFSI projects follow the pattern of the creation of an asset by a special-purpose company, whose 
shares are owned in the private sector. 
• The asset is leased to a public enterprise in a contract where the public enterprise must use and pay 
for the asset until the funding taken on by the special-purpose company is repaid. 
• The special-purpose company, while off-balance sheet for the Eurostat figures for national debt, is 
in substance an "other public sector entity". 
• The debts of the public enterprise that uses the asset may fall within the scope of the Eurostat figures, 
but what it signs with the special-purpose company is a commercial contract, not a loan agreement 
or a bond indenture. 
• This is the important accounting point:  whether or not the public enterprise that uses the asset has 
its debts classified as within the scope of the Eurostat figures, what it enters into with the special-
purpose company is not a debt agreement and so will be excluded from the Eurostat figures. 
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• Likewise, the special-purpose company does not fall within the definition of the entities whose debts 
are captured by the Eurostat figures, and it is the special-purpose company that takes on the debt. 
• Nevertheless, the debt service owed by the special-purpose company can only be covered if the 
public enterprise makes the payments due under the commercial contract. 
• The debt taken on is dependent upon the financial capacity of the public sector, but accounting and 
disclosure conventions exclude the debt from the normally accepted measure of public sector debt. 
• The debt classifies itself into the level "other public sector entity" in our taxonomy. 
• A prime objective of the EFSI is to complement the efforts of the EIB to reflate the Eurozone 
economy after 2011/13. 
• The EFSI structure, to which the EIF is central, enables more debt to be raised and spent on public 
sector work, without the debts counting into the Eurostat figures. 
Nor do the debts greatly impinge upon the balance sheets of the EU, EIB or EIF.  The liabilities of these 
entities are all contingent ones, predominantly off-balance sheet. 
The EU's liabilities—under its callable capital in the EIF and its €26 bn EFSI guarantee—are marked 
against the Commitments Appropriation of the EU Budget. 
Both the guarantees and the "equity commitments" are off-balance sheet for the EIF, except for the 
Provision for guarantee liabilities of €47,370 and the private equity investments of €570 mn. 
The EIB can hold its paid-in capital in the EIF of €528 mn as an equity investment in its unconsolidated 
figures.  Given that EIF's major business is off-balance sheet and that its balance sheet footings are only 
€2.7 bn, consolidating EIF only adds €2.2 bn to its own footings, which are €556 bn.  
As regards the EIB having to recognise the risks being taken in the EIF and reduce its own lending on 
account of that, the EIB is assisted by the EIF not being a bank.  The EIB is not required to deduct its 
capital in the EIF from its own capital before determining the EIB's ability to lend itself.  That ability is 
limited in two ways:  to 20 times the EIB's on-balance sheet capital under the Basel Rules Leverage 
Ratio and to the amount, after the application of the EIB's IRB methodology and taking into 
consideration the EIB's regulatory capital fraction, which causes the EIB to have a surplus over its 
minimum CET1 ratio. 
Since the capital in the EIF is part-paid, and 80% unpaid, this 80% is not considered in the EIB's 
Leverage Ratio, and given that the EIB calculates its own Leverage Ratio with respect to its subscribed 
capital and not to the 10% that is the part-paid portion, the EIB would still meet its Leverage Ratio, 
even if it factored all of its subscribed capital in the EIF into asset side of its Leverage Ratio in the same 
way it factors all of the capital subscribed by its shareholders into the capital side of its Leverage Ratio.  
As regards the EIB's capital adequacy treatment of its investment in the EIF, it should hold a risk-
weighted asset against both the paid-in capital and its commitment to meet the balance.  The one does 
appear in its 2018 Balance Sheet on p. 32 of its Financial Report, and the other is the first item in the 
list of off-balance sheet business on p. 34. 
It is not possible, though, to see how these amounts are put through the EIB's IRB model to determine 
the respective risk-weighted asset and whether these amounts then equate to 58.645% (EIB's 
shareholding) of the EIF's calculations of its "exposure at risk", for which we have the figures for the 
guarantees but not for the "equity commitments".  
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If the "exposure at risk" for the guarantees was €8.5 bn at the end of 2018, it would be reasonable to 
posit that the figure for the "equity commitments" was the same, given that they have no run-off date, 
are more highly leveraged than the guarantees and represent the first-loss position in their respective 
financing, despite their lower quantum.  This would put EIF's total "exposure at risk" at €19 bn, of 
which EIB's portion would be €11 bn.  The EIB might be able to set part of the EU first-loss guarantee 
for EFSI operations against that exposure, since the guarantee is written in the EIB's favour.  The EIB's 
"exposure at risk" could not be reduced to zero, because the guarantee covers all of the EIB's EFSI 
business, including its direct loans into the same projects, and so the EIB could lose more than €26 bn 
on both its own EFSI loans and its business through EIF. 
As it is, we do not know what RWA the EIB holds in respect of its asset and its contingent liability 
regarding the EIF.  We can posit, though, that the EIB risk-weights its exposure based on the EIF's 
public credit rating, which is AAA, due to the recourse the EIF has to the EU and EIB, which are also 
both AAA-rated.  
On that basis, the EIB could accord a very low risk-weighting to its capital in EIF, as long as it 
overlooked the fact that it was itself a significant source of support to the EIF's rating.  If, on the other 
hand, the EIB considered the quality of the EIF's portfolio as exemplified by the contents of pages 69 
to 77 in the EIF 2018 Annual Report, and if the EIB considered the level of subordination of the EIF's 
loans and investments in its customers (as shown in Annex 3 regarding the EFSI), then the EIB should 
apply a very high risk-weighting to its paid-in capital in the EIF of €528 mn, and should carry a 
substantial risk-weighted asset to take account of the off-balance sheet liability to pay in the callable 
capital of €2.1 bn. 
The EFSI, constructed on the EIF and enabling the EIB to lend directly to the same projects, has created 
an extra block of public sector debt which is outside the scope of the Eurostat figures.  Nevertheless, 
the debt service is entirely dependent upon the public sector. 
The EFSI operates EU-wide, but it is possible to track the size of its investments down to the Eurozone 
member state level.  The total finance enabled by EFSI—over €300 bn by the end of 2018—can be 
tracked to the member state in which a public sector entity has agreed to use the resulting asset, and 
should therefore be added to the state's public sector debt, the borrower ranking as an "other public 
sector entity". 
A chart on p. 140 of the EIF 2018 annual report gives a geographical breakdown of the "exposure at 
risk" under guarantees:  18.4% is into Italy and 11.0% into Spain.  If we use these percentages as 
markers for how much of the total finance enabled by the EIF has been added as new, invisible, public 
sector debt in those two countries, it is €55 bn in Italy and €33 bn in Spain. 
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Annex 3:   
The European Fund for Strategic Investments 
3.1 More volumes of EIB lending and at higher risk268 
The EFSI was established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 25/06/15.  That Regulation permits the EU to issue a guarantee of €16 billion in favour of the EIB, 
and it permits the EIB to engage in loans and other financial instruments not within the terms of its 
normal business, up to specified limits. 
The European Commission felt it had identified an "investment gap", in the form of a shortage of a 
certain type of capital, which was stopping projects from getting off the ground and holding back 
economic growth and employment creation in Europe as a whole.  
The type of capital concerned would be of the "mezzanine debt" or "subordinated debt" types on the 
creditor ladder – ranking above "shareholders equity" but below "preferred creditors", "secured 
creditors" and "senior unsecured creditors".  This type of capital would act as a "credit enhancement" 
for the suppliers of levels of capitalisation ranking higher on the creditor ladder.  
The lack of this type of capital was held to be inhibiting the availability of "senior unsecured debt", in 
the amounts a project would need to take on.  This would be a multiple of the amount of "mezzanine 
debt", "subordinated debt" or "shareholders equity", so that a relatively small injection of "mezzanine 
debt" or "subordinated debt" from the EFSI would enable very large projects to get underway. 
This concept is termed the "multiplier effect": 
• €21 billion in the top-slice of risk:  "mezzanine debt", "subordinated debt" or "preference share 
capital" from the EFSI enables… 
• The EIB to lend a middle-slice of risk of €40 billion on its normal terms as regards interest rate and 
final maturity but not seniority on the creditor ladder, which enables… 
• The same projects to borrow €254 billion of "senior unsecured debt" from private sources. 
The total amount raised would be €315 billion, all enabled by EU/EIB taking a high-risk position of 
€21 billion and a medium-risk position of €40 billion. 
In order for this multiplier effect to be realised, the EIB would have to inject its medium-risk position 
of €40 billion at a lower rung on the creditor ladder than the €254 billion of "senior unsecured debt" 
from private sources.  The EIB's total position of €61 billion then acts as a credit enhancement towards 
the suppliers of the €254 billion:  the EIB is in a first-loss position and would lose all its money before 
the suppliers of the €254 billion lost anything. 
This is a major departure from the EIB's risk policy up to now:  to be a preferred creditor and at the top 
of the creditor ladder.  Indeed, the EIB's ability to provide this sort of credit argues against its preferred 
creditor status being enshrined in law in all EU member states for all types of borrower. 
€315 billion—the total financing—represents 64% of the EIB's "loans signed for EU borrowers" as at 
31/12/14, so this is a big increase in the EIB's business, but not of its capital base. 
                                                     
268 Excerpt from Lyddon B (2016), The UK's liabilities to the financial mechanisms of the European Union, Bruges Group 
Paper. 
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The EFSI is not a "fund" but, rather, an expansion of the EIB's loan portfolio in four aspects: 
1. The EIB benefits from a €16 billion guarantee from the EU of loans made by the EIB into specific 
situations, where the EIB will either make a loan into a higher-risk project and/or subscribe to 
another form of capital in the project which ranks below the claims of other creditors – far lower 
down on the creditor ladder from its normal "preferred" status or at least "senior unsecured" status. 
2. The EIB can then more easily lend its own money on its normal terms into the same project because 
this second loan is protected by the "credit enhancement" of the loan that is under the EU guarantee 
and which ranks below the EIB's normal loan on the creditor ladder:  the EU would lose all its money 
in the project before the EIB lost anything. 
3. A special €5 billion "permission" to the EIB to inject its funds into higher-risk projects and/or into 
lower-ranking forms of capital, with the EIB's subsidiary the EIF acting as the conduit for this 
money. 
4. Once again, the EIB can then more easily lend its own money on its normal terms into the same 
project because this loan is protected by the "credit enhancement" of the EIF engagement, which 
ranks below the EIB's "normal" loan on the creditor ladder. 
The big picture is that the EFSI puts up EU money into higher-risk projects and/or into higher-risk 
financing levels, such as mezzanine debt, subordinated debt and preference shares, and it enables the 
EIB to lend a larger amount on the same capital base.  In all cases, the EIB is the financier.  The EFSI 
is not a legal person and is not part of the contracting chain. 
The EIB fronts-up €61 billion of financing in two slices, one counter-guaranteed by the EU (€21 billion) 
and one at its own risk (€40 billion).  The EU ranks junior to the EIB, so the EU would lose its money 
before the EIB did, and both would lose their money before the private lenders did. 
This distinction under which the EIB is protected by the EU does not matter at all because behind the 
EU and EIB stand the same member states. 
The EFSI is a way of enabling more volumes of EIB loans for projects, in this case higher-risk ones, 
using the "credit enhancement" of the guarantees of the EU member states, with the greatest reliance 
placed on the largest and strongest, like the UK.  Table 13 shows EFSI funding agreed since launch. 
Table 13:  EFSI funding agreed since launch – drawn from EFSI Country Factsheets 
COUNTRY 
FUNDING IN 
 € BILLION 
Germany 0.2 
UK 1.4 
France 1.2 
Italy 1.3 
Spain 0.5 
Netherlands 0.1 
Belgium 0.2 
Poland 18.5 
Denmark 0.1 
Total 23.5 
 
The EFSI is still in its infancy and can be expected to grow strongly over the coming years. 
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3.2 The EIB – the UK's maximum possible loss under its contractual commitments 
The UK's maximum possible loss under current commitments is €39.2 billion, being the loss of our 
paid-in capital of €3.5 billion plus the obligation to pay in—and then the subsequent loss of—our 
subscribed-but-uncalled capital of €35.7 billion. 
3.3 The EIB – likelihood of the UK's maximum possible loss materialising or even being 
exceeded 
The EIB, by its own admission, is acting aggressively and in a counter-cyclical manner to create 
economic activity where it has sagged during the Eurozone crisis. 
This means lending more within its traditional brief and then, in the context of the EFSI, engaging in 
higher-risk projects either by simply lending outside its traditional criteria or by subscribing to levels 
of capitalisation in projects that rank lower on the creditor ladder in a liquidation, or both. 
In the EFSI, the EIB benefits from a first-loss guarantee of €16 billion from the EU in respect of its 
engagements and can risk up to €5 billion of its own resources through the European Investment Fund, 
for which it has no external guarantee. 
These facts should be of no comfort to the EIB's shareholders which are also the guarantors of the EU 
Budget: 
• Transferring the highest slice of risk from the EIB to the EU under the EU's first-loss guarantee 
merely alters the nature of the member state liability from several-but-not-joint through the EIB to 
joint-and-several through the EU. 
• The fact that the EIF is directly investing in higher-risk projects and low-ranking levels of capital 
makes a loss more likely, that tracks back to the EIB – and makes a call on the EIB's uncalled capital 
more likely. 
• The "multiplier" effect of the EFSI means that, because the "traditional loans" department of the EIB 
can see "investors" subscribing to the higher-risk levels of capital, the EIB is willing to commit 
"traditional loans" to the same project. 
• It does not seem to interrupt the logic chain that these "investors" are the EIB itself either acting 
directly and under EU guarantee or at the EIB's own risk through the EIF. 
• The EIB "traditional loans" are only the first multiplying effect – the second one is that the injection 
of both the EFSI bottom-slice and then the EIB "traditional loans" middle-slice enables the project 
to raise further private loan finance in a top-slice:  "top" meaning highest-ranking on the creditor 
ladder; 
• In both the EFSI bottom-slice and the EIB "traditional loans" middle-slice, the EIB explicitly gives 
up the preferential status on the creditor ladder which, elsewhere, it cites as a reason for its own 
creditworthiness. 
• These circumstances make losses for the EIB on EFSI-backed projects far more likely than losses 
on traditional EIB loans. 
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The multiplier effect in the EFSI works as shows in Table 14. 
Table 14:  EFSI Multiplier Effect 
LEVEL/MULTIPLIER AMOUNT 
EFSI funding/bottom-slice €21 billion 
First-level Multiplier 190% 
EIB "traditional loans"/middle-slice €40 billion 
EFSI and EIB funding combined on EIB balance sheet €61 billion 
Second-level multiplier 416% 
Private loans/top-slice €254 billion 
Total funding raised €315 billion 
Leverage of Total funding to EFSI funding 15 times 
Leverage of Total funding to EFSI+EIB Loans funding 5.2 times 
 
This is a clear Enron-like example of double-leveraging the same capital.  The Enron parent company 
was already highly leveraged itself, and then it used borrowings at the parent level to inject capital into 
subsidiaries, which then in turn borrowed on a similar multiple of loans-to-capital – see Figure 18. 
Figure 18:  Enron Structure 
 
 
In the context of the EFSI, the EIB will borrow an extra €61 billion itself and then inject it into EFSI 
projects, either itself as "normal" loans, as mezzanine or subordinated financing itself or through the 
EIF.  The projects will then borrow €254 billion themselves, just as the Enron subsidiaries did – see 
Figure 19. 
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Figure 19:  EFSI Structure 
 
 
Table 15 shows the figures for the total leverage being created in the EIB and EFSI. 
Table 15:  Total Leverage in the EIB and EFSI 
CAPITAL/DEBT/LEVERAGE FIGURE 
EIB current called capital €21.7 billion 
EIB current debts €453 billion 
Current leverage 2088% 
Extra EIB debts raised to fund the EFSI bottom-slice €21 billion 
Extra EIB debts raised to fund the EFSI middle-slice €40 billion 
Extra debts raised through EFSI €254 billion 
Total future debts threatening integrity of EU capital €768 billion 
Total future debts as a function of EIB current called capital 3539% 
 
While the EIB's direct position in the bottom-slice is counter-guaranteed by the EU (€16 billion), 
whereas its indirect position in that same slice through the EIF is not (€5 billion), it is worth considering 
how much of a loss would have to be booked in the EFSI projects in order to eliminate the EIB's capital, 
even if they could turn around and claim €16 billion from the EU Budget. 
This distinction—that the EIB could lose €16 billion on the EFSI before it had to book the loss against 
its own capital—is of little comfort when the loss would met by the member states through the EU 
Budget or by the same member states through a call by the EIB for more capital. 
It is of equally little comfort that the lenders of the extra, private loans that are raised by EFSI-backed 
projects will not be able to press those claims on either the EU, the EIF or the EIB in a liquidation, at 
least as long as the contracts for each project say that they cannot. 
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What is important is how much the projects have to pay out to someone else before the claims of the 
EIB/EU are met and how much the assets of the projects would have to shrink for the EIB/EU to receive 
zero-cents-in-the-euro in a liquidation.  That comes down to whether the EFSI projects are themselves 
highly leveraged.  They are:  €254 billion divided by €61 billion is 416%. 
The high level of leverage in the EFSI projects raises the likelihood that the EFSI funding (the bottom-
slice) and the EIB traditional loans (the middle-slice) will not be paid back in full in a liquidation of an 
EFSI project. 
Before the EFSI and looking at the EIB on its own as at 31/12/14, it would have required a 4.4% 
shrinkage of the value of the EIB's assets to eliminate the EIB's capital – see Figure 20. 
Figure 20:  Percentage Loss on EIB Loans Needed to Eliminate EIB Capital pre-EFSI 
 
With the addition of the EFSI but no raising of the EIB capital, it would require only a 2.7% shrinkage 
in the combined value of the EIB direct assets and EFSI project assets to eliminate the value of EIB/EIF 
engagements in EFSI and the EIB capital as a whole – see Figure 21. 
Figure 21:  Percentage Loss on EIB Loans and EFSI Projects Needed to Eliminate EIB Capital 
 
The existence of the EFSI renders it more likely that there will either be another call for capital from 
the EIB and/or that there will be a need for extra member state payments into the EU Budget to meet a 
call from the EIB on the EU under the EU's EFSI guarantee in the EIB's favour. 
Either way, the member states pay. 
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Annex 4:   
EBA Stress Tests 
The EBA stress tests have to be put into context firstly in the SSM and the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM) as a supposedly complete solution to the issues raised by the Eurozone financial crisis, and 
secondly in the framework of attempts by financial regulators to ensure overall soundness by focusing 
on the most significant institutions – globally through the GSIFI list, nationally through identification 
of institutions that are systemically important at that level and transnationally by applying the SSM to 
the Eurozone. 
The objectives of the SSM, as set out on the ECB's website,269 can be taken as doing service for the 
objectives of the entire Eurozone solution, as they are to: 
• "ensure the safety and soundness of the European banking system [i.e., the Eurozone banking 
system]; 
• increase financial integration and stability; [and] 
• ensure consistent supervision". 
The role of the SRM,270 if a bank fails, is: 
• "ensuring the orderly resolution of failing banks with minimum impact on the real economy and the 
public finances of banking union countries; [and] 
• managing the Single Resolution Fund". 
Based on the outcome so far, this has failed.  Institutions under the SSM and stress tests have still failed.  
Other institutions limp along thanks to official support and with their underlying problems uncured.  
The markets—to judge by the market-to-book deficits of Eurozone banks—are unconvinced that the 
banking system is sound. 
Stress tests have been conducted in 2014, 2016 and 2018, based on banks' figures and portfolios as at 
the preceding year-end:  31 December 2013, 2015 and 2017.  A further round of stress tests is being 
launched by the EBA in January 2020, based on figures and portfolios as at 31 December 2019, with 
results published by the end of June 2020.271 
Obvious weaknesses are that the tests are carried out retrospectively and on a snapshot at a point-in-
time, and indeed at a point-in-time known to the participants well in advance and for which they can 
prepare their inputs.  A second weakness is that December 31st is the least likely day in the financial 
calendar for stressed markets to occur and is a day susceptible to "window-dressing".  
There is also the question of what is being tested:  the methodology and results look impressive on paper 
but, as Peter Lee commented in 2018 in Euromoney272, "stress test results are meant to reassure on bank 
resilience, but they no longer seem to address banks' key risks".  
He continued:  "this now looks like a test that the examiners—the EBA, the European Central Bank 
(ECB), national central banks—have designed for their charges to pass easily and which is chiefly 
intended to reassure investors what a wonderful job the examiners have done in forcing banks to hold 
larger amounts of higher quality capital to protect against a severe downturn.  The EBA says the adverse 
                                                     
269 https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/thessm/html/index.en.html, accessed on 1/1/20. 
270 https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/banking-union/single-resolution-mechanism_en, 
accessed on 1/1/20. 
271 https://eba.europa.eu/eba-publishes-2020-eu-wide-stress-test-methodology-and-draft-templates, accessed on 1/1/20. 
272 https://www.euromoney.com/article/b1bqf7cs87jl7l/eba-stress-tests-are-past-their-sell-by-date, accessed on 1/1/20. 
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scenario for the 2018 test was more severe than for any previous such EU-wide exercise.  Maybe it is.  
Investors can decide for themselves how dystopian is a cumulative fall in GDP over three years by 
2.7%, with unemployment reaching 9.7% by 2020, and houses prices and commercial real-estate values 
falling by around 20%". 
The stress tests highlight the measure of CET1 capital in the test results:  the results are announced as 
a deficit or surplus percentage of CET1 capital, rather than as a pass or fail, but the announcement gives 
only half the story, as the percentage is of the bank's RWA – calculated, of course, using the bank's own 
IRB methodology and incorporating benevolent weightings for the types of asset discussed in this paper. 
That, thus far, all banks which were required to raise more capital have either done so or remained in 
business was meant to provide reassurance, but it might have provided greater reassurance if some 
banks had actually been put out of business directly as a result of a stress test.  The message from such 
a response would have been that banks whose failure at an unknown future point in time might trigger 
a systemic collapse cannot be allowed to contaminate the financial system and have to be closed (or 
resolved) at once. 
The acid test of investor reassurance would be that Eurozone banks' market capitalisation was at least 
their book value but this is not the case:  Eurozone banks as a generality show a market-to-book deficit, 
inferring that investors do not believe that the banks' accounts accurately report the value of and risks 
residing in their assets and off-balance sheet business.  Mr Andrea Enria, the ECB's head of banking 
supervision, admitted in his introductory statement in January 2020 to the unveiling of the Supervisory 
Report Evaluation Process that many banks "do not earn their cost of capital, and valuations remain 
low.  From a supervisory perspective, this means low organic generation of capital, and lower capacity 
to raise equity in markets under challenging economic conditions".  The market does thus not believe 
in the "safety and soundness of the European banking system", meaning that the objectives not only of 
the stress tests have not been fulfilled but also those of the SSM.  The SRM's objectives have not been 
fulfilled because, as we have shown elsewhere in this paper, failing banks have not been resolved in 
line with the SRM. 
In sum, no part of the Eurozone's solution is currently doing what it was supposed to do. 
The first list of banks subject to the SSM273 that we were able to find, dated 4 September 2014, contained 
all of the notable failures in the meantime, as well as names against which stand significant question 
marks, such as the well-publicised case of Monte dei Paschi di Siena.  An earlier list of SSM institutions 
will have given rise to the institutions subject to the 2014 stress tests. 
This analysis focuses on the list of SSM institutions current in 2015 at the same time as the EBA issued 
the first list of O-SIIs.  We have also used the list of GSIFIs that was current at the same time, this being 
the list of November 2014, which was valid until November 2015.  We try to reconcile the lists, and go 
on to follow the fate of a number of individual institutions, whether or not they were required to raise 
extra capital as a result of the first stress test. 
We have a confusing overlay in the form of the EU's version of the Basel Committee's category D-
SIBs274" which the EU has called "O-SIIs"275.  The O-SII lists covers the whole of the EU and, within 
the Eurozone, contains a handful of names that are not subject to the SSM.  More significantly, the SSM 
contains 41 institutions not regarded as systemically important by national authorities in any one 
member state, but which pass the tests for inclusion in the SSM. 
The list of O-SIIs is nominated by national authorities on the basis of importance to their national 
financial system.  By contrast, the SSM banks are selected based on meeting a €30bn asset hurdle or 
                                                     
273 ssm-listofsupervisedentities1409en.pdf, accessed from the EBA website. 
274 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_systemically_important_banks accessed on 1/1/20:  note – could be incomplete and 
is not drawn from the central bank of the country concerned. 
275 https://eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/other-systemically-important-institutions-o-siis-, accessed on 1/3/20. 
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failing that, either (1) having "significant cross-border assets" (e.g., Bank Degroof, Belgium); (2) having 
assets in excess of 20% of the GDP of the member state they are in (e.g., AS SEB Pank, Estonia); or 
(3) being "among the three largest credit institutions in the Member State" (e.g., Slovenská sporitelna, 
Slovakia). 
The O-SII list tends to have the important subsidiaries of transnational banking groups in every country 
where they are significant:  the SSM list is based on the location of the group's headquarters and then 
lists all of the Eurozone banking operations that are part of the group, not just the ones that are locally 
significant.  However, it does not include the operations in non-Eurozone countries of the same 
institutions, even where they are significant.  The SSM list is far longer than the O-SII list when one 
includes the lists of subsidiaries. 
Surely these lists should at least be structured in the same way, e.g., based on an institution's home 
member state as the SSM is, identifying the subsidiaries both within the Eurozone and within other EU 
countries and identifying the subset of subsidiaries that are of national systemic importance in another 
member state:  the national list from that member state should then pick up the subsidiaries which are 
of national systemic importance there.  
There really should not be an O-SII outside the SSM, just as no Eurozone-parented GSIFI is outside the 
SSM.  
There should be a clear incremental relationship between O-SII status and GSIFI status, whereas 
currently they overlap:  indeed, in several cases, the extra CET1 buffer for O-SII status in a certain 
member state is higher than the same bank's global extra CET1 buffer for GSIFI status.   
Indeed the ECB sees no issue in O-SII buffers being higher than GSIFI buffers.  This is justified by the 
ECB in their slide deck unveiling the 2019 SREP outcome, on the basis that "G-SIBs [GSIFIs] face 
lower P2G [Pillar 2 Guidance] reflecting higher resilience in the stress tests".  This turns the logic for 
having GSIFIs on its head.  The status GSIFI should cause banks, upon whom the financial system 
depends, to have more capital than other banks, and the stress tests should confirm GSIFIs do hold this 
extra buffer as a function of their RWA.  The stress tests should test, and not act as a justification for 
lowering hurdles. 
O-SII buffers are indeed the central issue but have gone somewhat under the radar.  They are set 
nationally and give rise to considerable differences in CET1 hurdles.  This undermines the concept of 
there being an SSM at all.  The requirements should be consistent, regardless of the member state in 
which the institution is headquartered.  The requirements should then trickle down consistently into 
each subsidiary bank of an SSM bank, both nationally and in other EU member states, including non-
Eurozone ones.  If institutions did not wish to hold capital in each entity, there are legal formats that 
could be adopted that overcome this. 
The situation at present is far removed from this, however. 
The EBA states that "the O-SII identification process reflect the 12 principles in the global framework 
provided by the Basel Committee to deal with Domestic Systemically Important Banks (D-SIBs).  The 
higher loss absorbency requirements set by the relevant authorities and resulting from this identification 
process are also included and with the obligation for these institutions to maintain a CET1 capital buffer 
of up to 2% of the total risk exposure amount, as laid down in Article 131 (5) of Directive 2013/36/EU.  
The O-SIIs identification process started in 2015 and takes place on a yearly basis.  The CET1 O-SII 
buffer requirement should also be re-assessed every year on the basis of this yearly identification 
exercise and the O-SIIs scores". 
It is national authorities who are the "relevant authorities" that set the "higher loss absorbency 
requirements" of "up to [our emphasis] 2% of the total risk exposure amount", who run the annual 
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process for O-SII identification and who reassess the CET1 O-SII buffer requirement.  EBA lists of O-
SIIs exist now for 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018, although not yet for 2019 or 2020. 
Some of the O-SIIs are also GSIFIs, but the GSIFIs amongst them do not have the preponderance of 
ownerships of O-SIIs in other member states than their home one.  Several non-GSIFIs have pan-
European networks. 
It is furthermore not the case that all subsidiary banks in any member state of a GSIFI are captured in 
the O-SII lists as a matter of course. 
The 2015 O-SII list contained 173 names in all, with CET1 O-SII buffers (where set system-wide by a 
national authority) ranging from 0% (Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, Latvia, the UK) to 2% (Sweden) 
and going as low as 0.2% (for three banks in Croatia) and 0.25% (for four banks in Slovenia) where 
different rates were set by a national authority for different banks falling under their purview.  Three 
banks each from Iceland and Norway were included, even though they are not EU member states.  There 
were no lists from the other two EEA member states, Liechtenstein and Switzerland, or (as noted above) 
from Bulgaria or Poland.  O-SII buffers have now evolved to a point where there is greater 
differentiation by institution, rather than the national supervisor setting one buffer for all its O-SIIs. 
As the names are selected by national authorities and notified to EBA, anomalies exist.  For example, a 
GSIFI may appear on the O-SII lists for certain member states, each with different O-SII buffers 
compared to its GSIFI buffer. 
An institution can be mentioned multiple times in the O-SII list, whilst it should only appear once in 
the SSM list as a main heading, and, as noted above, have its Eurozone banking operations listed 
underneath it.  The lists are mismatched, with 173 institutions on the 2015 O-SII list including 
significant duplications, but only 121 main headings in the 2015 SSM list. 
16 banking groups had more than one institution on the O-SII list:  KBC, Santander, Unicredit, Intesa 
SanPaolo, Socéité Générale, BNP Paribas, Raiffeisen International (Austria), Die Erste (Austria), 
Deutsche, ING, Nordea, Danske, Swedbank, SEB, HSBC and DNB of Norway.  In total, these groups 
had 58 institutions included.  After reversing out the 42 doubled-counted institutions, as well as the 
three banks each from Norway (including DNB) and Iceland, we have 125 O-SII groups. 
Going through the same exercise on the SSM list, we find that we have 121 groups on the initial list, 
but this is a coincidence and the mismatches are far more significant than this difference in numbers of 
five would infer. 
No non-Eurozone countries are included in the SSM, which eliminates 66 O-SIIs.  On the other hand, 
important local operations of non-Eurozone institutions are captured in the form of Royal Bank of 
Canada Investor Services and State Street in Luxembourg, Bank of New York Mellon in Belgium, 
Barclays in Italy, RBS Group in the Republic of Ireland and the Netherlands and HSBC in France.  It 
does not follow, however, that Eurozone operations of GSIFIs are automatically included:  no 
operations of any of the other non-Eurozone GSIFIs are included (JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Bank 
of America, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, Mitsubishi-UFJ, Morgan Stanley, Agricultural Bank of 
China, Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited, Mizuho, Standard Chartered 
Sumitomo, UBS).  RBC was not a GSIFI at the time, but State Street was. 
All Eurozone-parented GSIFIs are part of the SSM, as one would expect.  In 2015, these were BNP 
Paribas, Deutsche, BBVA, Groupe BPCE, Credit Agricole, ING, Santander, Socéité Générale and 
Unicredit. 
Nevertheless, there remain anomalies, such as where subsidiaries of non-Eurozone subsidiaries of EU 
banks are included in their own rights or the exclusion of banks that play a pivotal role in securities 
custody and settlement. 
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A much bigger anomaly is why it is that so many institutions are large enough in absolute terms or in 
relation to size of their country to be included in the SSM but are not O-SIIs.  
Making all SSM banks and any of their major EU subsidiaries (inside and outside the Eurozone) O-SIIs 
would infer that many more banks should have been nominated as O-SIIs and been subject to the CET1 
O-SII extra buffer requirement, albeit that this was set at 0% in some countries.  As it is, 42 SSM 
institutions at the group level are spared the CET1 O-SII extra buffer requirement (see right-hand 
column in the table below). 
Here is a reconciliation between the 2015 O-SIIs list and the introductory SSM list: 
Country # O-SIIs O-SIIs not in SSM # O-SIIs in SSM # SSM SSM banks that are not O-SIIs 
-- A B C = A – B D E = Δ between C & D 
AT 7 Raiffeisen Bank 
International 
Unicredit Bank 
Austria 
5 8 Ӧesterreichische Volksbanken 
Sberbank Europe 
VTB Bank 
BE 8 BNP Paribas Fortis 
Euroclear Bank 
ING Belgium 
5 7 Banque Degroof 
Dexia 
CY 6 Eurobank Ergasias 
Alpha Bank 
4 4 0 
CZ 7 7 – not Eurozone 0 0 N/A – not Eurozone 
DE 16 Unicredit Bank AG 
ING DiBa AG 
14 20 Aareal Bank 
Deut.  Apoteker- und 
Ärtztebank 
Hamburger Sparkasse 
Hypo Real Estate/DePfA 
Münchener Hypotekenbank 
SEB AG 
DK 6 6 – not Eurozone 0 0 N/A – not Eurozone 
EE 2 0 2 2 0 
ES 6 0 6 15 Banco Mare Nostrum 
Bank Inter 
Ibercaja Banco 
Banco de Credito Social/Coop 
Catalunya Banc 
Kutxabank 
Liberbank 
Banesco 
Unicaja Banco 
FI 4 Municipality 
Finance 
3 3 0 
FR 6 0 6 10 Bpifrance 
Caisse de Refinance de 
l'Habitat 
Societe de Financement Locale 
HSBC France 
GR 4 0 4 4 0 
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Country # O-SIIs O-SIIs not in SSM # O-SIIs in SSM # SSM SSM banks that are not O-SIIs 
-- A B C = A – B D E = Δ between C & D 
HR 9 9 – not Eurozone 0 0 N/A – not Eurozone 
HU 9 9 – not Eurozone 0 0 N/A – not Eurozone 
IE 2 0 2 4 Permanent TSB 
Ulster Bank 
IS 3 3 – not Eurozone 0 0 N/A – not Eurozone 
IT 3 0 3 14 Carige 
Banco Popolare 
Banca Pop – Emilia/Romagna 
Banca Pop – Milano 
Banca Pop – Sondrio 
Banca Pop – Vicenza 
Barclays 
ICCREA 
Mediobanca 
Unione de Banche Italiane 
Veneto Banca 
LT 4 AB Siauliy bankas 3 3 0 
LU 6 Deutsche Bank 
Luxembourg 
Socéité Générale 
Bnk & Trust 
BGL BNP Paribas 
CACEIS Bank 
2 4 RBC Investor Services 
State Street 
LV 6 Citadele banka 
Rietumu banka 
AS DNB banka 
3 3 0 
MT 3 Medifin Holdings 2 3 Deutsche Bank (Malta) 
NL 5 0 5 7 Nederland.  Waterschapsbank 
Royal Bank of Scotland NV 
NO 3 3 – not Eurozone 0 0 N/A – not Eurozone 
PT 6 Santander Totta 
Caixa Economica 
Montepio 
4 4 0 
RO 9 9 – not Eurozone 0 0 N/A – not Eurozone 
SE 4 4 – not Eurozone 0 0 N/A – not Eurozone 
SI 8 SID 
Abanka 
SKB 
Sberbank 
Banka Koper 
3 3 0 
SK 5 CSOB 
Postova Banka 
3 3 0 
UK 16 16 – not Eurozone 0 0 N/A – not Eurozone 
Totals 173 94 79 121 42 
 
The introductory SSM list gave rise to the list of institutions (supposedly 130) who were subjected to 
the initial stress test, and this, in turn, gave rise to the list of 24 institutions which needed to raise more 
capital, based on their figures and portfolios as at 31 December 2013 (see below). 
At best, one can state that there has been broad overlap between the SSM list and the stress tests list 
over time but not between either of these lists and the O-SII list. 
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The O-SII lists give an appearance of unevenness even after allowing for double counting, with, for 
example, the Czech Republic nominating seven institutions but Italy only three. 
Given (1) the extra CET1 buffer defined by national authorities of 2% being a maximum, not a 
minimum, nor even a guideline; (2) the lower level set by several national authorities; and (3) the fact 
that the extra CET1 buffer is, as usual, a function "of RWA", an institution's being designated as an O-
SII can have had little incremental effect on the institution concerned and, by consequence, on the 
soundness of that country's banking system. 
The main significance of designation as an O-SII may have been to protect the institution from US 
sanctions under the Patriot Act.  Before the Financial Crime Enforcement Network (FinCen) of the US 
Treasury can issue a 311 Notice against a foreign financial institution, it has to determine whether the 
institution is systemically important either globally or in its own country. 
The SSM, meanwhile, has acted as the supervision framework for the following institutions, all of which 
are on the September 2014 list: 
ENTITY COUNTRY FATE 
Deutsche Bank Germany Launched a restructuring plan in 2019.  Shares trade at a market-to-book 
discount of over 80% 
HSH Nordbank276 Germany Sold in 2018 by the states of Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein to US 
private equity companies after amassing NPLs 
Hypo Real Estate 
Holding277 
Germany Former international real estate business of Hypovereinsbank, spun off in 
2002.  Restructured in 2008 and nationalised by the German Financial 
Markets Stabilisation Fund in 2009.  Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG 
remained as the only outward-facing entity operating in financial markets 
and is now the entity that is within the scope of the SSM and the stress 
tests, with total assets as at 31/12/18 of €57.8bn and a claimed CET1 ratio 
of 18.5% 
Eurobank 
Ergasias 
Greece Prospective major beneficiary of Project Hercules278 to relieve it of NPLs 
through a securitisation template 
National Bank of 
Greece 
Greece Prospective major beneficiary of Project Hercules to relieve it of NPLs 
through a securitisation template 
Piraeus Bank Greece Prospective major beneficiary of Project Hercules to relieve it of NPLs 
through a securitisation template 
Banco Popular 
Espanol 
Spain Sold to Banco Santander in 2017 for a nominal amount after it had 
experienced a high rate of deposit withdrawals279 
Banca Carige 
S.p.A. – Cassa di 
Risparmio di 
Genova e Imperia  
Italy On 2 January 2019, the ECB appointed administrators to run the bank 
after it was unable to raise €400 million of new share capital at the end of 
2018.  The bank carries a large portfolio of NPLs.  The situation remains 
unstable but the bank has not been put into resolution, although it is 
clearly potentially unviable 
Monte dei Paschi 
di Siena 
Italy Has continued to trade despite carrying a large portfolio of NPLs and 
being clearly potentially unviable.  Has twice received overt state aid, in 
2016 from the Bank of Italy and in 2018 from the Italian Ministry of 
Economy and Finance 
Banca Popolare di 
Vicenza  
Italy Taken over in 2017 by Intesa SanPaolo in a transaction involving Veneto 
Banca under which the Republic of Italy supplied state cash and a promise 
of guarantees to assist with securitisation of NPLs280 
                                                     
276 https://safety4sea.com/hsh-nordbank-sale-officially-completed/, accessed on 1/2/20. 
277 https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2011_3_9_en.pdf. 
278 See factor 4 in section 1 on NPL securitisation. 
279 See factor 1 in section 1 on resolutions not done in accordance with the BBRD. 
280 See factor 4 in section 1 on NPL securitisation. 
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ENTITY COUNTRY FATE 
Veneto Banca  Italy Taken over in 2017 by Intesa SanPaolo in a transaction involving Banca 
Popolare di Vicenza under which the Republic of Italy supplied state cash 
and a promise of guarantees to assist with securitisation of NPLs281 
Bank of Cyprus Cyprus Had €8bn face value of NPLs as at 31 March 2018, written down to a 
"carrying value" of €4bn.  NPLs had only been kept down to €8bn face 
value thanks to the usage of "forbearance" and "restructuring" techniques 
and not by recoveries, as shown by the bank's quarterly report to 31 March 
2018282.  A "carrying value" of 50% of face for a portfolio consisting of 
loans classed as "Bad" or "Unlikely to pay" is over-overoptimistic.  A 
more realistic valuation would be 20% of face, necessitating a further 
write-down of 30%, or €2.4bn.  Page 5 of the same report showed the 
bank's capital as being €2.3bn, so this write-down would have caused the 
bank to have negative capital.  Its claimed CET1 ratio on the same date 
of 12% is palpably unrealistic, since the bank was only being allowed to 
survive thanks to its NPLs being overvalued.  On 23 July 2018, it was 
announced that the bank was lining up a transaction to sell off a block of 
its NPLs in "Project Helix" to private equity investors listed as Apollo, 
Pimco and Lone Star283 
Co-Operative 
Central Bank 
Cyprus Merged into Hellenic Bank in 2018284 
Hellenic Bank Cyprus Now owns a disproportionate quantity of sector NPLs after its takeover 
of Co-Operative Central Bank and because Bank of Cyprus nominally 
relieved itself of some of its NPLs through Project Helix.  Both banks 
have made usage of "forbearance" and "restructuring" actions to return 
NPLs to performing status.  The Cyprus Business Mail285 reported on 18 
December 2019, that NPLs in the Cypriot banking system were €9.7bn at 
the end of July 2019, as compared to €19.9bn at the end of March 2018.  
If Hellenic is holding 40% of sector NPLs, that amounts to €3.9bn, 
compared to its capital and reserves of €1.1bn286, upon which it claims a 
CET1 ratio of 19% as at 30 September 2019.287  Loans were stated as 
€6.1bn, so on this metric, over half are on NPL status and the bank is 
bankrupt, notwithstanding its claimed CET1 ratio 
ABLV Bank Latvia Subject to a Section 311 Notice288 from the Financial Crime Enforcement 
Network of the US Treasury in December 2018 denying it direct and 
indirect correspondent banking facilities is US dollars, effectively cutting 
it off from the international banking system.  It was deemed not 
systemically important to the domestic banking system in Latvia, despite 
being the third largest bank, an SSM participant and an O-SII, on the 
grounds that a majority of its business was offshore and conducted with 
non-residents, a factor in its being considered as an institution of "primary 
money laundering concern". 
 
None of the institutions that failed did so due to their inability to withstand stressed market conditions. 
                                                     
281 See factor 4 in section 1 on NPL securitisation. 
282 https://www.bankofcyprus.com/globalassets/investor-relations/press-releases/eng/20180529-1q2018-
financialresultsannouncement_eng_final.pdf, sections F1 to F8 on pages 28 to 35. 
283 https://cyprus-mail.com/2018/07/23/three-us-firms-eying-e5bn-in-boc-npls/, accessed on 1/2/20. 
284 See factor 1 in section 1 on resolutions not done in accordance with the BBRD. 
285 https://cyprus-mail.com/2019/12/18/npes-in-cyprus-banks-down-to-e9-7-billion-in-july/, accessed on 1/2/20. 
286 Page 7 Hellenic Consolidated Financial Statements at 30 September 2019. 
287 https://www.hellenicbank.com/portalserver/hb-en-portal/en/about-us/investor-relations/show-me/financial-results, 
accessed on 1/2/20. 
288 ABLV NPRM 20180212 (Final for FR Submission) document of FinCen announcing 311 Notice. 
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The institutions in the table that have not failed remain in business despite their potential unviability 
caused by their large portfolios of NPLs.  Several have been flagged up by stress tests as requiring extra 
capital, but obtaining or not obtaining that extra capital has neither resulted in closure nor a return to 
good health. 
These institutions are kept in business and have not been resolved thanks to a mixture of state support, 
supervisor tolerance of "forbearance" and "restructuring" techniques to reverse loans out of NPL status 
into performing status and the usage of the common template for the securitisation of NPLs. 
The reasons for failure or unresolved unviability are more basic than external stress events and include 
compliance as a cause of instability – specifically the failure of compliance with applicable regulations 
to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism.  Now there is pressure for the creation of 
an EU-level supervisor for these matters, but it is noteworthy that this pressure has not come from the 
SSM or the EBA, but from member states.289 
As regards the stress tests themselves, their customary result is to call for a subset of banks examined 
to raise more capital, the meaning of which judgement is that these banks have inadequate CET1 capital 
to withstand the stress scenarios.  The BBC reported the results of the first test in 2014,290 based on data 
as at 31 December 2013.  The BBC noted that 24 banks "failed" and that 10 of them had taken the 
necessary measures before the results were announced.  All of the residual 14 banks were in the 
Eurozone: 
Country Bank 
Austria Ӧesterreichische Volksbanken 
Belgium AXA Bank Europe 
Belgium Dexia 
Cyprus Hellenic 
Greece Eurobank Ergasias 
Greece National Bank of Greece 
Ireland Permanent TSB 
Italy Banca Carige 
Italy Monte dei Paschi di Siena 
Italy Banca Popolare di Milano 
Italy Banca Popolare di Vicenza 
Portugal Banco Comercial Portugues 
Slovenia Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor 
Slovenia Nova Ljubljanska Banka 
 
Some of these banks have failed in the meantime, despite being allowed by regulators to continue to 
trade.  Hellenic, Eurobank Ergasias, National Bank of Greece and Monte dei Paschi di Siena have been 
allowed to continue, and do so still, while remaining questionable.  
It is possible that other banks not included on this list are harbouring serious issues but have managed 
to avoid a public call under the stress tests to raise more capital. 
It is concerning how the techniques for keeping banks in business and evading resolution are so common 
between Italy, Greece and Cyprus.  It is almost as if the SSM and the banking union have succeeded in 
the objective of "consistent supervision" by propagating, not best practice, but—especially in the area 
                                                     
289 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-moneylaundering-reform/eu-heavyweight-states-push-for-joint-supervisor-
against-money-laundering-idUSKBN1XJ04D, accessed on 1/2/20. 
290 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-29777589, accessed on 1/2/20. 
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of the treatment of NPLs—poor practice, enabling dubious techniques to become acceptable 
everywhere once they have been established somewhere. 
Permitting "forbearance" and "restructuring" techniques to reverse loans out of NPL status into 
Performing status succeeds in creating "zombie" "performing loans" that risk falling back into NPL 
status at any time.  
The common template for the securitisation of NPLs causes an exchange of a block of overvalued, bad 
loans for two 0% RWA:  10% cash and 90% bonds guaranteed by a Eurozone sovereign.  The latter is 
a typical example of an asset benefitting from the erroneous Basel treatment that is the subject of this 
paper.  Underlying the transaction is the same block of overvalued, bad loans. 
In addition, if the SSM and SRM are the main manifestations of the banking union, then current calls 
for the "completion of the banking union" follow a familiar path: 
1. An organisation or a process is established with a given rationale and set of objectives; 
2. In due course, the creation of the organisation and/or the implementation of the process are feted as 
achievements in themselves, rather than their being judged on the achievement of their objectives 
and the fulfilment of their rationale for existing; and 
3. An argument is built that these latter criteria can only be fulfilled by the establishment of further 
organisations or processes, and so the advance and expansion of European institutions continues, 
driven by its own logic that parts company with the market's logic. 
Looked at without the ambition of enhancing pan-European powers, institutions and processes, what 
has been achieved up to now has not met the original objectives. 
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Annex 5:   
ECB Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) 2019 Outcome 
The outputs from the 2019 SREP are an introductory statement by Mr Andrea Enria,291 a publication of 
the results for significant institutions,292 an "Aggregate SREP outcome for 2019".293 
The key messages in the "Aggregate SREP outcome for 2019" include concerns about banks' business 
model sustainability and governance.  To this latter point, the ECB refers to "deteriorating scores driven 
by limited effectiveness of management bodies, weaknesses in internal controls, poor data aggregation 
capabilities and weak outsourcing arrangements". 
CET1 ratios have generally been static in 2018, which is curious when NPLs have been so much 
reduced, or at least claimed to be.  Reductions in NPLs should have a direct and positive impact in 
CET1 ratios. 
Point 4.1 on "Evolution of Scores" attests that "90% of overall SREP scores remained constant in the 
period 2018-19, however the high spread of weak governance and operational risk scores are a concern 
to supervisors", and that "The number of banks receiving 'weaker' (score 3) overall scores has been 
increasing in recent years".  No bank scores a 1. 
The statistics are thus mildly negative at a time of relative economic calm. i.e., in unstressed conditions.  
Mr Enria's Introductory Statement sums up this situation as follows:  "Almost all banks have adequate 
levels of capital, in excess of all requirements, including the systemic and countercyclical buffers.  At 
the end of the third quarter of 2019, six banks had capital levels below the Pillar 2 guidance set for 
2020.  In four cases, that shortfall had already been remedied by the end of 2019.  The two remaining 
banks have been requested to take remedial actions within a well-defined timeline". 
However, his statement shows that the rules are about to be undermined:  "The upcoming revision of 
European banking regulation will allow banks to fulfil Pillar 2 requirements partly with capital of lower 
quality, and hence lower loss-absorbing capacity, than CET1.  According to our calculations, from 2021 
onwards, CET1 requirements will thus fall by around 90 basis points as a consequence of this reform".  
Mr Enria makes specific mention of issues raised in this paper, low profitability and low share 
valuations:  "Another prominent area of supervisory concern is the low level of profitability of European 
banks.  Many of them do not earn their cost of capital, and valuations remain low.  From a supervisory 
perspective, this means low organic generation of capital, and lower capacity to raise equity in markets 
under challenging economic conditions". 
But there is a rejection that the ECB's own interest rate policy can be blamed for this, and an exhortation 
to banks to work on their business models:  "Banks tend to blame the lack of profitability on external 
conditions, pointing to negative interest rate policies, stringent regulatory requirements, tougher 
competition including from companies that employ new technologies, and sluggish growth in the euro 
area.  While it is undeniable that the external environment is challenging, this is not going to change in 
the short term.  Banks need to sharpen their managerial efforts to refocus their business models, deploy 
effective strategies on digitalisation and achieve more radical improvements in cost efficiency.  
Consolidation could also prove helpful in achieving these goals". 
Mr Enria goes on to state that "one of our priorities this year is to assess banks' future resilience and the 
sustainability of their business models".  There is an inference of on-going internal stress in banks 
                                                     
291  https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2020/html/ssm.sp200128~886dbc9984.en.html accessed 
on 29/1/20. 
292 https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2020/html/ssm.sp200128_annex~2268324186.en.pdf. 
293  https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/srep/srep_2019/html/aggregate_results_2019.en.html#toc1 accessed 
on 29/1/20. 
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caused by a range of challenging internal factors or, put another way, the banks are running out of road 
with no prospect of relief from an improvement in conditions externally. 
Mr Enria finishes by referring to NPLs, and the achievements in reducing them so far, without referring 
to the methods used to bring about the reductions.  He also addresses banks' plans to reduce them even 
further:  "this planned reduction targets in particular very old NPLs, which tend to be the most difficult 
to cure or dispose of".  In other words, banks are holding NPLs that are old, have had no debt service, 
and cannot be securitised, "restructured" or subjected to "forbearance".  In other words, these NPLs are 
in reality worthless and ought to be completely written off.  
Mr Enria states that "in 2014, non-performing loans (NPLs) in the euro area stood at €1 trillion, 8% of 
total loans.  Since then, we have taken various supervisory measures, and the banks have put a lot of 
work into bringing down NPLs.  And these efforts have been successful:  since 2014, the volume of 
NPLs has shrunk by almost half, to €543 billion, and the NPL ratio has fallen to 3.4%". 
€543 bn divided by 3.4% implies a loan amount of €15.97 trn.  This updates the ECB's statement in 
June, which we have quoted above, that NPLs at that time were €580 bn and amounted to 3.8% of all 
loans.  That implied a loan amount of €15.26 trn. 
Both implied loan amounts are higher than the figures for total loans in the ECB statistical database294, 
where loans were €11.91 trn at the end of June 2019 and €11.98 trn at the end of September.  Presumably 
the ECB statistical database, like the ECB's SREP statistics page, cover only the SSM banks (113 of 
them as at September 2019) whilst the NPL figures are for the whole market. 
The total assets of the SRM banks were €22.7 trn at the end of June 2019 and €23.3 trn at the end of 
September, inferring a ratio of loans to total assets of around 52%.  Studying the ratios of 8 major 
Eurozone gave a group of indicators around 56%, with two French banks (BNPP and Societe Generale) 
nearer 34%, because they carry their insurance business on the same balance sheet as their banking 
business. 
We are entitled to conclude that the figures for total loans implied by the NPL calculations point to total 
assets in the range of €28-29 trn for the entire banking market, and that the SSM addresses banks that 
make up around 80% of the market. 
If Mr Enria's description is correct of the type of loans still residing as NPLs in Eurozone bank balance 
sheets, €543 billion of NPLs – 3.4% of the Eurosystem's banking loan assets – are worthless and should 
be written off against capital, in the same timeframe as European banking reforms will reduce CET1 
capital ratios by 0.9%.  
One might infer that the total reduction in CET1 capital would then be 4.5%.  However this is not 
necessarily the case, since the NPL amounts are Carrying Values (the loan's nominal amount less any 
write-offs taken so far), and the Carrying Values are assigned a risk-weighting through the bank's IRB 
model, as if the Carrying Value were a performing loan. 
The SRM banks only have €1.5 trn of equity in total, to cover all of their assets and their off-balance 
sheet business, which is not mentioned in the ECB statistics at all.  The equity amount is only adequate 
if the loans are risk-weighted at 40% and the off-balance sheet business at 15%, assuming the nominal 
of the latter is 75% of the nominal of the former (the EIB's off-balance sheet business as at 31/12/18 
had a nominal value of €1.045 trn compared to its loans of €556 bn).  If the off-balance sheet business 
has a larger nominal, it would cause the capital buffer to be inadequate, unless the risk-weightings on 
both on- and off-balance sheet business were revised to compensate.  
                                                     
294  https://www.euro-area-statistics.org/ accessed on 29/1/20. 
Technical Analysis  The ECB's SREP 2019 Outcome: Annex 5 
 
129 
If the SRM banks are 80% of the market, then the market will have at most €1.88 trillion of equity, as 
the non-SRM institutions have lower hurdles to meet. 
If the Carrying Values are being translated through IRB models as if they were performing loans, these 
NPLs will not represent a very large RWA against which the banks can claim CET1 ratios of 12-14-
16%. 
But if these NPLs really are the residue at the bottom of the barrel that has thus far proven immune to 
curing through securitisation, restructuring or forbearance, then a €543 bn write-off may on the one 
hand be a write-off of only €190 bn of RWAs (if an NPL was risk-weighted at 35% on its Carrying 
Value), but on the other hand it is write-off of 30% of the sector's equity, and the write-off goes straight 
against that equity 1-for-1. 
A write-off of that magnitude is a bigger percentage of equity than a reduction of 3.4% in the CET1 
ratio for all banks with a CET1 ratio of 11.33% or more (3.4% divided by 30%), and that is the vast 
majority of SSM banks, given the chart on slide 4 of the SREP results pdf.  It appears that only six or 
seven institutions of the 113 have a CET1 ratio of less than 11.33%. 
So Mr Enria's statements are important in disclosing the very poor quality of the remaining NPLs that 
are even admitted to, and the method of presenting them underweights their threat to CET1 ratios.  We 
also know that securitisation, restructuring and forbearance are the main reasons for the reduction of 
NPLs down to these levels, with write-offs coming a distant fourth, and borrowers curing their arrears 
with cash barely featuring. 
The absence of any discussion of these matters by the ECB indicates the weak foundation upon which 
its supervision approach is built, not forgetting as well the degree to which its own remit is limited to 
113 credit institutions out of 4,472 in the Eurozone in December 2019.295  This is a higher percentage 
– at 2.4% - than the Bank of England's stress tests on 6 institutions out of 400 in the UK, but over 300 
of those 400 are foreign banks, and include the UK operations of institutions based in the Eurozone and 
part of the ECB's remit.  The 6 UK banks constitute a 75% share of the domestic market, whilst the 
SSM appears to address an 80% share of the Eurozone market, with the capital levels and risks in the 
other 4.363 institutions lying outside of their remit. 
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Annex 6:   
The Eurozone Liquidity Problem 
The liquidity problem extends to the functioning of the Eurozone bond market as a whole.  First, there 
is a question of the market's size.  Eurostat points to the "general government gross debt" of the 
Eurozone as being €9.9 trn.  This figure can be mistaken for the Eurozone bond market size, as it 
includes the loan debts as well as the bond debts of a subset of public sector issuers, but excludes the 
loan and bond debts of other types of public sector issuers and of all non-public entities.  A better marker 
would be the total nominal amount of the 25,000+ bond issues on the Eurosystem list of eligible 
collateral, were that to be available. 
All of the bonds in the ECB's QE portfolio of €2.6 trn should be drawn from issues on this list of eligible 
collateral.  ECB QE is a buy-and-hold portfolio:  the bonds in it have been taken out of circulation in 
the secondary market, directly reducing liquidity in those issues.  For example, the portion of QE that 
is the "Public Sector Purchase Programme" has reduced the public sector bonds in active circulation by 
around 33%, since this is the ceiling for how much of each member state's public debt can be bought 
up into the QE programme, and the ECB has reported that this threshold has been reached.  
It is opaque, though, exactly which bonds are tied up in QE, or otherwise under the control of the 
Eurozone NCBs as pledged collateral either to secure their €3.1 trn of loans to "monetary financial 
institutions" (i.e. banks), or to secure their TARGET2 debts with one another (the gross size of which 
is undisclosed).  The bonds pledged behind both programmes must perforce be on the list of eligible 
collateral.  However, only the net TARGET2 debts – after two stages of netting - are disclosed by the 
ECB, and they amount to around €1 trn.  Of course, if the Eurosystem's loans total €4.1 trn, the bonds 
pledged must exceed this amount by a factor in order to offer a security margin.  Even if the margin is 
only 3%, the combined collateral needed to secure the Eurosystem's loans is €4.2 trn – and more if the 
gross TARGET2 balances are larger than €1 trn.  Put that collateral amount together with the QE amount 
and you have €6.8 trn of bonds tied up and illiquid within the Eurosystem, leaving issues of availability 
of supply to meet the needs of the rest of the market. 
Various commentators have remarked upon liquidity problems in the Eurozone bond market.  ESMA, 
on p4 of its Working Paper 1 of 2018, noted that "Market analysts continue to point at an overall 
reduction of liquidity, at changes in the role of banks as market makers and at their willingness and 
ability to facilitate liquidity as reflected by the decrease of market makers' inventories in particular in 
the corporate bond segment."296  DWS, the German fund management group, issued a paper on the sub-
market of Covered Bonds in February 2019.297  In it they identify, on p2, the Eurosystem as the 
dominant buyer owning 40% of the supply, with the share of private investors having decreased from 
holdings in 2014 of €700 bn out of a total supply of €800 bn, to a share of €400 bn out of €700 bn now.  
They note that all the bonds in question are on the Eurosystem eligible collateral list.  The Eurosystem's 
intervention appears to have reduced the absolute market size, tied 40% of the remainder into its QE 
programme, and caused private investor interest to fall by 43%.  There is also a telling remark at the 
foot of p3:  "Anecdotal evidence suggests that…it became more difficult for potential investors to 
source bonds (at least without increasing market prices significantly)".  In other words, this sub-market 
cannot meet the legitimate investment requirements of private investors because the Eurosystem has 
squeezed them out, unless the private investors overpay to obtain supply. 
The immediate prospects for market liquidity are poor.  A deterioration is expected as a result of the 
mandatory buy-in provisions of the CSD Regulation, being implemented in 2020.  The International 
Capital Market Association (ICMA) issued an impact analysis in November 2019 on the so-called 
mandatory buy-in provisions, whose aim is to deter or punish short-selling.298  The assumption is that 
                                                     
296  ESMA Working Paper No. 1, 2018 Liquidity in fixed income markets - risk indicators and EU evidence. 
297  DWS:  Liquidity in Euro Area Bond Markets and the Market Impact of the End of Net Purchases of the App, February 
2019. 
298  ICMA "Mandatory buy-ins under CSDR and the European bond markets Impact Study", November 2019. 
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an institution has borrowed stock and then sold it, leaving their securities settlement account square but 
their balance sheet with an asset of cash, and a liability to deliver stock back to the institution they 
borrowed it from.  A mandatory – or forced - buy-in occurs in a short seller's account when an original 
lender of the stock recalls it, and/or when the seller cannot find stock to borrow.  The seller might not 
be notified before a mandatory buy-in occurred.299  The introduction of the mandatory buy-in will 
increase the risks of short-selling operations, and also, according to the graph on p5 of the ICMA study, 
cause bid-offer spreads to widen, thus deterring trading, and directly reducing liquidity.  ICMA state:  
"The new buy-in regime is expected to impact the capacity of market-makers to show offers across all 
bond subclasses, with core sovereign markets the least affected.  Again, it is the lower end of the credit 
spectrum that is most impacted, in particular illiquid IG credit and high yield".  It is noteworthy that it 
merits no comment that there is a class of Eurozone bond known as "Investment Grade illiquid" or 
"illiquid IG", as if liquidity was not a prerequisite of a security being investment grade, in normal 
markets anyway. 
Restraining or punishing short-selling has the effect of restricting the trades a market actor can 
undertake if they consider a particular bond to be over-valued, whether because the market actor has a 
certain view on the future direction of interest rates or on the credit quality of the issuer or both.  
Restricting the options available to actors whose view is that prices should go down and yields up has 
the inevitable impact of tilting the market in favour of actors who are favoured by prices going up and 
yields down.  Those are the actors who have a large inventory (the Eurosystem) or who have large 
borrowing needs (Eurozone member states).  The CSD Regulation can thus be presented by the 
European authorities as a welcome method of deterring aggressive, "Anglo-Saxon" trading practices, 
while simultaneously serving as a device for tilting the market in the authorities' own favour, a typical 
indicator of a market in which it is not safe for investors to be involved – assuming that they have the 
option not to be involved. 
The CSD Regulation – together with the Eurosystem's QE and the EU's controls on CCPs and rating 
agencies – inhibit market actors from independently assessing and pricing risk, and from carrying out 
trades and running positions reflecting their views.  In consequence prices and yields are artificially 
restrained from adjusting to market-determined levels. 
With so much supply now in the hands of the Eurosystem, and with all these inhibitors to trading and 
liquidity, the Eurozone bond market cannot now be as liquid as it was at the time of the Eurozone crisis 
in 2011-3.  There is no obvious group of private buyers who would be willing to buy up a major 
divestment of bonds from a current holder who needed to encash their bonds, least of all if the 
Eurosystem attempted to encash its QE portfolio or had to repossess and liquidate a block of pledged 
collateral. 
The putative new buyers of this stock would first have to have the cash available, and not be relying on 
raising the cash by pledging the bonds to the Eurosystem.  This conduit for financing the purchase 
would of course be closed if it was the Eurosystem that was the original seller and was looking to raise 
net cash. 
The putative new buyers of this stock would secondly have to be willing to buy the bonds at a price that 
reflected current yields or very near to them.  They would be foolish to do so if the Eurosystem was the 
seller, since the Eurosystem's actions – as the largest buyer over the past few years – would be indicative 
of a change in the direction of interest rates, and a reversal of recent market dynamics.  If the seller was 
a bank, these putative new buyers might not be willing to buy at a price that furnished the bank with the 
necessary proceeds to meet their cash needs:  this situation is the precursor to a firesale, where the seller 
has to then sell more stock, driving the price down, receiving a smaller percentage of the nominal each 
time. 
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These are the typical outcomes when a market is over-bought, as the Eurozone bond market is, and with 
one major player – the Eurosystem – having driven it there and now owning or controlling a very high 
share of the stock.  A sign that the Eurosystem is changing its stance will cause a whiplash effect, and 
all the investor interest will move to the other side, the selling side. 
The liquidity situation in the Eurozone is exacerbated by a further technicality, caused by the 
Eurosystem's policies in reducing interest rates:  seasoned bonds will have been issued with higher 
nominal interest coupons, causing the price to increase well above the nominal ("above par") in the 
meantime.  The price increases so that the yield for a buyer in the secondary market is the same as the 
yield for a buyer in the primary market, whose bond carries the current level of coupon – which will be 
near to or actually below 0%. 
With seasoned stock priced above par, tax and accounting dynamics come into play.  A given investor, 
selling such a bond, may be presented with an immediate and taxable capital gain, which they cannot 
amortise over the remaining life of the bond, because they have no bond any longer.  To avoid triggering 
that capital gain, the investor will hold the bond to maturity.  Investor selling interest in that bond 
reduces, meaning the bond's liquidity reduces.  
Another given investor, were they to buy such a bond, would pay a premium over par, and it may be  
that their accounting rules will not allow them to amortise this premium over the bond's remaining life:  
it has to be taken as a current cost, and possibly not one that is tax-deductible.  The investor will then 
not buy that bond, but wait for one whose coupon is pitched at current levels and which can be bought 
at near to par.  Investor buying interest in that bond reduces, meaning the bond's liquidity reduces. 
In both cases, these investors will not wish to trade in seasoned bonds, because of the premium at which 
they trade.  The premium has been caused by the Eurosystem's monetary policy, and this policy has 
reduced liquidity. 
The above evidence raises the suspicion that there is considerable liquidity risk within the Eurosystem, 
that certain classes of bond – ranked as HQLAs because they are on the Eurosystem list of eligible 
collateral – are actually illiquid, that other classes have become illiquid because of the Eurosystem's 
interventions, and that EU regulation threatens to reduce real liquidity still further – to the detriment of 
private investors but to the benefit of Eurozone authorities. 
This is a very serious matter if, as is made clear above, the measures taken and planned by the Eurozone 
authorities direct markets towards adopting risk assessments and trading positions that serve the 
authorities' own financial interests, and control and even punish contrary and independent trading 
positions and assessments.  This diminishes or drives out the layer of trading actors who make the 
market liquid.  In effect these independent actors are no longer allowed to act in a way that contradicts 
the financial interests of authorities, meaning the markets are no longer free markets but serve the 
interests of the state actors that supervise them. 
Liquidity is a complex concept with a number of dimensions.300  However, the bid-ask spread is often 
used as a summary measure of liquidity.  Figure 22 is derived from the graph on p5 of the ICMA's 
                                                     
300  For example, ESMA considers the following dimensions: 
Liquidity dimensions Liquidity metrics  
Tightness Bid-Ask spreads 
Roll  
Depth and Breadth Volumes traded   
Turnover ratio    
Average trade size  
Amihud illiquidity coefficient  
Resilience   Volatility spikes   
Dealer count   
Probabilities of liquidity regime 
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November 2019 mentioned earlier.301  It is likely that only sovereign core and a subset of sovereign 
periphery and supra/agency bonds can be regarded as genuinely liquid.  Indeed, a market participant 
informed us that only around 800 of the 25,000+ bonds on the ECB's eligble list can be regarded as 
liquid. 
Figure 22:  Bid-ask spreads on Eurozone bonds 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Tania De Renzis, Claudia Guagliano, Giuseppe Loiacono, Liquidity in fixed income markets –  risk indicators and 
EU evidence, ESMA Working Paper No. 1, 2018; https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma50-165-
651_wp_bond_liquidity.pdf.
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Glossary of Terms Used 
Term Meaning 
Legislation 
BRRD Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (Directive 2014/59/EU) 
CRA Regulation CRA Regulation (Regulation (EC) 1060/2009) 
CRR Capital Requirements Regulation (Regulation (EU) 575/2013) 
CSD Regulation Central Securities Depositories Regulation (Regulation (EU) 909/2014) 
EMIR European Market Infrastructure Regulation (Regulation (EU) 648/2012) 
EMIR 2.2 Regulation (EU) No 2019/2099 amending EMIR 
MiFID II Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (Directive 2014/65/EU) 
Solvency II Solvency II Directive (Directive 2009/138/EC) 
Other Definitions 
ABSPP Asset-Backed Securities Purchase Programme 
APP Asset Purchase Programme 
Basel Rules Rules on credit risk management issued by the Basel Committee 
BIS Bank of International Settlements 
BVG Bundesverfassungsgericht, the German constitutional court 
Basel Committee Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
CCF Credit Conversion Factor 
CCP Central Counterparty 
CCyB Countercyclical buffer 
CDS Credit default swap 
CET1 capital Common Equity Tier 1 capital 
CFTC Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union  
CBPP3 Covered Bond Purchase Programme 3 
CRC Country risk classification 
CSPP Corporate Sector Purchase Programme 
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Term Meaning 
D-SIB Domestic Systemically Important Banks 
EBA European Banking Authority 
ECB European Central Bank 
EDIS European deposit insurance scheme 
EEA European Economic Area 
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility 
EFSI European Fund for Strategic Investments 
EFSM European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism 
EIB European Investment Bank 
EIF European Investment Fund 
EIOPA European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
ESA European Supervisory Authority 
ESMA European Securities and Markets Authority 
ESM European Stability Mechanism 
EU European Union 
FinCen Financial Crime Enforcement Network 
FSB Financial Stability Board 
GSIFI Global Systemically Important Financial Institution 
HQLAs High-Quality Liquid Assets 
ICMA International Capital Market Association 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IRB approach Internal ratings-based approach 
LCR Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
MFF Multiannual Financial Frameworks 
MFI Monetary financial institutions 
NCBs National central banks 
NDGS national deposit guarantee scheme 
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Term Meaning 
NPLs Non-performing loans 
OMT Outright Monetary Transactions 
OPSE Other public sector entities 
O-SII Other Systemically Important Institution 
PRA Prudential Regulation Authority 
PSE Public sector entity 
PSPP Public Sector Purchase Programme 
QE programme Quantitative Easing programme 
RTGS Real-time gross settlement 
RWA Risk-weighted assets 
S&P Standard & Poor 
SRB Single Resolution Board 
SREP Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process 
SRM Single Resolution Mechanism 
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism 
TLAC Total Loss Absorbing Capacity 
UK United Kingdom 
US United States of America 
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Many people in Britain can see that the EU project has lost touch with the normal arrangements 
that govern successful western economies. But less obvious is that the zone’s financial system 
and its legal underpinnings are weak. As this analysis shows, EU law sidesteps the Basel 
standards – the international rules which protect the financial system from systemic risk. But, 
whereas the UK has until now helped to manage the risk by applying its own controls to the 
business it regulates, after Brexit much will depend on whose laws govern trade. 
Managing Euro Risk: Saving Investors from Systemic Risk explains how the problem has 
arisen. Legally the Eurozone has circumvented the Basel rules. Eurozone states can raise funds 
on the debt markets, behaving as sovereign, but in fact are ‘sub sovereign’ - and without the 
currency being backed by a single sovereign. The EU’s supra-national bodies, its central bank 
(the ECB) and investment bank (the EIB) operate under the same misassumptions. The 
problems have been exacerbated by an absence of transparent accounting practices. The upshot 
is that the Eurozone’s financial sector today is under-capitalised, under-collateralised and less 
liquid than it should be. 
The authors, Barnabas Reynolds, a UK and international financial services lawyer, David 
Blake, an academic economist and Robert Lyddon, a bank accounting and financial analyst, 
warn that the potential for systemic risk spreading to the UK or globally is grave, endangering 
businesses, savers and investors - a danger likely to become acute after Brexit. 
The authors explain how the risk can be managed and contagion contained. They propose that 
the EU should be obliged to apply the Basel and accounting standards properly, with Eurozone 
member states adopting joint-and-several liability for each other's debts. Above all, the UK 
should insist that future financial services trade with the bloc will be on an Enhanced 
Equivalence basis, with UK trade governed by UK law. If the EU refuses, the UK and US, the 
regulators of the global financial market, must take whatever steps are needed to prevent 
systemic risk. 
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